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Full-Text Articles in Business

Ownership Structure And Monitoring Around Secondary Offerings, Joshua Tyler White Aug 2012

Ownership Structure And Monitoring Around Secondary Offerings, Joshua Tyler White

Doctoral Dissertations

Secondary offerings represent a unique setting to examine investors’ perception of the value of monitoring intensity around changes in block ownership. I find blockholders present at 97% of firms with a secondary offering over 1998-2006. These blockholders participate in 87% of secondary offerings and offer the majority of secondary shares in 75% of these offerings. Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of ownership structure, I empirically test two hypotheses explaining secondary offering announcement returns and underpricing based on seller heterogeneities: the information hypothesis and the monitoring hypothesis. The results largely support the monitoring hypothesis. Secondary offerings by close, active monitors who …


Cross-Listed Firms And Shareholder-Initiated Lawsuits: The Market Penalties Of Securities Class Action Lawsuits Against Foreign Firms, Kathryn Mary Schumann May 2012

Cross-Listed Firms And Shareholder-Initiated Lawsuits: The Market Penalties Of Securities Class Action Lawsuits Against Foreign Firms, Kathryn Mary Schumann

Doctoral Dissertations

This paper examines the market penalties levied by shareholders against firms that are alleged to have violated securities laws within the U.S. Using a sample of private securities class action cases brought against foreign firms that cross-list on the major U.S. exchanges, this paper presents evidence that the enforcement risk criticism may not be as severe as initially thought. I examine market penalties at alleged violation disclosure dates and securities class action filing dates and find that each event corresponds to an economically and statistically significant loss of value for the accused firm. On average I find that the violation …