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Accounting

Selected Works

Gordon Potter

Selected Works

Moral hazard

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An Empirical Analysis Of Continuing Improvements Following The Implementation Of A Performance-Based Compensation Plan, Rajiv D. Banker, Seok-Young Lee, Gordon S. Potter, Dhinu Srinivasan Sep 2016

An Empirical Analysis Of Continuing Improvements Following The Implementation Of A Performance-Based Compensation Plan, Rajiv D. Banker, Seok-Young Lee, Gordon S. Potter, Dhinu Srinivasan

Gordon Potter

Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and/or because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees’ performance declines before they leave the firm.