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Opinion: How Software Stifles Competition And Innovation, James Bessen
Opinion: How Software Stifles Competition And Innovation, James Bessen
Faculty Scholarship
Innovation is not what it used to be, and software is part of the reason. In many industries—industries well beyond Big Tech—dominant firms have built large software-based platforms delivering important consumer benefits, but these platforms also slow the rise of innovative rivals, including productive startups.5 Because access to these platforms is limited, competition has been constrained, creating a troubling market dynamic that slows economic growth.
Enhancing Efficiency At Nonprofits With Analysis And Disclosure, David M. Schizer
Enhancing Efficiency At Nonprofits With Analysis And Disclosure, David M. Schizer
Faculty Scholarship
The U.S. nonprofit sector spends $2.54 trillion each year. If the sector were a country, it would have the eighth largest economy in the world, ahead of Brazil, Italy, Canada, and Russia. The government provides nonprofits with billions in tax subsidies, but instead of evaluating the quality of their work, it leaves this responsibility to nonprofit managers, boards, and donors. The best nonprofits are laboratories of innovation, but unfortunately some are stagnant backwaters, which waste money on out-of-date missions and inefficient programs. To promote more innovation and less stagnation, this Article makes two contributions to the literature.
First, this Article …
Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Faculty Scholarship
This article modifies the optimal punishment analysis by incorporating investment incentives with external benefits. In the models examined, the recommendation that the optimal penalty should internalize the marginal social harm is no longer valid. We focus on antitrust applications. In light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal policy will punish monopolizing firms more leniently than suggested in the standard static model. It may be optimal not to punish the monopolizing firm at all, or to reward the firm rather than punish it. We examine the precise balance between penalty and reward in the optimal punishment scheme.