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Fishy Business: Regulatory And Enforcement Challenges Of Transnational Organised Iuu Fishing Crimes, Andrea A. Stefanus, John A.E. Vervaele
Fishy Business: Regulatory And Enforcement Challenges Of Transnational Organised Iuu Fishing Crimes, Andrea A. Stefanus, John A.E. Vervaele
Security Research Hub Reports
The article aims to find the answer on the main question of how can the criminalisation of IUU fishing, especially when committed by OCGs, under suppression conventions tackle the deficits of regulations and enforcement at the international and national levels? These deficits have origin in the limited prescription by international fisheries instruments and a large autonomy and discretion of states leading to substantive divergent policies, legal framework and practices at the national level. Further, the actual international fisheries instruments do not provide for regulatory and enforcement solutions in relation to the involvement of OCGs in IUU fishing. We argue that …
Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation When Agents Learn And Adapt, Andres Gonzalez Lira, Ahmed Musfiq Mobarak
Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation When Agents Learn And Adapt, Andres Gonzalez Lira, Ahmed Musfiq Mobarak
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Attempts to curb undesired behavior through regulation gets complicated when agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. We test a model of enforcement with learning and adaptation, by auditing vendors selling illegal fish in Chile in a randomized controlled trial, and tracking them daily using mystery shoppers. Conducting audits on a predictable schedule and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency is less effective, as agents learn to take advantage of loopholes. A consumer information campaign proves to be almost as cost-effective and curbing illegal sales, and obviates the need for complex monitoring and policing. The Chilean government subsequently chooses to scale up this …
Enforcing Regulation Under Illicit Adaptation, Andrés González Lira, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak
Enforcing Regulation Under Illicit Adaptation, Andrés González Lira, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Attempts to curb illegal activity by enforcing regulations gets complicated when agents react to the new regulatory regime in unanticipated ways to circumvent enforcement. We present a research strategy that uncovers such reactions, and permits program evaluation net of such adaptive behaviors. Our interventions were designed to reduce over-fishing of the critically endangered Pacific hake by either (a) monitoring and penalizing vendors that sell illegal fish or (b) discouraging consumers from purchasing using an information campaign. Vendors attempt to circumvent the ban through hidden sales and other means, which we track using mystery shoppers. Instituting random monitoring visits are much …
Addressing Corruption In Pacific Islands Fisheries: A Report/Prepared For Iucn Profish Law Enforcement, Corruption And Fisheries Project, Ben M. Tsamenyi, Quentin A. Hanich
Addressing Corruption In Pacific Islands Fisheries: A Report/Prepared For Iucn Profish Law Enforcement, Corruption And Fisheries Project, Ben M. Tsamenyi, Quentin A. Hanich
Quentin Hanich
No abstract provided.
Enforcement Cooperation In Combating Illegal And Unauthorized Fishing: An Assessment Of Contemporary Practice, Stuart Kaye
Enforcement Cooperation In Combating Illegal And Unauthorized Fishing: An Assessment Of Contemporary Practice, Stuart Kaye
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)
The emergence of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the 1970s placed potentially vast areas of the sea under national jurisdiction. Moving from relatively modest territorial seas close to the coast as the only basis of fisheries jurisdiction for States, the international community suddenly embraced a new form of jurisdiction over resources that extended fisheries up to 200 nautical miles from land. This extension brought over one third of the world's oceans, or, more importantly, approximately 90% of the world's wild fish catch, under national jurisdiction.
Addressing Corruption In Pacific Islands Fisheries: A Report/Prepared For Iucn Profish Law Enforcement, Corruption And Fisheries Project, Ben M. Tsamenyi, Quentin A. Hanich
Addressing Corruption In Pacific Islands Fisheries: A Report/Prepared For Iucn Profish Law Enforcement, Corruption And Fisheries Project, Ben M. Tsamenyi, Quentin A. Hanich
Professor Ben M Tsamenyi
No abstract provided.
Prompt Release Procedures And The Challenge For Fisheries Law Enforcement: The Judgement Of The International Tribunal For The Law Of The Sea In The 'Volga' Case (Russian Federation V Australia), Warwick Gullett
Warwick Gullett
On 23 December 2002, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ('ITLOS') ordered the prompt release of the Russian 1ongline fishing vessel Volga, at the time detained by Australian authorities in Fremantle, upon the posting of a bond or other security of A$l 920 000. The Volga was arrested for allegedly fishing without authorisation by a boarding party from the Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Canberra in the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone ('EEZ') surrounding Heard and McDonald Islands in the Southern Ocean on 7 Februarv 2002. At issue in the ITLOS proceedings was not whether the activities of …
Regulatory Compliance In Small-Scale Fisheries In Old Providence Island (Colombia), Laura Maria Alayon
Regulatory Compliance In Small-Scale Fisheries In Old Providence Island (Colombia), Laura Maria Alayon
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
This research evaluates how contextual variables such as knowledge of the rules, the perception about punishment and formal enforcement levels, perception of social control, fishers’ attitudes about legitimacy of rules, and social/economic factors, affect compliance with fisheries regulations. The analysis is carried out in Old Providence Island [OPI]. A survey of 100 fishermen was completed and data from that survey is used to econometrically estimate a model of compliance choices. Results suggest that reports on compliance change depending whether the interviewed is asked about compliance or about violation. I argue that this seemingly inconsistency, reveals an implication on methodological approach. …
Joining Forces To Combat Crime In The Maritime Domain: Cooperative Maritime Surveillance And Enforcement In The South Pacific Region, Robin M. Warner
Joining Forces To Combat Crime In The Maritime Domain: Cooperative Maritime Surveillance And Enforcement In The South Pacific Region, Robin M. Warner
Faculty of Law - Papers (Archive)
The South Pacific as a region has far more ocean space than land territory. The majority of small island States in the South Pacific are heavily dependent on the sea for their resources and livelihoods. While militaries in our region have recently been focussed on resolving the civil disorder generated by political unrest on land, in locations such as Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Fiji, navies have also had prevalent maritime law enforcement roles in the region, both advisory and operational, for several decades. Threats to the security of the region from crime in the maritime domain will continue to arise …
Addressing Corruption In Pacific Islands Fisheries: A Report/Prepared For Iucn Profish Law Enforcement, Corruption And Fisheries Project, Ben M. Tsamenyi, Quentin A. Hanich
Addressing Corruption In Pacific Islands Fisheries: A Report/Prepared For Iucn Profish Law Enforcement, Corruption And Fisheries Project, Ben M. Tsamenyi, Quentin A. Hanich
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)
No abstract provided.
The Regulatory Choice Of Noncompliance In Emissions Trading Programs, John K. Stranlund
The Regulatory Choice Of Noncompliance In Emissions Trading Programs, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This paper addresses the following question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target? The total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs, monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Under common assumptions, I show that allowing noncompliance is cost-effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty. However, one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal …
Risk Aversion And Compliance In Markets For Pollution Control, John K. Stranlund
Risk Aversion And Compliance In Markets For Pollution Control, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on compliance choices in markets for pollution control. A firm’s decision to be compliant or not is independent of its manager’s risk preference. However, noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower violations than otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers. The violations of noncompliant firms with risk averse managers are independent of differences in their benefits from emissions and their initial allocations of permits if and only if their managers’ utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. However, firm-level characteristics do impact violation choices when managers have coefficients of absolute …
Risk Aversion And Compliance In Markets For Pollution Control, John K. Stranlund
Risk Aversion And Compliance In Markets For Pollution Control, John K. Stranlund
PERI Working Papers
This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on compliance choices in markets for pollution control. A firm’s decision to be compliant or not is independent of its manager’s risk preference. However, noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower violations than otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers. The violations of noncompliant firms with risk averse managers are independent of differences in their benefits from emissions and their initial allocations of permits if and only if their managers’ utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. However, firm-level characteristics do impact violation choices when managers have coefficients of absolute …
A Laboratory Investigation Of Compliance Behavior Under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications For Targeted Enforcement, James J. Murphy, John Stranlund
A Laboratory Investigation Of Compliance Behavior Under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications For Targeted Enforcement, James J. Murphy, John Stranlund
PERI Working Papers
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the theoretical observations that both the violations of competitive risk-neutral firms and the marginal effectiveness of increased enforcement across firms are independent of differences in their abatement costs and their initial allocations of permits. This conclusion has important implications for enforcing emissions trading programs because it suggests that regulators have no justification for targeting their enforcement effort based on firm-level characteristics. Consistent with the theory, we find that subjects’ violations were independent of parametric differences in their abatement costs. However, those subjects that were predicted to buy permits tended to have higher violation …
A Laboratory Investigation Of Compliance Behavior Under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications For Targeted Enforcement, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy
A Laboratory Investigation Of Compliance Behavior Under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications For Targeted Enforcement, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy
John K. Stranlund
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the theoretical observations that both the violations of competitive risk-neutral firms and the marginal effectiveness of increased enforcement across firms are independent of differences in their abatement costs and their initial allocations of permits. This conclusion has important implications for enforcing emissions trading programs because it suggests that regulators have no justification for targeting their enforcement effort based on firm-level characteristics. Consistent with the theory, we find that subjects’ violations were independent of parametric differences in their abatement costs. However, those subjects that were predicted to buy permits tended to have higher violation …
Maritime Law Enforcement And Compliance In Indonesia: Problems And Recommendations, Dirham Dirhamsyah
Maritime Law Enforcement And Compliance In Indonesia: Problems And Recommendations, Dirham Dirhamsyah
Faculty of Law - Papers (Archive)
Like most coastal states, Indonesia is faced with a need to protect, conserve, and manage its marine and coastal resources. Twenty-six and a half per cent of the Indonesian Gross National Product was derived from the utilisation of coastal and marine resources in 2002.1 Fish and other marine resources make a significant contribution to the supply of food, employment, and foreign exchange. More than 60% of animal protein consumed by the population is derived from the fisheries sector; and per capita consumption was estimated to be 21.7 kg per year in 2002.2 Employment in the primary fishing sector …
Prompt Release Procedures And The Challenge For Fisheries Law Enforcement: The Judgement Of The International Tribunal For The Law Of The Sea In The 'Volga' Case (Russian Federation V Australia), Warwick Gullett
Faculty of Law - Papers (Archive)
On 23 December 2002, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ('ITLOS') ordered the prompt release of the Russian 1ongline fishing vessel Volga, at the time detained by Australian authorities in Fremantle, upon the posting of a bond or other security of A$l 920 000. The Volga was arrested for allegedly fishing without authorisation by a boarding party from the Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Canberra in the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone ('EEZ') surrounding Heard and McDonald Islands in the Southern Ocean on 7 Februarv 2002. At issue in the ITLOS proceedings was not whether the activities of …
Legal Framework And Enforcement Experience Of Marine Protected Areas In Tasmania, New South Wales And Commonwealth Waters, Warwick Gullett
Legal Framework And Enforcement Experience Of Marine Protected Areas In Tasmania, New South Wales And Commonwealth Waters, Warwick Gullett
Faculty of Law - Papers (Archive)
With the exception of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, there have been no prosecutions for specific offences within marine protected areas (MPAs) in Australia at the federal level or in Tasmania and New South Wales. However, it cannot be assumed that compliance is responsible for this lack of prosecutions. Rather, in some cases, enforcement officers prosecute offences under more general provisions found in fisheries legislation than under provisions for specific offences created in MPAs. In other cases, there has been a long lag time between the declaration of MPAs and the adoption of comprehensive and effective legislative arrangements creating …