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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
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The Evolution Of Revolution: Is Splintering Inevitable?, Atin Basu Choudhary, Laura Razzolini
The Evolution Of Revolution: Is Splintering Inevitable?, Atin Basu Choudhary, Laura Razzolini
Atin Basu Choudhary
We use an evolutionary model to study splintering in rebels’ groups. We assume that rebels possess cultural traits that encourage cooperation, defection (splintering) or some sort of trigger behavior like Tit-For-Tat. We characterize the dynamic process through which the rebels’ discount rate determines whether splintering will occur in the population, even when cooperation is efficient. Contrary to the usual Folk Theorem prediction, we show that, even when rebels are extremely patient, cooperation may not evolve if the initial distribution of cultures in the population is not favorable. Thus, political actions by the states or governments that make rebels impatient may …
Cultural Assimilation: The Political Economy Of Psychology As An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Dynamic, Atin Basu Choudhary, Dave Cotting
Cultural Assimilation: The Political Economy Of Psychology As An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Dynamic, Atin Basu Choudhary, Dave Cotting
Atin Basu Choudhary
In this paper, we model the interaction between idiocentric and allocentric immigrants in two settings – in a society that is predominantly collectivist and in a society that is predominantly individualist. Immigrants, either allocentric or idiocentric, can also be entity theorists (fixed mindset) or incremental theorists (growth mindset). We use evolutionary game theory to model how the host country cultural environment places selective pressure on the cultures of immigrant populations. This has implications for how well immigrants assimilate into their host country. Our results show: (a) depending on the initial ratio of allocentric and idiocentric immigrants, assimilation is either complete …
Is Reform Inevitable In Iran? An Evolutionary Analysis, Atin Basu Choudhary, Laura Razzolini, Dixon Josh
Is Reform Inevitable In Iran? An Evolutionary Analysis, Atin Basu Choudhary, Laura Razzolini, Dixon Josh
Atin Basu Choudhary
A persistent, if somewhat violent, reformist movement in Iran has many observers believing that reform is inevitable in Iran. We suggest that such optimism is misplaced. We use an evolutionary game theory approach to a standard assurance game to show that even when the gains to reform are obvious, the reformists may not succeed. We show further that as long as hardliners hold the levers of government they can stymie the success of reformists. Thus, from a policy perspective we believe that a gradual evolutionary path to reformist success is plausible but it depends crucially on the initial proportion of …
Predicting State Failure: A Classification Tree Approach, Atin Basu Choudhary, Jim T. Bang, William F. Shughart Ii
Predicting State Failure: A Classification Tree Approach, Atin Basu Choudhary, Jim T. Bang, William F. Shughart Ii
Atin Basu Choudhary
We deviate from standard practice in the literature on state failure to use classification tree methods to predict state failure. We argue that the rarity of state failure and simplicity of use and interpretation makes this approach more attractive. We determine simple decision rules, based on observable and measurable variables, to determine whether a country is likely to fail or not.
Reducing The Impact Of Ethnic Tensions On Economic Growth – Economic Or Political Institutions?, Atin Basu Choudhary, Jim Bang, Michael Reksulak
Reducing The Impact Of Ethnic Tensions On Economic Growth – Economic Or Political Institutions?, Atin Basu Choudhary, Jim Bang, Michael Reksulak
Atin Basu Choudhary
We use a standard growth regression model and show that ethnic tensions reduce per capita growth rates. We also find evidence that “good” economic and political institutions improve per capita growth rates. More importantly, good economic institutions mitigate the effect of ethnic tensions on per capita growth while good political institutions do not. Consequently, it is foremost capitalist freedom that promotes peace and development.