Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Business Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Business

Retail Investors And Corporate Governance: Evidence From Zero-Commission Trading, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee Feb 2024

Retail Investors And Corporate Governance: Evidence From Zero-Commission Trading, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

Law & Economics Working Papers

We examine the effects of the sudden abolition of trading commissions by major online brokerages in 2019, which lowered stock market entry costs for retail investors, on corporate governance. Firms already popular with retail investors experienced positive abnormal returns around the abolition of commissions. Firms with positive abnormal returns in response to commission-free trading subsequently saw a decrease in institutional ownership, a decrease in shareholder voting, and a deterioration in environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) metrics. Finally, these firms were more likely to adopt bylaw amendments to reduce the percentage of shares needed for a quorum at shareholder meetings. …


Pricing Corporate Governance, Albert Choi Dec 2023

Pricing Corporate Governance, Albert Choi

Articles

Scholars and practitioners have long theorized that by penalizing firms with unattractive governance features, the stock market incentivizes firms to adopt the optimal governance structure at their initial public offerings (IPOs). This theory, however, does not seem to match with practice. Not only do many IPO firms offer putatively suboptimal governance arrangements, such as staggered boards and dual-class structures, but these arrangements have been gaining popularity among IPO firms. This Article argues that the IPO market is unlikely to provide the necessary discipline to incentivize companies to adopt the optimal governance package. In particular, when the optimal governance package differs …


Meme Corporate Governance, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee May 2023

Meme Corporate Governance, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

Law & Economics Working Papers

Can retail investors revolutionize corporate governance and make public companies more responsive to social concerns? The U.S. stock market offered an unusual experiment to test the impact of retail investors in 2021, when there was a dramatic influx of retail investors into the shareholder base of companies such as GameStop and AMC. The meme surge phenomenon elicited a variety of reactions from scholars and practitioners. While some worried that affected companies’ share prices were becoming disjointed from their financial fundamentals, others predicted that retail shareholders will reduce the power of large institutional investors and democratize corporate governance. This Article presents …


The Meme Stock Frenzy: Origins And Implications, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee Apr 2023

The Meme Stock Frenzy: Origins And Implications, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

Law & Economics Working Papers

In 2021, several publicly traded companies, such as GameStop and AMC, became “meme stocks,” experiencing a sharp rise in their stock prices through a dramatic influx of retail investors into their shareholder base. Analyses of the meme stock surge and its implications for corporate governance have focused on the idiosyncratic creation of online communities around particular stocks during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this Article, we argue that the emergence of meme stocks is part of longer-running digital transformations in trading, investing, and governance. On the trading front, the sudden abolition of commissions by major online brokerages in 2019 reduced entry …


Learning To Manipulate A Financial Benchmark, Megan Shearer, Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Michael P. Wellman Jan 2022

Learning To Manipulate A Financial Benchmark, Megan Shearer, Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Michael P. Wellman

Law & Economics Working Papers

Financial benchmarks estimate market values or reference rates used in a wide variety of contexts, but are often calculated from data generated by parties who have incentives to manipulate these benchmarks. Since the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) scandal in 2011, market participants, scholars, and regulators have scrutinized financial benchmarks and the ability of traders to manipulate them.

We study the impact on market welfare of manipulating transaction-based benchmarks in a simulated market environment. Our market consists of a single benchmark manipulator with external holdings dependent on the benchmark, and numerous background traders unaffected by the benchmark. We explore two …