Business Commons^™

The New Exit In Venture Capital, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

No abstract provided.

The Unique Benefits Of Treating Personal Goodwill As Property In Corporate Acquisitions, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

Corporate acquisition talks may not get far if buyer and seller disagree over transaction structure, which can have significant after-tax effects. But the parties may have overlooked an item that, due to its potential tax treatment, could be the key to facilitating the acquisition. That item is the selling shareholder's "personal goodwill."

Personal goodwill exists when the shareholder's reputation, expertise, or contacts gives the corporation its intrinsic value. It is most likely to be found in closely held businesses, especially those that are technical, specialized, orprofessional in nature or have few customers and suppliers. If personal goodwill is treated as …

The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior Of Angel Investors, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

No abstract provided.

Should Angel-Backed Start-Ups Reject Venture Capital?, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

The conventional wisdom is that entrepreneurs seek financing for their high-growth, high-risk start-up companies in a particular order. They begin with friends, family, and "bootstrapping" (e.g., credit card debt). Next they turn to angel investors, or accredited investors (and usually ex-entrepreneurs) who invest their own money in multiple, early-stage start-ups. Finally, after angel funds run dry, entrepreneurs seek funding from venture capitalists (VCs), whose deep pockets and connections lead the startup to an initial public offering (IPO) or sale to a larger company in the same industry (trade sale).

That conventional wisdom may have been the model for start-up success …

How Do Start-Ups Obtain Their Legal Services?, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

This Essay is the first to examine, using responses to online surveys, the use of in-house versus outside counsel by rapid-growth start-up companies. It also explores, from the vantage point of the start-up’s entrepreneur, some reasons for that choice. The Essay tests several hypotheses derived from the economic and entrepreneurship literatures about the benefits of in-house versus outside counsel in the unique context of start-up firms.

Financing The Next Silicon Valley, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

Silicon Valley’s success has led other regions to attempt their own high-tech transformations, yet most imitators have failed. Entrepreneurs may be in short supply in these “non-tech” regions, but some non-tech regions are home to high-quality entrepreneurs who relocate to Silicon Valley due to a lack of local financing for their start-ups. Non-tech regions must provide local finance to prevent entrepreneurial relocation and reap spillover benefits for their communities. This Article compares three possible sources of entrepreneurial finance—private venture capital, state-sponsored venture capital, and angel investor groups—and finds that angel groups have distinct advantages when it comes to funding innovation …

Entrepreneurs On Horseback: Reflections On The Organization Of Law, Darian M. Ibrahim, D. Gordon Smith

Darian M. Ibrahim

“Law and entrepreneurship” is an emerging field of study. Skeptics might wonder whether law and entrepreneurship is a variant of that old canard, the Law of the Horse. In this Essay, we defend law and entrepreneurship against that charge and urge legal scholars to become even more engaged in the wide-ranging scholarly discourse regarding entrepreneurship. In making our case, we argue that research at the intersection of entrepreneurship and law is distinctive. In some instances, legal rules and practices are tailored to the entrepreneurial context, and in other instances, general rules of law find novel expression in the entrepreneurial context. …

The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody

Karen Woody

This Article posits that the success of macroprudential regulation will depend on four factors. First, the economic philosophy of the central banker in charge of the domestic institution with jurisdiction over macroprudential regulation will prove crucial in the implementation of adopted regulation. If, like Chairman Greenspan, the banker is averse to the exercise of the Central Bank's regulatory oversight authority, then no amount or volume of policy or regulation will prevent or mitigate systemic risks and the accompanying shocks. Second, a sufficiently deep level of international cooperation is required to mitigate regulatory arbitrage, without being so broad that the ensuing …

The Stewardship Of Trust In The Global Value Chain, Kishanthi Parella

Kish Parella

Global governance has not yet caught up with the globalization of business. As a result, our headlines provide daily accounts of the extent and consequences of these "governance gaps." The ability of corporations to evade state control also contributes to an unusual, even frightening, phenomenon: corporations are governing like states. Some governance functions traditionally delivered by state actors are now increasingly undertaken by transnational corporations. One area that is experiencing this substitution is dispute resolution of human rights. Corporations and other business enterprises, individually or collectively, are creating a variety of grievance mechanisms to address human rights and other conflicts …

Reforming The Global Value Chain Through Transnational Private Regulation, Kishanthi Parella

Kish Parella

In many industries, corporations have changed the organization of their production from a vertically integrated model to a model that is often characterized by outsourcing-shifting business activities to external parties -and offshoring, where production occurs at sites overseas. The global value chain (GVC) for an American corporation often involves several tiers of suppliers. One end of the GVC is often occupied by a multinational buyer (MNB), such as a large brand name corporation. At the opposite end of the value chain are the factories, farms, and other production sites that supply multinational corporations with their goods. This organization of production …

State Capture, Corporate Ownership Structure, And Institutional Reform Issues In Ethiopia- Abstract.Docx, Seid Y. Hassan

Seid Hassan

Law’S Facilitating Role In The Field Of Social Enterprise., Evelyn Brody

Evelyn Brody

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Is Say On Pay All About Pay? The Impact Of Firm Performance, Jill E. Fisch, Darius Palia, Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven M. Davidoff Solomon

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandated a number of regulatory reforms including a requirement that large U.S. public companies provide their shareholders with the opportunity to cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation. The “say on pay” vote was designed to rein in excessive levels of executive compensation and to encourage boards to adopt compensation structures that tie executive pay more closely to performance. Although the literature is mixed, many studies question whether the statute has had the desired effect. Shareholders at most companies overwhelmingly approve the compensation packages, and pay levels continue to be high. Although a lack of …

How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven Davidoff Solomon

This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them. The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …

In Pursuit Of Good & Gold: Data Observations Of Employee Ownership & Impact Investment, Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, Anne M. Tucker

Anne Tucker

A startup's path to self-sustaining profitability is risky and hard, and most do not make it. Venture capital (VC) investors try to improve these odds with contractual terms that focus and sharpen employees' incentives to pursue gold. If the employees and investors expect the startup to balance the goal of profitability with another goal - the goal of good - the risks are likely to both grow and multiply. They grow to the extent that profits are threatened, and they multiply to the extent that balancing competing goals adds a dimension to the incentive problem. In this Article, we explore …

Entrepreneurs On Horseback: Reflections On The Organization Of Law, Darian M. Ibrahim, D. Gordon Smith

D. Gordon Smith

“Law and entrepreneurship” is an emerging field of study. Skeptics might wonder whether law and entrepreneurship is a variant of that old canard, the Law of the Horse. In this Essay, we defend law and entrepreneurship against that charge and urge legal scholars to become even more engaged in the wide-ranging scholarly discourse regarding entrepreneurship. In making our case, we argue that research at the intersection of entrepreneurship and law is distinctive. In some instances, legal rules and practices are tailored to the entrepreneurial context, and in other instances, general rules of law find novel expression in the entrepreneurial context. …

Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage Of Citizen Shareholders, Anne M. Tucker

Anne Tucker

In this Essay, I challenge the conventional corporate law wisdom that unhappy mutual fund investors paying high fees don’t need litigation or regulation to protect their interests because they should simply exit a fund and reinvest elsewhere. The exit solution, advanced by Professors John Morley and Quinn Curtis in Taking Exit Rights Seriously provided an elegantly simply solution to the problem of unhappy indirect investors (e.g., mutual fund investors) given that they are often low-dollar, low-incentive, rationally-apathetic investors facing enormous information asymmetries and collective action problems. According to their view, competition produced by exit, or the threat of exit, is …

Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Lubomir P. Litov

The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors. This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, …

The Corporate Conspiracy Vacuum (Formerly "Corporate Conspiracy: How Not Calling A Conspiracy A Conspiracy Is Warping The Law On Corporate Wrongdoing"), J.S. Nelson

J.S. Nelson

An Efficiency-Based Explanation For Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.

Kenneth Ayotte

No abstract provided.

Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, Christopher Geczy, Jessica Jeffers, David Musto, Anne Tucker

Anne Tucker

Institutional investors, with trillions in assets under management, hold increasingly important stakes in public companies and fund individual retirement for many Americans, making institutional investors’ behaviors and preferences paramount determinants of capital allocations and the economy. In this paper, we examine high fiduciary duty institutions' (HFDIs') response to decreased profit maximization pressure as measured by the effect of constituency statutes on HFDI investment. We ask this question, in part, to anticipate HFDIs’ response to alternative purpose firms, like benefit corporations. Only with access to institutional investors’ capital can alternative purpose firms gain economic significance to rival the purely for-profit corporation. …

Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Charles K Whitehead

The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors. This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, …

On The Nature Of Corporations, Lynn A. Stout

Lynn A. Stout

Legal experts traditionally distinguish corporations from unincorporated business forms by focusing on corporate characteristics like limited shareholder liability, centralized management, perpetual life, and free transferability of shares. While such approaches have value, this essay argues that the nature of the corporation can be better understood by focusing on a fifth, often-overlooked, characteristic of corporations: their capacity to "lock in" equity investors' initial capital contributions by making it far more difficult for those investors to subsequently withdraw assets from the firm. Like a tar pit, a corporation is much easier for equity investors to get into, than to get out of. …

Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence On Why Investors In Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, Lynn A. Stout

Lynn A. Stout

This Article evaluates two possible explanations for why shareholders of public corporations tolerate board control of corporate assets and outputs: the widely accepted monitoring hypothesis, which posits that shareholders rely on boards primarily to control the "agency costs" associated with turning day-to-day control over the firm over to self-interested corporate executives, and the mediating hypothesis, which posits that shareholders also seek to "tie their own hands" by ceding control to directors as a means of attracting the extracontractual, firm-specific investments of such stakeholder groups as executives, creditors, and rank-and- file employees. Part I reviews each hypothesis and concludes that each …

Iniciativas Legais Para O Desenvolvimento Da Governança Corporativa No Mercado Financeiro E De Capitais Brasileiro, Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago

Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago Mr.

The study of Corporate Governance is of utmost importance for the development of transparency and ethics in the conduct of public and private institutions activities. Corporate governance has been important for the development of relations between the shareholder and the senior management of companies, employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, Regulators and the community as a whole. The study of such practice goes beyond legal issues and also involves economic analysis and policy for discussing the best strategy to ensure the return on investment or consideration, in the case of public service. The Financial and Capital Market are industries …

Determining A Partner's Share Of Unrealized Receivables At The Liquidation Of The Partner's Interest, Stephen Utz

Stephen Gerard Utz

Partnership law allows partners great freedom to vary the terms on which they share partnership profits from different sources. Partnership tax law, however, seems to presume, for purposes of the collapsible partner rules, that partners will share the revenue from the collection of receivables always in proportion to the value of their partnership interests. This counterfactual presumption exposes both the government and partner/taxpayers to unfortunate consequences. A substance-over-form approach to the attribution of unrealized receivables would certainly be unworkable, because too costly and intrusive to administer. Something between substance-over form and form-over-substance would best implement the policy of Subchapter K …

Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff

Steven Davidoff Solomon

Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …

A Alienação Fiduciária De Ações Nas Operações De M&A, Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago

Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago Mr.

The need to establish mechanisms, in particular, laws that guarantee a return to the investor, or rather a quick fix that will sustain if the default is a global trend. In seeking to balance this scale, increasing investment and guaranteed security to investors, the Brazilian legislature has innovated. The Fiduciary Alienation is a secured guarantee that resulted from this innovation, having the scope of developing a more trustable funding on the financial and capital markets. The present article will analyze the legality of stocks’ fiduciary alienation in operations of Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”) in light of the different legal applicable …

Planificación Sucesoria Y Patrimonial En La Empresa Familiar, Carlos Molina Sandoval

Carlos Molina Sandoval

Una de las causas de la desaparición de un número importante de empresas familiares se vincula con las dificultades en la sucesión familiar y en la toma de ciertas decisiones por parte del fundador y sus sucesores. Se trata de una decisión que toda empresa familiar, tarde o temprano, debe enfrentar si es que la empresa tiene vocación de continuidad más allá del fundador y que los sucesores deberán afrontar en un futuro (aun cuando se haya hecho sin la planificación adecuada). El proceso de sucesión, tanto en la propiedad como en la gestión de la empresa familiar, origina sus …