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Phony Originalism And The Establishment Clause, Andrew M. Koppelman Jan 2011

Phony Originalism And The Establishment Clause, Andrew M. Koppelman

Faculty Working Papers

The "originalist" interpretations of the Establishment Clause by Supreme Court Justices William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas are remarkably indifferent to the original purposes of that clause. Their arguments are a remarkable congeries of historical error and outright misrepresentation. This is not necessarily a criticism of originalism per se. However, the abuse of originalist scholarship that these judges have practiced raises questions about what originalist scholars are actually accomplishing.


How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter On Respect For Religion, Andrew Koppelman Jan 2010

How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter On Respect For Religion, Andrew Koppelman

Faculty Working Papers

In two recent papers, Brian Leiter argues that there is no good reason for law to single out religion for special treatment, and that religion is not an apt candidate for respect in the "thick" sense of being an object of favorable appraisal. Both arguments depend on a radically impoverished conception of what religion is and what it does. In this paper, I explain what Leiter leaves out, and offer an hypothesis about why. I also engage with some related reflections by Simon Blackburn and Timothy Macklem, both of whom influence, in different ways, Leiter's analysis.


No Respect: Brian Leiter On Religion, Andrew Koppelman Jan 2010

No Respect: Brian Leiter On Religion, Andrew Koppelman

Faculty Working Papers

In two recent papers, Brian Leiter argues that there is no good reason for law to single out religion for special treatment, and that religion is not an apt candidate for respect in the "thick" sense of being an object of favorable appraisal. Both arguments depend on a radically impoverished conception of what religion is and what it does. In this paper, I explain what Leiter leaves out, and offer an hypothesis about why. I also engage with some related reflections by Simon Blackburn and Timothy Macklem, both of whom influence, in different ways, Leiter's analysis.


Public And Private As Viewed Through The Work Of The Muhtasib, Kristen Stilt, Roy Mottahedeh Jan 2010

Public And Private As Viewed Through The Work Of The Muhtasib, Kristen Stilt, Roy Mottahedeh

Faculty Working Papers

This article examines the distinctions between public and private space in classical Islamic law through the work of the muhtasib, a legal official charged with the inspection of public places and behavior in towns of the premodern Middle East and North Africa (and in some Muslim communities outside of these areas).


Religious Establishment And Autonomy, Andrew Koppelman Jan 2009

Religious Establishment And Autonomy, Andrew Koppelman

Faculty Working Papers

Kent Greenawalt claims that one rationale for nonestablishment of religion is personal autonomy. If, however, the law is barred from manipulating people in religious directions (and thus violating their autonomy), while it remains free to manipulate them in nonreligious directions (and thus violate their autonomy in exactly the same way), autonomy as such is not what is being protected. The most promising alternative is to understand religion as a distinctive human good that is being protected from government interference.


Corruption Of Religion And The Establishment Clause, Andrew Koppelman Jan 2008

Corruption Of Religion And The Establishment Clause, Andrew Koppelman

Faculty Working Papers

Government neutrality toward religion is based on familiar considerations: the importance of avoiding religious conflict, alienation of religious minorities, and the danger that religious considerations will introduce a dangerous irrational dogmatism into politics and make democratic compromise more difficult. This paper explores one consideration, prominent at the time of the framing, that is often overlooked: the idea that religion can be corrupted by state involvement with it. This idea is friendly to religion but, precisely for that reason, is determined to keep the state away from religion.

If the religion-protective argument for disestablishment is to be useful today, it cannot …