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2016

Antitrust

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Other Markets, Other Costs: Modernizing Antitrust, Jeffrey L. Harrison Dec 2016

Other Markets, Other Costs: Modernizing Antitrust, Jeffrey L. Harrison

UF Law Faculty Publications

Today’s antitrust law is characterized by stagnation and indeterminacy. The failure is so thorough that it is not clear that U.S. competition law actually leads to any outcomes that are defendable except at the most superficial level. Moreover, when enforcement does result in a desirable outcome, it not clear that it is the best outcome. The principal reason for this state of affairs is that antitrust scholars and courts cling to misguided goals and theories that have not evolved despite an avalanche of information now available that can modernize the discipline.

This Article has two main sections that necessarily overlap. …


European Community Law And Institutions In Perspective: Text, Cases And Readings, Josef Rohlik Nov 2016

European Community Law And Institutions In Perspective: Text, Cases And Readings, Josef Rohlik

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


Economic Law, Inequality, And Hidden Hierarchies On The Eu Internal Market, Damjan Kukovec Oct 2016

Economic Law, Inequality, And Hidden Hierarchies On The Eu Internal Market, Damjan Kukovec

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Article has several aims. First, the aim is to show the continuing importance and relevance of antitrust and international trade lawyers in countering the concentration of power in the hands of the few or in some geographic areas of the world, if some of the assumptions of antitrust and trade are adjusted. Second, the goal is to articulate a particular analysis from the perspective of the (European) periphery. As the recent Euro crises and the near exit of Greece from the Union show, the European prospect of development for all has not arrived. This Article will articulate the privilege …


Legislation's Culture, Richard K. Neumann Jr. Sep 2016

Legislation's Culture, Richard K. Neumann Jr.

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Hidden Costs Of Free Goods: Implications For Antitrust Enforcement, Michal S. Gal, Daniel L. Rubinfeld Aug 2016

The Hidden Costs Of Free Goods: Implications For Antitrust Enforcement, Michal S. Gal, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Today a growing number of goods and services are provided in the marketplace free of charge; indeed, free or the appearance of free, have become part of our ecosystem. More often than not, free goods and services provide real benefits to consumers and are clearly pro-competitive. Yet free goods may also create significant costs. We show that despite the fact that the consumer does not pay a direct price, there are indirect prices that reflect the opportunity cost associated with the consumption of free goods. These indirect costs can be overt or covert, in the same market in which the …


Is Your Digital Assistant Devious?, Maurice Stucke Aug 2016

Is Your Digital Assistant Devious?, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

Who wouldn’t want a personal butler? Technological developments have moved us closer to that dream. The rise of digital personal assistants has already changed the way we shop, interact and surf the web. Technological developments and artificial intelligence are likely to further accelerate this trend. Indeed, all of the leading online platforms are currently investing in this technology. Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa, Facebook’s M, and Google Assistant can quickly provide us with information, if we so desire, and anticipate and fulfill certain needs and requests. Yet, could they also reduce our welfare? Could they limit competition and transfer our wealth …


A Socio-Economic Approach To Antitrust: Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, And Allocative Efficiency, Jeffrey L. Harrison Jun 2016

A Socio-Economic Approach To Antitrust: Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, And Allocative Efficiency, Jeffrey L. Harrison

Akron Law Review

The primary function of socio-economics is to ask questions and broaden the discussion. I have attempted to do that by unpacking and contextualizing the two economic goals of antitrust law - maximizing consumer surplus and allocative efficiency. I have avoided what I believe is today's faith-based approach as exemplified by the Supreme Court. That approach has now gone beyond economics and seems to reveal, in its most benign form, a deep distrust of government.

At its most basic and obvious level the two antitrust goals cede to those with income - earned or not - the right to determine how …


Hospital Mergers And Economic Efficiency, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance, D. Daniel Sokol May 2016

Hospital Mergers And Economic Efficiency, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

Consolidation via merger both from hospital-to-hospital mergers and from hospital acquisitions of physician groups is changing the competitive landscape of the provision of health care delivery in the United States. This Article undertakes a legal and economic examination of a recent Ninth Circuit case examining the hospital acquisition of a physician group. This Article explores the Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd. (St. Luke’s) decision—proposing a type of analysis that the district court and Ninth Circuit should have undertaken and that we hope future courts undertake when analyzing mergers in the …


Statement Of Paul F. Figley Before The Committee On The Judiciary 
Subcommittee On Regulatory Reform, Commercial And Antitrust Law, United States House Of Representatives, Paul F. Figley Apr 2016

Statement Of Paul F. Figley Before The Committee On The Judiciary 
Subcommittee On Regulatory Reform, Commercial And Antitrust Law, United States House Of Representatives, Paul F. Figley

Paul Figley

Statement of Paul F. Figley Before the Committee onthe Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law, United States House of Representatives at a hearing on H.R. 5063 , the “Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016”.

Full hearing details are available here; https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/h-r-___-stop-settlement-slush-funds-act-2016/.


Monopoly Power With A Short Selling Constraint, Robert Baumann, Bryan Engelhardt, David L. Fuller Apr 2016

Monopoly Power With A Short Selling Constraint, Robert Baumann, Bryan Engelhardt, David L. Fuller

Economics Department Working Papers

We show if a speculator can benefit from reducing a monopoly’s rents through short selling, then a speculator may take a short position in a monopoly, overcome the barriers to entry, and compete with the monopoly. The competition drives down the monopoly’s rents, and as a result, the short position becomes profitable and covers the cost of entry. If entry is impossible, then the speculator may coordinate and pay the firm’s counter-parties to stop trading with the monopoly rather than entering. Either way, increasing a speculator’s ability to short a firm’s rents results in a constraint on the monopoly and …


Assembled Products: The Key To More Effective Competition And Antitrust Oversight In Health Care, William M. Sage Apr 2016

Assembled Products: The Key To More Effective Competition And Antitrust Oversight In Health Care, William M. Sage

Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that recent calls for antitrust enforcement to protect health insurers from hospital and physician consolidation are incomplete. The principal obstacle to effective competition in health care is not that one or the other party has too much bargaining power, but that they have been buying and selling the wrong things. Vigorous antitrust enforcement will benefit health care consumers only if it accounts for the competitive distortions caused by the sector’s long history of government regulation. Because of regulation, what pass for products in health care are typically small process steps and isolated components that can be assigned …


Antitrust Balancing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Apr 2016

Antitrust Balancing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust litigation often confronts situations where effects point in both directions. Judges sometimes describe the process of evaluating these factors as “balancing.” In its e-Books decision the Second Circuit believed that the need to balance is what justifies application of the rule of reason. In Microsoft the D.C. Circuit stated that “courts routinely apply a…balancing approach” under which “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm…outweighs the procompetitive benefit.” But then it decided the case without balancing anything.

The term “balancing” is a very poor label for what courts actually do in these cases. Balancing requires that two offsetting effects …


California Fair Trade: Antitrust And The Politics Of “Fairness” In U.S. Competition Policy, Laura Phillips Sawyer Apr 2016

California Fair Trade: Antitrust And The Politics Of “Fairness” In U.S. Competition Policy, Laura Phillips Sawyer

Scholarly Works

In the decades before World War II, U.S. antitrust law was anything but settled. Considerable pressure for antitrust revision came from the states. A perhaps unlikely leader, Edna Gleason, organized California’s retail pharmacists and coordinated trade networks to monitor and enforce Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contracts, a system of price-fixing, then known as “fair trade.” Progressive jurists, including Louis Brandeis and institutional economist E. R. A. Seligman, supported RPM as a protection to independent proprietors. The breakdown of legal and economic consensus regarding what constituted “unfair competition” allowed businesspeople to act as intermediaries between heterodox economic thought and contested antitrust …


Permissible Product Hopping: Why A Per Se Legal Rule Barring Antitrust Liability Is Necessary To Protect Future Innovation In The Pharmaceutical Industry, Michelle L. Ethier Mar 2016

Permissible Product Hopping: Why A Per Se Legal Rule Barring Antitrust Liability Is Necessary To Protect Future Innovation In The Pharmaceutical Industry, Michelle L. Ethier

Akron Intellectual Property Journal

Pharmaceutical product hopping is a relatively new phenomenon in which a brand-name pharmaceutical company tactically reformulates a drug and patents the reformulation in an attempt to avoid competition by a generic competitor. When viewed in the context of the HatchWaxman framework, product hopping can effectively eliminate generic competitors from the market, thereby implicating § 2 of the Sherman Act. In addressing antitrust liability, this Note advocates a per se legal approach to product hopping so long as the hop is supported by a valid patent. Although some have argued that deference to the United States Patent and Trademark Office and …


The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: New Developments And Empirical Evidence, Michael Faure, Xinzhu Zhang, Susan Farmer Mar 2016

The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: New Developments And Empirical Evidence, Michael Faure, Xinzhu Zhang, Susan Farmer

Susan Beth Farmer

Beth Farmer contributed the following chapter: "Competition Policy in China: Trends in Private Civil Litigation"

Effective enforcement of competition laws and regulations benefits society, consumers and market participants, and promotes a competition culture. Private civil actions can contribute to healthy economic development (AML Article 1), consumer welfare, and economic efficiency and more complete and effective enforcement of competition law. This chapter discusses developments in private civil actions under the Chinese AML in the context of recent Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court, national development goals, and the experience of four years of active civil litigation. A spokesperson of the Intellectual …


The Law Of The Platform, Orly Lobel Mar 2016

The Law Of The Platform, Orly Lobel

Faculty Scholarship

New digital platform companies are turning everything into an available resource: services, products, spaces, connections, and knowledge, all of which would otherwise be collecting dust. Unsurprisingly then, the platform economy defies conventional regulatory theory. Millions of people are becoming part-time entrepreneurs, disrupting established business models and entrenched market interests, challenging regulated industries, and turning ideas about consumption, work, risk, and ownership on their head. Paradoxically, as the digital platform economy becomes more established, we are also at an all-time high in regulatory permitting, licensing, and protection. The battle over law in the platform is therefore both conceptual and highly practical. …


Hospital Mergers And Economic Efficiency, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance, D. Daniel Sokol Mar 2016

Hospital Mergers And Economic Efficiency, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

Consolidation via merger both from hospital-to-hospital mergers and from hospital acquisitions of physician groups is changing the competitive landscape of the provision of health care delivery in the United States. This Article undertakes a legal and economic examination of a recent Ninth Circuit case examining the hospital acquisition of a physician group. This Article explores the Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd. (St. Luke’s) decision—proposing a type of analysis that the district court and Ninth Circuit should have undertaken and that we hope future courts undertake when analyzing mergers in the …


Antitrust And Information Technologies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2016

Antitrust And Information Technologies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Technological change strongly affects the use of information to facilitate anticompetitive practices. The effects result mainly from digitization and the many products and processes that it enables. These technologies of information also account for a significant portion of the difficulties that antitrust law encounters when its addresses intellectual property rights. In addition, changes in the technologies of information affect the structures of certain products, in the process either increasing or decreasing the potential for competitive harm.

For example, digital technology affects the way firms exercise market power, but it also imposes serious measurement difficulties. The digital revolution has occurred in …


Richard A. Posner: A Study In Judicial Entrepreneurship, Sean J. Shannon Feb 2016

Richard A. Posner: A Study In Judicial Entrepreneurship, Sean J. Shannon

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

This dissertation analyzes the role of Richard Posner, one of the most prolific and innovative legal thinkers over the past forty years, as a judicial entrepreneur in his efforts to persuade the legal academy and judiciary to incorporate economic principles into the judicial decision making process in market and non-market areas of the law and legal discourse and thereby to re-examine the role of the judge. Though political scientists have explored the entrepreneurial activities of policy makers and political actors, they have given little attention to the role of judges as judicial entrepreneurs. This dissertation develops a comprehensive theoretical understanding …


Economic Espionage As Reality Or Rhetoric: Equating Trade Secrecy With National Security, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Orly Lobel Jan 2016

Economic Espionage As Reality Or Rhetoric: Equating Trade Secrecy With National Security, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Orly Lobel

Faculty Scholarship

In the last few years, the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), a 1996 statute that criminalizes trade secrecy misappropriation, was amended twice, once to increase the penalties and once to expand the definition of trade secrets and the types of behaviors that are illegal. Recent developments also reveal a pattern of expansion in investigation, indictments, and convictions under the EEA as well as the devotion of large resources by the FBI and other agencies to warn private industry against the global threats of trade secret theft. At the international level, the United States government has been advocating enhanced levels of trade …


Dueling Monologues On The Public Domain: What Digital Copyright Can Learn From Antitrust, Timothy K. Armstrong Jan 2016

Dueling Monologues On The Public Domain: What Digital Copyright Can Learn From Antitrust, Timothy K. Armstrong

The University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal

This article, written for the inaugural volume of the University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, explores the disconnect between contemporary United States intellectual property law and the often quite different consensus views of disinterested expert opinion. Questions concerning how copyright law treats the public domain (that is, uncopyrighted material) supply a lens for comparing the law as it stands with the law as scholars have suggested it should be. The ultimate goal is to understand why a quarter century of predominantly critical scholarship on intellectual property seems to have exerted such limited influence on Congress and …


A Profile Of Bio-Pharma Consolidation Activity, Jordan Paradise Jan 2016

A Profile Of Bio-Pharma Consolidation Activity, Jordan Paradise

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.


The Commensurability Myth In Antitrust, Rebecca Haw Allensworth Jan 2016

The Commensurability Myth In Antitrust, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Modern antitrust law pursues a seemingly unitary goal: competition. In fact, competition—whether defined as a process or as a set of outcomes associated with competitive markets—is multifaceted. What are offered in antitrust cases as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are typically qualitatively different, and trading them off is as much an exercise in judgment as mathematics. But despite the inevitability of value judgments in antitrust cases, courts have perpetuated a commensurability myth, claiming to evaluate “net” competitive effect as if the pros and cons of a restraint of trade are in the same unit of measure. The myth is attractive to …


Us Government Antitrust Intervention In Standard-Setting Activities And The Competitive Process, Alden F. Abbott Jan 2016

Us Government Antitrust Intervention In Standard-Setting Activities And The Competitive Process, Alden F. Abbott

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

The private sector historically has driven the setting of technical standards in the United States, with the federal government only intervening in response to perceived violations of specific statutes, such as antitrust laws. This concern is reflected in case law and in advice proffered by US antitrust enforcers. Recently, however, US enforcers have turned their attention primarily to the alleged misuse of monopoly power over patents that cover technologies embodied in standards. This new focus threatens to undermine innovation and departs from sound antitrust enforcement policy. American antitrust enforcers should redirect their priorities away from alleged single-firm, patent-related abuses associated …


The Commensurability Myth In Antitrust, Rebecca H. Allensworth Jan 2016

The Commensurability Myth In Antitrust, Rebecca H. Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law Review

Modern antitrust law pursues a seemingly unitary goal: competition. In fact, competition-whether defined as a process or as a set of outcomes associated with competitive markets-is multifaceted. What are offered in antitrust cases as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are typically qualitatively different, and trading them off is as much an exercise in judgment as mathematics. But despite the inevitability of value judgments in antitrust cases, courts have perpetuated a commensurability myth, claiming to evaluate "net" competitive effect as if the pros and cons of a restraint of trade are in the same unit of measure. The myth is attractive to …


Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, And Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement With Professor Elhauge, Jonathan Baker Jan 2016

Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, And Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement With Professor Elhauge, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

As is well known among financial economists but not previously recognized within the antitrust community, large and diversified institutional investors such as BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard collectively own roughly two-thirds of the shares of publicly traded U.S. firms overall, up from about one-third in 1980. Recent economic research involving airlines and banking raises the possibility that overlapping ownership of horizontal rivals by diversified financial institutions facilitates anticompetitive conduct throughout the economy, and that the problem has been growing for decades, unnoticed until now. This response to an article by Professor Einer Elhauge, explains why it may be more …


Antitrust And Regulating Big Data, D. Daniel Sokol, Roisin E. Comerford Jan 2016

Antitrust And Regulating Big Data, D. Daniel Sokol, Roisin E. Comerford

UF Law Faculty Publications

The collection of user data online has seen enormous growth in recent years. Consumers have benefited from this growth through an increase in free or heavily subsidized services, better quality offerings, and rapid innovation. At the same time, the debate about Big Data, and what it really means for consumers and competition, has grown louder. Many have focused on whether Big Data even presents an antitrust issue, and whether and how harms resulting from Big Data should be analyzed and remedied under the antitrust laws. The academic literature, however, has somewhat lagged behind the policy debate, and a closer inspection …


Telecommunications: Competition Policy In The Telecommunications Space, Gene Kimmelman, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Michael O’Rielly, Christopher S. Yoo, Stephen F. Williams Jan 2016

Telecommunications: Competition Policy In The Telecommunications Space, Gene Kimmelman, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Michael O’Rielly, Christopher S. Yoo, Stephen F. Williams

All Faculty Scholarship

In today’s rapidly evolving telecommunications landscape, the development of new technologies and distribution platforms are driving innovation and growth at a breakneck speed across the Internet ecosystem. Broadband connectivity is increasingly important to our civil discourse, our economy, and our future. What is the proper role of government in facilitating robust investment and competition in this critical sector? When technology companies constantly have to reinvent themselves and adapt to survive – what role should government play? This panel of experts at the Federalist Society’s 2014 National Lawyers Convention discussed the current regulatory environment and how government policies – particularly regarding …


Re-Imagining Antitrust: The Revisionist Work Of Richard S. Markovits, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2016

Re-Imagining Antitrust: The Revisionist Work Of Richard S. Markovits, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This review discusses Richard Markovits’ two volume book "Economics and the Interpretation" and "Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law" (2014), focusing mainly on Markovits’ approaches to antitrust tests of illegality, pricing offenses, market definition and the assessment of market power, and his important work anticipating unilateral effects theory in merger cases. Markovits argues forcefully that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were intended to employ different tests of illegality. As a result, even when they cover the same practices, such as mergers, exclusive dealing, or tying, they address them under different tests. He then shows how he would analyze various …


Do Not Pass Go And Do Not Collect $200: Nike's Monopoly On Usatf Violates Antitrust Laws And Prevents Athletes From Living At Park Place, Jill K. Ingels Jan 2016

Do Not Pass Go And Do Not Collect $200: Nike's Monopoly On Usatf Violates Antitrust Laws And Prevents Athletes From Living At Park Place, Jill K. Ingels

Marquette Sports Law Review

No abstract provided.