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Religion And Insularity: Brian Leiter On Accommodating Religion, Christopher J. Eberle
Religion And Insularity: Brian Leiter On Accommodating Religion, Christopher J. Eberle
San Diego Law Review
Crucial to Leiter’s overall case is the claim that there is no credible reason to accommodate religious objectors but not secular objectors: “[N]o one has been able to articulate a credible principled argument . . . that would explain why . . . we ought to accord special legal and moral treatment to religious practices.” He reaches this skeptical conclusion, in significant part, because he takes religion to be afflicted with a troubling defect, that is, religion involves commitment to categorical demands that are insulated from scientific and commonsensical scrutiny. But, I will argue, there is no good reason to …
Why Distinguish Religion, Legally Speaking?, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan
Why Distinguish Religion, Legally Speaking?, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan
San Diego Law Review
Law professors commonly answer this critique by scholars of religion, as Andrew Koppelman does, with the comment that, after all, any ambiguity in definition only arises in a few cases. Most of the time the reference is obvious, he says. Moreover, he insists, it has worked fine for all those for whom it should work. But that is the problem—its very obviousness. The problems of exclusion are largely invisible. The reference is so obvious to many and so obviously inclusive of those who are deserving that there is no way to have a conversation about it without the conversation devolving …
How Much Autonomy Do You Want?, Maimon Schwarzschild
How Much Autonomy Do You Want?, Maimon Schwarzschild
San Diego Law Review
At root, the questions of special accommodation and religious adjudicatory independence arise most urgently when a government grows in its reach and ambition. After all, if most areas of life, including those that touch on religious life, are left to people’s private arrangement, then not much special accommodation will be necessary. But when government takes control over more and more areas of life, regulating who shall do what and under what rules and conditions, then clashes with one or another religious way of life are almost inevitable. The dispute over government mandates to provide abortive drugs and contraception, in the …
Religion, Conscience, And The Case For Accommodation, William A. Galston
Religion, Conscience, And The Case For Accommodation, William A. Galston
San Diego Law Review
I do not believe that religion is an obsolete constitutional category. But I do believe that the holdings in United States v. Seeger and Welsh v. United States, the Vietnam-era draft cases that extended conscientious objector status to individuals invoking nonreligious claims, were correct. Can I consistently embrace both propositions? I think I can. My argument, in brief, is that religion is indeed special. But when we understand what it is about religion that warrants both distinctive privileges and distinctive burdens, we will see that some other systems of belief track these features of religion closely enough to warrant comparable …
“Religion” As A Bundle Of Legal Proxies: Reply To Micah Schwartzman, Andrew Koppelman
“Religion” As A Bundle Of Legal Proxies: Reply To Micah Schwartzman, Andrew Koppelman
San Diego Law Review
The debate among legal scholars about whether religion is special is chronically confused by the scholars’ failure to grasp a point familiar in the academic study of religion: “religion” is a label for something that has no ontological reality. Religion has no essence. If it has a determinate meaning, it is simply because there is a settled and familiar practice of applying the label of religion in predictable ways. The question of religious accommodation arises in cases where a law can allow some exceptions. Many laws, such as military conscription, taxes, environmental regulations, and antidiscrimination laws, will accomplish their ends …
Religion As A Legal Proxy, Micah Schwartzman
Religion As A Legal Proxy, Micah Schwartzman
San Diego Law Review
In what follows, after briefly summarizing Koppelman’s position, I argue that his view is vulnerable to the charge that using religion as a legal proxy is unfair to those with comparable, but otherwise secular, ethical and moral convictions. Koppelman has, of course, anticipated this objection, but his responses are either ambivalent or insufficient to overcome it. The case for adopting religion as a proxy turns partly on arguments against other potential candidates. In particular, Koppelman rejects the freedom of conscience as a possible substitute. But even if he is right that its coverage is not fully extensive with the category …
Religion, Meaning, Truth, Life, Frederick Mark Gedicks
Religion, Meaning, Truth, Life, Frederick Mark Gedicks
San Diego Law Review
I am a believer, yet I will also say that it is simply not correct that only religion can offer deep meaning to life, and I can say this out of my own experience. Ordinary activities can be crucial to the meaning of one’s life, whether or not they are experienced or defined as “religious.” Though not all such activities are as morally serious as religious belief and practice, some are, and they are surely not “nihilistic” or “nothing” because they lack the character of transcendent religious truth.