Business Commons^™

Palm Papers, Nicole Rothwell

Capstones

The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) came into possession of a secret dataset of property owners of the Palm Islands, the elite high-end artificial islands on the coast of Dubai.

With over 250 neighborhoods on Dubai’s waterfront, a group of journalists around the world has been investigating who these individuals are that can afford the posh and pricey real estate. While most fall into the uber-rich category, some also have corrupt to criminal backgrounds leading to questions such as if the Palm Islands are truly a real-estate paradise, or instead a refuge for the corrupt.

The task for …

The Seventeenth Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center, Caroline M. Gentile, The Honorable Karen L. Valihura

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Venture Capital Contract Design: An Empirical Analysis Of The Connection Between Bargaining Power And Venture Financing Contract Terms, Spencer Williams

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Article presents an empirical analysis of the connection between bargaining power and contract design using an original dataset of over 5,500 equity and debt venture financings from 2004–2015. Using the total supply of venture capital in the U.S. as a measure of relative bargaining power between entrepreneurs and investors, this Article finds that venture capital supply has a statistically significant relationship with price and non-price terms in both equity and debt financings. These results contradict one of three theoretical accounts of bargaining power and support the other two.

Proxy Access And Optimal Standardization In Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Reilly S. Steel

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

According to the conventional wisdom, “one size does not fit all” in corporate governance. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their governance needs, implying that the optimal corporate governance structure must also vary from firm to firm. This one-size-does-not-fit-all axiom has featured prominently in arguments against numerous corporate law regulatory initiatives, including the SEC’s failed Rule 14a-11—an attempt to impose mandatory, uniform “proxy access” on all public companies—which the D.C. Circuit struck down for inadequate cost–benefit analysis.

This Article presents an alternative theory as to the role of standardization in corporate governance—in which investors prefer standardized terms—and empirical …

A Novel Approach To Defining "Whistleblower" In Dodd-Frank, Ian A. Engoron

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Following the Financial Crisis of 2008, trust in the financial industry was at an all-time low as the American taxpayer was forced to bailout the very same institutions responsible for their suffering. In response, Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 2010 to ensure another crisis like 2008 never happen again. Section 78u-6 of the Act provides incentives and protections for whistleblowers who report violations of securities laws. In recent years there has been a divide among circuit courts over the question of whether employees who report violations internally to their bosses—and not directly to the SEC—are protected by the Act. Currently, the …

Distributive Justice And Donative Intent, Alexander Boni-Saenz

All Faculty Scholarship

The inheritance system is beset by formalism. Probate courts reject wills on technicalities and refuse to correct obvious drafting mistakes by testators. These doctrines lead to donative errors, or outcomes that are not in line with the decedent’s donative intent. While scholars and reformers have critiqued the intent-defeating effects of formalism in the past, none have examined the resulting distribution of donative errors and connected it to broader social and economic inequalities. Drawing on egalitarian theories of distributive justice, this Article develops a novel critique of formalism in the inheritance law context. The central normative claim is that formalistic wills …

Who Bleeds When The Wolves Bite? A Flesh-And-Blood Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism And Our Strange Corporate Governance System, Leo E. Strine Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the effects of hedge fund activism and so-called wolf pack activity on the ordinary human beings—the human investors—who fund our capital markets but who, as indirect of owners of corporate equity, have only limited direct power to ensure that the capital they contribute is deployed to serve their welfare and in turn the broader social good.

Most human investors in fact depend much more on their labor than on their equity for their wealth and therefore care deeply about whether our corporate governance system creates incentives for corporations to create and sustain jobs for them. And because …

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

William & Mary Law Review

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.

You Can’T Stop What You Can’T See: Complementary Risk Mitigation Through Compensation Disclosure, Matt Reeder

William & Mary Business Law Review

Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires regulators to help prevent the next financial crisis by monitoring executive compensation arrangements to prevent them from becoming excessive or leading to “material financial loss.” A now-pending rule seeks to do just this. This Article argues that the rule is well-conceived inasmuch as it limits the total portion of compensation that can be based on risk-inducing incentives, ties incentive-based compensation to longer-term performance, places a ceiling on potential incentivebased earnings, provides for downward adjustment and clawbacks, prohibits many hedging behaviors, and institutionalizes governance mechanisms and oversight policies. But, by placing a number of …

The Costs Of Bailouts In The 2007-08 Financial Crisis, Xiaoxi Liu

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The 2007-08 bailout programs were initially created under the emergent situation of financial crisis. Despite their effectiveness in stopping the collapse of financial system, those bailouts have been criticized as ill-planned governmental intervention. Nonetheless, based on the calculation of both the dollar amount of return and the rate of return of each program, this Comment argues that the bailouts are in fact good investments. Furthermore, since Dodd-Frank was invented with the primary purpose of curtailing future bailouts, this Comment also argues that Dodd-Frank reflected an unwise, overhasty decision by Congress.

Quasi-Appraisal: Appraising Breach Of Duty Of Disclosure Claims Following "Cash-Out" Mergers In Delaware, Zachary A. Paiva

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

In recent years, Delaware has served as the hot bed for the dramatic increase in merger appraisal litigation and the proliferation of “appraisal arbitrage” whereby opportunistic shareholders buy into companies following merger announcements and challenge announced deal prices as an investment strategy. While this has not always proved profitable, it has increased scrutiny over the Delaware appraisal regime and the ability for shareholders to avail themselves of the opportunity for a judicial valuation of their shares. Furthermore, it has highlighted information asymmetries in which controlling shareholders, particularly those seeking to cash out their minority shareholders, are incentivized to underpay or …

Off The Chain! A Guide To Blockchain Derivatives Markets And The Implications On Systemic Risk, Ryan Surujnath

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Blockchains are publicly viewable and theoretically unalterable records of bitcoin transactions. They are thus crucial to the functionality of cryptocurrencies. Through the blockchain, bitcoin algorithmically decentralizes the maintenance of the transaction ledger and delegates the task to users on its network.

Blockchain technology shows promise beyond cryptocurrency: banking and financial institutions have established partnerships with fintech firms to explore the applicability of blockchains in capital markets. Blockchains, used in conjunction with self-executing smartcontracts, present particularly compelling opportunities in derivatives markets, which are typically beset by numerous intermediaries. The blockchain could radically reinvent the existing market infrastructure. Certain intermediaries like central …

Regulating A Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes To Smart Regulation, Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Janos N. Barberis, Douglas W. Arner

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Prior to the global financial crisis, financial innovation was viewed very positively, resulting in a laissez-faire, deregulatory approach to financial regulation. Since the crisis the regulatory pendulum has swung to the other extreme. Post-crisis regulation, plus rapid technological change, have spurred the development of financial technology (FinTech). FinTech firms and data-driven financial service providers profoundly challenge the current regulatory paradigm. Financial regulators increasingly seek to balance the traditional regulatory objectives of financial stability and consumer protection with promoting growth and innovation. The resulting regulatory innovations include RegTech, regulatory sandboxes, and special charters. This Article analyzes possible new regulatory approaches, ranging …

The Big Patent Short: Hedge Fund Challenges To Pharmaceutical Patents And The Need For Financial Regulation, Ariel D. Multak

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The enactment of the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011 ushered in a new system for post-grant patent review. In the interest of enhancing the efficiency of the patent regime by invalidating “bad” patents, certain requirements were relaxed. For example, the AIA created an examination process called inter partes review, which allows a party without legal standing to challenge the validity of a patent in front of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. In the pharmaceutical patent context, it was expected that inter partes review would be utilized mostly by generic drug makers seeking to invalidate patents without incurring the …

Is The Dodd-Frank Act Destroying What Is Left Of U.S. Thrifts?, Scott Deacle

Business and Economics Faculty Publications

I examine data from 1992 to 2015 to assess the Dodd-Frank Act’s impact on the performance of U.S. depository institutions, thrifts in particular. Ceteris paribus, the average FDIC-regulated institution experienced a decline in profitability as measured by pre-tax return on assets (ROA) following the Act’s passage, but the decline was concentrated among commercial banks. Small thrifts increased pre-tax profitability, after controlling for other factors including weak economic growth. Depository institution loan quality improved after Dodd-Frank, less so for small thrifts but more so for large thrifts. Efficiency ratios, which regulatory costs affect, increased, more for thrifts than banks.

Benchmark Regulation, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

Benchmarks are metrics that are deeply embedded in the financial markets. They are essential to the efficient functioning of the markets and are used in a wide variety of ways—from pricing oil to setting interest rates for consumer lending to valuing complex financial instruments. In recent years, benchmarks have also been at the epicenter of numerous, multi-year market manipulation scandals. Oil traders, for example, deliberately execute trades to drive benchmarks lower artificially, allowing the traders to capitalize on the manipulated benchmarks. This ensures that later trades relying on the benchmarks will be more profitable than they otherwise would have been. …

Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, And Corporate Responsibility, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Domestic and international regulatory efforts to prevent another financial crisis have been converging on the idea of trying to end the problem of “too big to fail”—that systemically important financial firms take excessive risks because they profit from success and are (or at least, expect to be) bailed out by government money to avoid failure. The legal solutions being advanced to control this morally hazardous behavior tend, however, to be inefficient, ineffective, or even dangerous—such as breaking up firms and limiting their size, which can reduce economies of scale and scope; or restricting central bank authority to bail out failing …

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.

Choice-Of-Law Rules For Secured Transactions: An Interest-Based And Modern Principles-Based Framework For Assessment, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay examines the law applicable to secured transactions. It addresses in particular the codification of the choice-of-law rules for secured transactions (STCOL rules). These rules address the laws applicable to the creation, perfection, priority, and enforcement of security interests (security rights)—a form of legislative or statutory dépeçage. It draws on the 2016 UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions (Model Law) as well as relevant North American law (Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 and the Canadian provincial Personal Property Security Acts). The STCOL rules lie at the heart of the emerged and emerging modern principles of secured transactions law …

Controlling Systemic Risk Through Corporate Governance, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Most of the regulatory measures to control excessive risk taking by systemically important firms are designed to reduce moral hazard and to align the interests of managers and investors. These measures may be flawed because they are based on questionable assumptions. Excessive corporate risk taking is, at its core, a corporate governance problem. Shareholder primacy requires managers to view the consequences of their firm’s risk taking only from the standpoint of the firm and its shareholders, ignoring harm to the public. In governing, managers of systemically important firms should also consider public harm. This proposal engages the long-standing debate whether …

Immovable-Associated Equipment Under The Draft Mac Protocol: A Sui Generis Challenge For The Cape Town Convention, Benjamin Von Bodungen, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

UNIDROIT is in the process of adopting a fourth Protocol under the umbrella of the Cape Town Convention, the MAC Protocol, which will cover mining, agricultural and construction equipment. This article addresses a challenge faced by the MAC Protocol that was not encountered in the development of the previous Protocols - the potential for MAC equipment to be associated with immovable property in ways that result in the holder of an interest in the immovable property acquiring an interest in the associated MAC equipment under the law of the State in which the immovable property is located. The article first …