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A Game Theoretic Study On Csr And Government Intervention For Sustainable Production, Katherine Ann J. Fernandez, Joshua Ryan C. Go, Jean Nicole L. Ng, Bianca Alanis Ysabel C. Redulla, Jason P. Alinsunurin, Dickson A. Lim, Mariel Monica R. Sauler

Angelo King Institute for Economic and Business Studies (AKI)

We use a game theoretic approach to assess how the government can influence firms’ CSR investment and production decisions to enhance social welfare, considering the negative externalities brought by unsustainable production and positive externalities brought by CSR investments. Using a Stackelberg duopoly as a base model and lump-sum tax as the government’s decision variable, we find that when the government chooses not to intervene, it results in greater environmental damage as firms will underinvest in CSR and overproduce in quantity to achieve profit maximization. As such, the model extends to the assumption that the government acts as a benevolent dictator …