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Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li
Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the …
Bonding To The Improved Disclosure Environment In The Us: Firms Listing Choices And Their Capital Market Consequences, Ole-Kristian Hope, Tony Kang, Yoonseok Zang
Bonding To The Improved Disclosure Environment In The Us: Firms Listing Choices And Their Capital Market Consequences, Ole-Kristian Hope, Tony Kang, Yoonseok Zang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This paper examines whether the current reporting and disclosure requirements for foreign registrants in the United States affect foreign firms' decisions to list on a U.S. exchange. We find that while firms from a weak disclosure environment are more likely to cross-list and either trade over-the-counter or be placed privately among institutional investors, they are less likely to list on an exchange in which firms are required to comply with U.S. GAAP. This is consistent with the idea that the decrease in the potential private control benefits accruing to managers discourages them from listing on an organized exchange. We further …