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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Business
Message In Mortgage: What Dodd-Frank's 'Qualified Mortgage' Tells Us About Ourselves, David Reiss
Message In Mortgage: What Dodd-Frank's 'Qualified Mortgage' Tells Us About Ourselves, David Reiss
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The New Exit In Venture Capital, Darian M. Ibrahim
The New Exit In Venture Capital, Darian M. Ibrahim
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
A Floating Nav For Money Market Funds: Fix Or Fantasy?, Jill E. Fisch, Eric D. Roiter
A Floating Nav For Money Market Funds: Fix Or Fantasy?, Jill E. Fisch, Eric D. Roiter
All Faculty Scholarship
The announcement by the Reserve Primary Fund, in September 2008, that it was “breaking the buck,” triggered a widespread withdrawal of assets from other money market funds and led the U.S. Government to adopt emergency measures to maintain the stability of the short term credit markets. In light of these events, the SEC heightened the regulatory requirements to which money market funds – a three trillion dollar industry -- are subject. Regulators and commentators continue to press for further regulatory change, however. The most controversial reform proposal would eliminate the ability of money market funds to purchase and sell shares …
A Dialogue On The Costs And Benefits Of Automatic Stays For Derivatives And Repurchase Agreements, Darrell Duffie, David A. Skeel Jr.
A Dialogue On The Costs And Benefits Of Automatic Stays For Derivatives And Repurchase Agreements, Darrell Duffie, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
For nearly two years, the two of us have had a running discussion of the costs and benefits of automatic stays in bankruptcy for qualified financial contracts (QFCs) such as derivatives and repurchase agreements, particularly those held by systemically important major dealer banks. Under current U.S. bankruptcy law, these contracts are exempted from the automatic stay. The advantages and disadvantages of this treatment have been a matter of significant debate for the past decade, particularly since the 2008 crisis.
After some background on AFCs and automatic stays, we provide our joint analysis of the costs and benefits of stays on …
Transaction Consistency And The New Finance In Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr., Thomas Jackson
Transaction Consistency And The New Finance In Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr., Thomas Jackson
All Faculty Scholarship
Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act last summer, derivatives and repurchase agreements (“repos”) were largely unregulated outside of bankruptcy, and also were exempted from core bankruptcy provisions such as the automatic stay, which prevents creditors from seizing collateral or attempting to collect what they are owed. The Dodd-Frank Act now extensively regulates derivatives outside of bankruptcy, but it left their special treatment in bankruptcy completely untouched.
There is a gap in the debate over this special treatment. To date, neither scholars nor the derivatives industry have fully analyzed the key counterfactual: what would happen if derivatives and repos …
Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, The Evidence, And The Enduring Tension Between "Lumpers" And "Splitters", John C. Coffee Jr.
Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, The Evidence, And The Enduring Tension Between "Lumpers" And "Splitters", John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
This article argues that dispersed ownership resulted less from inexorable forces and more from private ordering. Neither legal nor political conditions mandated or prevented the appearance of dispersed ownership. Rather, entrepreneurs, investment bankers, and investors — all seeking to maximize value — sometimes saw reasons why selling control into the public market would maximize value for them. But when and why? That is the article's focus. It argues that law played less of a role than specialized intermediaries — investment banks, securities exchanges, and other agents — who found it to be in their self-interest to foster dispersed ownership and …