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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Business
What Are Analysts Really Good At?, Rong Wang, Leonardo Madureira, Rong Wang, Tzachi Zach
What Are Analysts Really Good At?, Rong Wang, Leonardo Madureira, Rong Wang, Tzachi Zach
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Sell-side analysts employ different benchmarks when defining their stock recommendations. For example, a ‘buy’ for some brokers means the stock is expected to outperform its peers in the same sector (“industry benchmarkers”), while for other brokers it means the stock is expected to outperform the market (“market benchmarkers”), or just some absolute return (“total benchmarkers”). We use these benchmarks to analyze the role of stock picking, industry picking and market timing in contributing to the performance of stock recommendations. We are able to do so given that different benchmarks suggest the use of different sets of abilities. Analysis of the …
Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang
Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-to-performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.
Political Connection And Firm Value, James S. Ang, David K. Ding, Tiong Yang Thong
Political Connection And Firm Value, James S. Ang, David K. Ding, Tiong Yang Thong
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We study the effect of political connection (PC) on company value in an environment where low PC is due to better institutions and not confounded by favorable social/cultural factors. We find that in Singapore, the only country that fits this description, PC in general adds little to the value of a company. However, in industries that are subject to more stringent government regulations, PC appears to be somewhat important. Robustness checks show that alternative PC variables give rise to similar results, and the addition of control variables do not drastically change the findings. Politically connected firms have higher managerial ownership …
How Capital Structure Influences Diversification Performance: A Transaction Cost Perspective, Jonathan O'Brien, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Andrew Delios
How Capital Structure Influences Diversification Performance: A Transaction Cost Perspective, Jonathan O'Brien, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Andrew Delios
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification, but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are …
Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer
Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers.
Which Board Interlocks Matter? The Impact Of Managerial Power, Legitimacy, And Family Power On The Adoption Of Stock Option Pay, Toru Yoshikawa, Jung Wook Shim, A. Tuschke
Which Board Interlocks Matter? The Impact Of Managerial Power, Legitimacy, And Family Power On The Adoption Of Stock Option Pay, Toru Yoshikawa, Jung Wook Shim, A. Tuschke
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Inter-organizational relationships and the networks they create are an important mechanism for the transfer of knowledge and learning. Network ties enable the transfer of experiential knowledge – for instance of vicarious information through board interlocks. While we know that organizational learning occurs and is influenced by factors like the strength of ties and a firm’s position in the network, it is still unclear what causes the firm to act on the information gained through network ties. We build on prior studies on the impact of interlocking board ties ion the adoption of new practices and analyze the effects of different …
How Important Are Earnings Announcements As An Information Source?, Sudipta Basu, Truong Duong, Stanimir Markov, Eng Joo Tan
How Important Are Earnings Announcements As An Information Source?, Sudipta Basu, Truong Duong, Stanimir Markov, Eng Joo Tan
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
In a competitive information market, no single information source is likely to dominate all other sources collectively, but a single source can dominate all or most other sources individually. We explore whether earnings announcements constitute such a dominant source using Ball and Shivakumar’s R2 metric: the proportion of the variation in annual returns explained by earnings announcement returns. We find that earnings announcement R2 is 11% -- higher than the corresponding R2 of returns on days with dividend announcements, management forecasts, preannouncements, 10-K and 10-Q filings and amendments. Only the four largest realized absolute daily returns in a year match …
Social Capital, Informal Governance, And Post-Ipo Firm Performance: A Study Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry X. Cao, Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang
Social Capital, Informal Governance, And Post-Ipo Firm Performance: A Study Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry X. Cao, Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This paper explores the links between entrepreneurs' social capital and post-IPO firm performance in China's unique capital market and regulatory setting. Using hand-collected data on entrepreneurs' political connections and firm financial information, we construct original measures for various types of social capital and examine their roles in determining the accounting and financial performance of entrepreneurial firms after an IPO. On one hand, firm accounting performance is enhanced by entrepreneurs' bridging social capital, such as political connections or a willingness to share power with external investors. On the other hand, bonding social capital such as intra-group related party transactions causes performance …