Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Legal Realism As Theory Of Law, Michael S. Green
Legal Realism As Theory Of Law, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
No abstract provided.
Leiter On The Legal Realists, Michael S. Green
Leiter On The Legal Realists, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
In this essay reviewing Brian Leiter’s recent book Naturalizing Jurisprudence, I focus on two positions that distinguish Leiter’s reading of the American legal realists from those offered in the past. The first is his claim that the realists thought the law is only locally indeterminate – primarily in cases that are appealed. The second is his claim that they did not offer a prediction theory of law, but were instead committed to a standard positivist theory. Leiter’s reading is vulnerable, because he fails to discuss in detail those passages from the realists that inspired past interpretations. My goal is to …
Nietzsche’S Place In Nineteenth Century German Philosophy, Michael S. Green
Nietzsche’S Place In Nineteenth Century German Philosophy, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
No abstract provided.
Hans Kelsen And The Logic Of Legal Systems, Michael S. Green
Hans Kelsen And The Logic Of Legal Systems, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
No abstract provided.
Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin’S Fallacy?: A Reply To Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green
Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin’S Fallacy?: A Reply To Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
In an article entitled ‘Dworkin’s Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy of Language Can’t Teach Us about the Law’, I argued that in Law’s Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived his interpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theory of meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin’s fallacy’. In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that he committed the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact that he considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’, ‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—in Law’s Empire. Only the last of these is interpretive, but each, he argues, is compatible with his interpretive theory of meaning, which he describes …
Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity In The Legal Order, Michael S. Green
Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity In The Legal Order, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
A legal revolution occurs when chains of legal dependence rupture-causing one legal system to be replaced by a different and incommensurable legal system. For example, before the French Revolution chains of legal dependence ultimately led to Louis XVI, but after this legal revolution they led to the National Assembly (or the people of France it represented). The very possibility of legal revolutions depends upon laws being structured into legal systems in this fashion. And yet, despite substantial academic interest in legal revolutions, there has been a reluctance to examine the structure that makes them possible. The goal of this Article …
Legal Realism, Lex Fori, And The Choice-Of-Law Revolution, Michael S. Green
Legal Realism, Lex Fori, And The Choice-Of-Law Revolution, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
No abstract provided.