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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Business
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac-Module B: Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, Daniel Thompson
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac-Module B: Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, Daniel Thompson
Journal of Financial Crises
On September 6, 2008, as part of a four-part government intervention, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) took into conservatorship the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that dominated the US secondary mortgage market. Concurrently, the FHFA, as conservator, entered into Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (SPSPAs) with Treasury, under which Treasury committed to provide funding to ensure the GSEs’ positive net worth. In return, Treasury received senior preferred stock and a warrant to purchase 79.9% of the GSEs’ common stock. The SPSPAs have been amended three …
Solvency As A Fundamental Constraint On Lolr Policy For Independent Central Banks: Principles, History, Law, Sir Paul M. W. Tucker
Solvency As A Fundamental Constraint On Lolr Policy For Independent Central Banks: Principles, History, Law, Sir Paul M. W. Tucker
Journal of Financial Crises
This paper follows up earlier work advocating a principled modernization of doctrines for central bank lender-of-last-resort policies and operations. It argues for a new Fundamental Constraint on such authorities: namely, “the principle that central banks should not lend to firms that they know (or should know) to be fundamentally bust or broken.” Tucker supports this with commentary from various peers, a review of principles underlying bankruptcy law and resolution schemes, and by deconstructing other common counterarguments. Centrally, he argues that when central banks breach the Fundamental Constraint, they distribute resources to short-term creditors at the expense of longer-term creditors, …
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
During 2008-09, the federal government extended multiple guarantee programs in an effort to restore the financial market and contain the panic and crisis in the market. For example, the Treasury provided a temporary guarantee program for the money market funds, the FDIC decided to stand behind certain debts and non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, and the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve agreed to share losses in certain assets belonging to Citigroup. This case reviews these guarantee programs implemented during the global financial crisis by the government and explores the different rationale that shaped certain design features of each program.
The Legal Authorities Framing The Government’S Response To The Global Financial Crisis, Scott G. Alvarez Esq., Thomas C. Baxter Jr., Esq., Robert F. Hoyt Esq.
The Legal Authorities Framing The Government’S Response To The Global Financial Crisis, Scott G. Alvarez Esq., Thomas C. Baxter Jr., Esq., Robert F. Hoyt Esq.
Journal of Financial Crises
The 2007–09 global financial crisis required that the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation survey their various legal authorities and consider how they might be used to mitigate the meltdown of the United States financial system. This essay explores the range of legal authorities and procedural issues presented by key facilities implemented during the crisis, many of which were new and creative. This essay also provides valuable examples of how such authorities were used and describes how, in some instances, agencies worked together to design innovative interventions that no separate agency could have achieved alone.
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
As a global financial service provider, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is supervised by banking regulatory agencies in different countries. Bruno Iksil, the derivatives trader primarily responsible for the $6 billion trading loss in 2012, was based in JPM’s London office. This office was regulated both by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of the United States (US) and by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which served as the sole regulator of all financial services in the United Kingdom (UK). Banking regulators in the US and the UK have entered into agreements with one another to define basic parameters …
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In December 2013, the primary United States financial regulatory agencies jointly adopted final rules to implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which is often referred to as the “Volcker Rule”. Section 619 prohibits banks from engaging in activities considered to be particularly risky, including proprietary trading and owning hedge funds or private equity funds. Banking regulators designed the final rule against proprietary trading in part to prevent losses like the $6 billion London Whale loss that took place in 2012 at JPMorgan Chase. Given the controversial nature of the Volcker Rule, it is …
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures, Arwin G. Zeissler, Giulio Girardi, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures, Arwin G. Zeissler, Giulio Girardi, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
On April 13, 2012, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) Chief Financial Officer Douglas Braunstein took part in a conference call to discuss the bank’s first quarter 2012 earnings. Coming just a week after media reports first questioned the risks taken by JPM derivatives trader Bruno Iksil, Braunstein made a series of assertions about the trades. On May 10, JPM finalized its first quarter financial results, which included some disclosures regarding Iksil’s trading that were substantially different from Braunstein’s statements of April 13. At issue is whether the regulatory filings on April 13 and May 10, as well as verbal comments by Braunstein …
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
As a diversified financial service provider and the largest United States bank holding company, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is supervised by multiple regulatory agencies. JPM’s commercial bank subsidiaries hold a national charter and therefore are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Since the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO) invested the surplus deposits of JPM’s commercial bank units, the OCC was also CIO’s primary regulator. During the critical period from late January through March 2012, when CIO traders undertook the failed derivatives strategy that ultimately cost the bank $6 billion, JPM did not provide the OCC with …
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Value at Risk (VaR) is one of the most commonly used ways to measure and monitor market risk. At JPMorgan Chase (JPM), very large derivative positions established by Bruno Iksil in the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) caused the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO) to exceed its VaR limit for four days in a row in January 2012. In response, the CIO changed to a new VaR model on January 30, which appeared to immediately reduce VaR by half. However, JPM soon discovered that this new VaR model had not been properly implemented and the bank went back to using the …
Lessons Learned: Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Esq., Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Esq., Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Baxter, who was General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the crisis, gives us his take on how best to prepare for future crises.