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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
What Fema Should Do After Puerto Rico: Toward Critical Administrative Constitutionalism, Yxta Maya Murray
What Fema Should Do After Puerto Rico: Toward Critical Administrative Constitutionalism, Yxta Maya Murray
Arkansas Law Review
The 200th anniversary of the 1819 Supreme Court decision McCulloch v. Maryland offers scholars a special opportunity to study the shortcomings of the federal The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as they were revealed by FEMA’s failures in Puerto Rico during and after Hurricane Maria. Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, as it has been interpreted by McCulloch, a law passed by Congress must be necessary and proper for executing its powers. In light of the expansive capacities allotted for disaster relief under the Stafford Act, and the catastrophic failure of FEMA to provide …
Defying Mcculloch? Jackson’S Bank Veto Reconsidered, David S. Schwartz
Defying Mcculloch? Jackson’S Bank Veto Reconsidered, David S. Schwartz
Arkansas Law Review
On July 10, 1832, President Andrew Jackson issued the most famous and controversial veto in United States history. The bill in question was “to modify and continue” the 1816 “act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States. This was to recharter of the Second Bank of the United States whose constitutionality was famously upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland. The bill was passed by Congress and presented to Jackson on July 4. Six days later, Jackson vetoed the bill. Jackson’s veto mortally wounded the Second Bank, which would forever close its doors four years later at the …
Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber
Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber
Arkansas Law Review
Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress. This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster was a close association of Justice Joseph Story. The justices at this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial sentiments on the issues of the day. Even if Webster lacked first-hand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig pessimism. …
M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck
M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck
Arkansas Law Review
M’Culloch v. Maryland is rightly regarded as a landmark opinion, one that affirmed the ability of Congress to exercise implied powers, articulated a rule of deference to Congressional judgments about whether given legislative actions were in fact “necessary,” and limited the ability of the states to impair or restrict the operations of the federal government. Most scholarly discussions of the case and its legacy emphasize these aspects of the decision. Less common are attempts to place M’Culloch within the ebb and flow of the Marshall Court and the political and social realities of the time. So, for example, very few …
The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson
The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson
Arkansas Law Review
All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition …
Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz
Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz
Arkansas Law Review
March 6, 2019 marked the 200th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, the successor to Alexander Hamilton’s national bank. McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge by the Second Bank of the United States to a Maryland tax on the banknotes issued by the Bank’s Baltimore branch. The tax was probably designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing loans and thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own state-chartered banks. Marshall’s opinion famously rejected the Jeffersonian strict-constructionist argument that implied powers …
Recent Developments, Raelynn J. Hillhouse
The Ever-Changing Landscape Of Informed Consent And Whether The Obligation To Explain A Procedure To The Patient May Be Delegated, Samuel D. Hodge, Maria Zambrano Steinhaus
The Ever-Changing Landscape Of Informed Consent And Whether The Obligation To Explain A Procedure To The Patient May Be Delegated, Samuel D. Hodge, Maria Zambrano Steinhaus
Arkansas Law Review
Informed consent is an integral part of the shared decision making process and requires a patient be informed of the benefits, risks and alternatives to a medical procedure. This information, which requirement has been codified into the law and practice of every healthcare provider, helps a patient decide whether to proceed with the recommended treatment plan. Informed consent has its foundation in the ethical notion of patient autonomy and fundamental human rights. After all, it is the patient’s decision to determine what may be done to his or her body and to ascertain the risks and benefits before undertaking a …
The Constitutional Rights Of Advanced Robots (And Of Human Beings), R. George Wright
The Constitutional Rights Of Advanced Robots (And Of Human Beings), R. George Wright
Arkansas Law Review
Constitutional rights create and destroy otherwise available options for the rights-bearer, for governments, and for affected third parties. Thus, conferring a constitutional right always requires at least some minimal defense. But conferring a constitutional right can certainly be appropriate if the recipient of the right seems to deserve or otherwise qualify for the right in question, or if conferring the right makes sense on other, perhaps partly pragmatic, grounds.
Protecting Due Process During Terrorism Adjudications: Redefining "Crimes Against Humanity" And Eliminating The Doctrine Of Complimentary Jurisdiction In Favor Of The International Criminal Court, Daniel N. Clay
Arkansas Law Review
“When we sit in judgment we are holding ourselves out as people—as the kind of a community—that are worthy of this task. It is the seriousness, the gravity, of the act of judgment which gives rise to our legitimate and laudable emphasis on procedural fairness and substantive accuracy in criminal procedure. But these things focus on the defendant—the one judged. I am concerned about us who would presume to sit in judgment. Who are we that we should do this? Whether we intend to do so or not, we answer this question in part through the way we conduct our …