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Full-Text Articles in Business
The Impact Of Independent Directors On The Cash Conversion Cycle Of American Manufacturing Firms, John Obradovich, Amarjit Gill, Nahum Biger
The Impact Of Independent Directors On The Cash Conversion Cycle Of American Manufacturing Firms, John Obradovich, Amarjit Gill, Nahum Biger
Faculty Publications and Presentations
This study examined the impact of independent directors on the cash conversion cycle of American manufacturing firms. A sample of 189 American manufacturing firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for a period of five years (from 2009–2013) was used. The findings indicate that the presence of independent directors on the board of directors shortens the inventory period and cash conversion cycle of manufacturing firms. The study contributes to the literature on the factors that shorten the cash conversion cycle of the firm. The results may be used by financial managers and operations managers.
Board Interlocks And The Diffusion Of Disclosure Policy, Ye Cai, Dan S. Dhaliwal, Yongtae Kim, Carrie Pan
Board Interlocks And The Diffusion Of Disclosure Policy, Ye Cai, Dan S. Dhaliwal, Yongtae Kim, Carrie Pan
Accounting
We examine whether board connections through shared directors influence firm disclosure policies. To overcome endogeneity challenges, we focus on an event that represents a significant change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance. Our research design allows us to exploit the timing of director interlocks and therefore differentiate the director interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative explanations, such as endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. We find that firms are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance if they share directors with previous guidance stoppers. We also find that director-specific experience from prior …
Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen
Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen
Faculty Scholarship
Using the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated change in listing standards as a natural experiment, we find that while board independence decreases the cost of debt when credit conditions are strong or leverage low, it increases the cost of debt when credit conditions are poor or leverage high. We also document that independent directors set corporate policies that increase firm risk. These results suggest that, acting in the interest of shareholders, independent directors are increasingly costly to bondholders with the intensification of the agency conflict between these two stakeholders.
Private Equity Firms As Gatekeepers, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Private Equity Firms As Gatekeepers, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Faculty Scholarship
Notwithstanding the considerable attention private equity receives, there continues to be substantial confusion about what private equity does and whether this creates value. Calls for more aggressive regulation of the industry reflect a skeptical view of private equity as—at best—a zero-sum game, in which profits are generated only at the expense of other constituencies. The standard defense of private equity points to its corporate governance advantages as a source of value. This Article identifies an overlooked and increasingly important way in which private equity creates value: private equity firms act as gatekeepers in the debt markets. As repeat players, private …