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Lessons Learned: Kevin Stiroh, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Kevin Stiroh, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Kevin Stiroh was head of the Financial Sector Analysis Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC). At the FRBNY, Stiroh was a leader in the design of the “stress test” for the banking system, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). In the aftermath of the GFC, members of the FRBNY, including Stiroh, drafted a report on systemic risk and bank supervision, laying out lessons learned from the crisis and their recommendations. In February 2021, Stiroh transitioned from the FRBNY to a leadership position with the Federal Reserve Board …
China: Reserve Requirements, 2015–2016, Carey K. Mott
China: Reserve Requirements, 2015–2016, Carey K. Mott
Journal of Financial Crises
After China devalued the renminbi against the US dollar in August 2015, Chinese equity markets experienced a significant drop that spilled into international markets. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) adjusted the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) five times between February 2015 and October 2015: three times before the market turmoil, to allocate credit to preferred sectors, and twice in response to the crisis to release liquidity into the financial system. Throughout this cycle, the central bank applied lower RRRs to rural credit institutions, agricultural lenders, leasing and financing companies, and other sectors in which government policy promoted lending. Although the …
China: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Carey K. Mott
China: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Carey K. Mott
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2008, China experienced several natural disasters that slowed economic growth, and fearing contagion from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the central bank cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) three times for large financial institutions, to 15.5%, and four times for small and medium-size financial institutions, to 13.5%. This monetary easing, combined with a USD 586 billion fiscal stimulus package, caused explosive credit growth in China. One year after these RRR cuts, the central bank hiked the ratio 12 times, to a historically high 21.5% for large banks in June 2011; however, it maintained a different ratio for rural credit …
Thailand: Fidf Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George
Thailand: Fidf Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
The Thai government’s decision to allow the baht to float in July 1997 was the pivotal event of the Asian Financial Crisis. The baht fell 20% by the end of the month, further pressuring Thai financial institutions that had borrowed heavily in US dollars and other foreign currencies. In early August, Thailand’s Finance Minister and the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the suspension and restructuring of insolvent finance companies and a blanket guarantee covering depositors and creditors of all domestic banks and the remaining finance companies, administered by the BOT’s Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF). However, the blanket guarantee was …
Jamaica: Finsac Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George
Jamaica: Finsac Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
After a period of sustained distress in the early 1990s, Jamaican financial institutions faced significant liquidity issues by 1996, evidenced by runs on banks by depositors. The government responded by creating the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) on January 29, 1997, to rehabilitate weak financial institutions and administer a blanket guarantee on financial sector liabilities. The blanket guarantee covered all deposit-taking financial institutions, life insurance policy providers, and pension funds registered under the Banking Act, Financial Institutions Act, and Insurance Act. Within eligible institutions, the blanket guarantee covered depositors’ funds in licensed deposit-taking institutions, pension funds managed by authorized institutions, …
Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George
Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
The Indonesian government closed 16 banks on November 1, 1997. At the time, the government said it would guarantee depositors up to 20 million Indonesian rupiah (IDR; USD 6,000) per account. The lack of immediate full protection for large depositors caused deposit runs throughout the banking sector and undermined foreign confidence in the Indonesian financial system. In response, the Indonesian president on January 26, 1998, announced a blanket guarantee and created the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to administer the guarantee and other bank rehabilitation efforts. The blanket guarantee covered all depositors and nonsubordinated creditors in locally incorporated commercial banks. …
Lessons Learned: Kevin Warsh, Matthew A. Lieber
Lessons Learned: Kevin Warsh, Matthew A. Lieber
Journal of Financial Crises
As senior deputy director of the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Spoth led examinations, enforcement actions, problem bank remediations, and failure resolutions, among a range of responsibilities. During the Global Financial Crisis, he was on the front lines of fast-moving policy discussions and actions to help stabilize the financial system, and he oversaw the closure and restructuring of some of the nation’s largest banks. This abstract is based on an interview with Spoth on February 4, 2021.
Lessons Learned: Kieran J. Fallon, Matthew A. Lieber
Lessons Learned: Kieran J. Fallon, Matthew A. Lieber
Journal of Financial Crises
Presently the senior deputy general counsel for regulation and government affairs at PNC Fi-nancial Services Group, Kieran Fallon completed a 16-year tenure in the legal division of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in 2011. As associate general counsel dur-ing the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), he helped design the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Pa-per Funding Facility, restructure American International Group (AIG), and implement the Dodd-Frank Act. Relatedly, Fallon also served as general counsel for the Financial Stability Oversight Board from 2008 to 2011. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview conducted with Fallon on August 13, 2020.
Sweden: Corporate Bond Purchases, Carey K. Mott
Sweden: Corporate Bond Purchases, Carey K. Mott
Journal of Financial Crises
In the spring of 2020, corporate revenues in Sweden felt the direct effects of the coronavirus pandemic and the resulting public health measures. With future cash flows in question, many investors sold corporate debt for safe assets. Sweden's corporate bond market-particularly vulnerable to stress due to its heterogeneity, fragmentation, and lack of transparency-saw diminished liquidity. On March 19, 2020, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank) announced it would purchase commercial paper and corporate bonds as part of a much larger bond-buying scheme, announced three days earlier, that included Swedish government, municipal, and covered bonds. It authorized the program under Chapter 6, Article …
Sweden: Commercial Paper Purchases, Carey K. Mott
Sweden: Commercial Paper Purchases, Carey K. Mott
Journal of Financial Crises
In March 2020, governments took measures to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic that significantly impacted corporate revenues. The uncertainty surrounding the pandemic drove investors out of corporate securities and into safe assets, complicating the ability of Swedish nonfinancial corporations to finance their operations. As the volume of commercial paper issuance dropped, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank) announced on March 19, 2020, it would purchase commercial paper and corporate bonds as part of a much larger bond-buying scheme that included Swedish government, municipal, and covered bonds. It authorized the program under Chapter 6, Article 5 of the Sveriges Riksbank Act. …
Taiwan (Roc): Central Deposit Insurance Corporation, Lily S. Engbith
Taiwan (Roc): Central Deposit Insurance Corporation, Lily S. Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, the failure of a large Taiwanese bank led depositors to shift billions of dollars from private banks to state-owned banks. To stem the runs, the government on October 7 invoked its authority under Articles 28 and 29 of the Deposit Insurance Act to announce a temporary, unlimited guarantee on all deposit accounts of institutions covered by the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC). In addition to removing the previous TWD 3 million (USD 90,000) cap per depositor, the expanded coverage included several types of deposit accounts that had not been previously insured by the CDIC. As the CDIC’s …
Lessons Learned: Steven Rattner, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Lessons Learned: Steven Rattner, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Journal of Financial Crises
Steven Rattner, an investment banker and private equity professional, joined the Obama administration as counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury and head of the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensely throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path …
Lessons Learned: Harry Wilson, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Lessons Learned: Harry Wilson, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Journal of Financial Crises
Harry Wilson was one of four senior advisers to the US Department of the Treasury during the Obama administration and served on the President’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to General Motors and Chrysler, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a …
Lessons Learned: Sadiq Malik, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Lessons Learned: Sadiq Malik, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Journal of Financial Crises
Sadiq Malik was a member of the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers, to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path to stability. Malik, working for the Auto Task Force, helped take General Motors through …
Lessons Learned: Matthew Feldman, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Lessons Learned: Matthew Feldman, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Journal of Financial Crises
Matthew Feldman was the chief legal advisor to the Department of the Treasury on the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors (GM), and later other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path to stability. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recognized …
Lessons Learned: Mara Mcneill, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Lessons Learned: Mara Mcneill, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Journal of Financial Crises
Mara McNeill was senior counsel to the US Department of the Treasury on the Obama administration’s Automotive Investment Financing Program (AIFP) during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09. As senior counsel, McNeill was responsible for the department’s $80 billon financing of General Motors, Chrysler, Ally Financial, and Chrysler Financial. She worked with the Auto Team Task Force, the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) legal team, and the Department of Treasury. The bipartisan AIFP team was charged with overseeing the government’s efforts to assist the companies toward a “new lease on life,” while exercising strong financial principles to protect the …
Lessons Learned: Ron Bloom, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Lessons Learned: Ron Bloom, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Journal of Financial Crises
Ron Bloom served as senior adviser to Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner on President Barack Obama’s Task Force on the Automotive Industry and as assistant to the president for manufacturing policy (2009–2011). As senior adviser on the Auto Task Force team, Bloom helped lead the restructuring of General Motors and Chrysler LLC. Subsequently, he advised the Obama administration with policy development and strategic planning to revitalize the manufacturing sector. Bloom brought to Treasury his unique experience working with organized labor (including the United Steelworkers Union, United Auto Workers, the Teamsters, the Air Line Pilots Association), and in the investment …
Wall Street’S Subprime Debacle: Firsthand Accounts From Inside The Cdo Machine, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff
Wall Street’S Subprime Debacle: Firsthand Accounts From Inside The Cdo Machine, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff
Journal of Financial Crises
The observations, perceptions, and actions of participants in the subprime markets remain poorly documented and incompletely understood. Seeking to deepen our understanding, this study has produced seven interview summaries and one article telling the story of a hypothetical CDO deal. This article is organized in four parts. First, it presents our research questions and methods in relation to the existing knowledge on the topic. Second, it describes what we think are the study’s main contributions. Third, it previews the Lessons Learned summaries and interviews from each of the participants. And last, it identifies what we believe are some of the …
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module B: Restructuring General Motors Through Bankruptcy, Kaleb B. Nygaard
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module B: Restructuring General Motors Through Bankruptcy, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Journal of Financial Crises
As the Global Financial Crisis worsened in 2008, credit markets tightened and a broader economic downturn developed, hitting the auto industry particularly hard. The crisis intensified a decade-long decline of the largest US auto manufacturers. Because of its size and importance to the economy, the US government decided to provide assistance to General Motors (GM) to sustain it while it developed plans for its long-term viability. Congress declined to authorize funding for the auto manufacturers, but in December 2008, Treasury provided a bridge loan to GM under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) to sustain the company until the Obama …
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module A: Automotive Bridge Loans, Alexander Nye
The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module A: Automotive Bridge Loans, Alexander Nye
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2008, in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis, America’s Big Three automakers neared their breaking point. Two of them, General Motors (GM) and Chrysler, asked Congress for funding to prevent uncontrolled bankruptcies. Policymakers realized these uncontrolled bankruptcies would damage the manufacturing sector. Congress considered but failed to pass a framework conditioning short-term financing on the companies’ producing acceptable restructuring plans. With the companies warning that they could not survive the coming presidential transition, on December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush announced the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) under the authority of the Emergency Economic Stability Act (EESA) …
Broad-Based Capital Injection Programs, June Rhee, Junko Oguri, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Broad-Based Capital Injection Programs, June Rhee, Junko Oguri, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
This paper surveys 36 broad-based capital injection (BBCI) programs and attempts to identify some best (and worst) practices. We argue that it is crucial to distinguish between programs implemented during acute (“panic”) and chronic (“debt overhang”) phases of a crisis, where the goals of program design should be different. In an acute phase, programs should be designed to influence the behavior of bank counterparties, while in chronic phases, the focus should be on bank behavior itself. With this framing, we identify seven themes to guide program design, and provide many illustrative examples for the policymaker’s tool kit.
Lessons Learned: Steven Adamske, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Steven Adamske, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Steven Adamske was Communications Director for the House Financial Services Committee under Chairman Barney Frank in 2008 and later served as a spokesman for the Treasury Department under Secretary Timothy Geithner. Adamske handled communications for issues including the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the auto industry rescue, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. At Treasury, he specialized in domestic finance issues such as the reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the wind-down of TARP, and implementation of Dodd-Frank. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Mr. Adamske.
Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym, Junko Oguri
Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym, Junko Oguri
Journal of Financial Crises
Between September and December 1925, the Second Polish Republic faced a so-called twin-crisis: the złoty, the Polish currency, collapsed, and the financial system faced bank runs and flights of deposits. On November 28, 1925, the Polish Government established Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym (FPIK), injecting over PLN 60 million capital through Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), a national development bank. The government-led capital injection scheme kept supporting the unstable Polish financial system during the inter-war period. Furthermore, in the 1930s, the FPIK served not only the large banks but also smaller financial institutions, and sometimes, non-financial companies. While the FPIK successfully …
Malaysia: Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal), Devyn Jeffereis
Malaysia: Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal), Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
The Malaysian economy was relatively well positioned at the beginning of the Asian Financial Crisis. However, the government’s response of tight fiscal and monetary policy, along with contagion from surrounding countries, had severe negative consequences. The banking industry became particularly vulnerable due to substantial loan growth preceding the crisis and exposure to volatile sectors, leading to an increase in NPLs and capital deterioration. As part of its approach to assist the ailing banking sector, the Bank Negara Malaysia created Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) on August 10, 1998, as a wholly owned subsidiary aimed at recapitalizing banking institutions. Funding for Danamodal …
Prompt Recapitalization Act, Vaasavi Unnava
Prompt Recapitalization Act, Vaasavi Unnava
Journal of Financial Crises
In 1997, Japan’s banks were in crisis due to hundreds of billions of dollars of non-performing real estate loans. In response, the government performed three rounds of capital injections in 1998, 1999, and the early 2000s. The capital injection of 1999, authorized by the Prompt Recapitalization Act, made as much as ¥25 trillion ($208 billion) available to financial institutions that applied, regardless of their capitalization. By the end of the injection window, 32 banks and trusts applied for and received ¥8.6 trillion ($71.6 billion) total in preferred shares and subordinated debts. The Act required banks to submit and adhere to …
Finland’S 1992 Capital Injection, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Finland’S 1992 Capital Injection, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Journal of Financial Crises
Following a large-scale deregulation of the financial sector during the 1980s and subsequent massive credit expansion, a banking crisis in Finland caused a sharp contraction in the economy in the early 1990s. To prevent the collapse of the banking system, the government offered FIM 8 billion in capital injections. Parliament appropriated the funds in the spring of 1992 and terms were defined in June 1992. The program was open to all banks, in proportion to their size, regardless of their solvency. In the fall of 1992, FIM 7.9 billion was deployed to 56 cooperative banks and 22 savings banks of …
Hungary: Magyar Reorganizációs És Követeléskezelő Zrt (Mark Zrt.), Mallory Dreyer
Hungary: Magyar Reorganizációs És Követeléskezelő Zrt (Mark Zrt.), Mallory Dreyer
Journal of Financial Crises
Hungary saw a surge in commercial real estate (CRE) lending prior to the Global Financial Crisis. By 2014, the banking sector was saddled with a high ratio of nonperforming CRE loans and repossessed property, though Hungarian banks remained solvent with high capital adequacy ratios. The central bank of Hungary, the MNB, announced the creation of an asset management company, Magyar Reorganizációs és Követeléskezelő Zrt. (MARK), to purchase nonperforming CRE assets from Hungarian banks on a voluntary basis, to clear their balance sheets and allow for increased lending. MARK was fully-owned by the MNB, which provided MARK’s share capital and a …
Bank Assets Management Company (Bamc), Alexander Nye
Bank Assets Management Company (Bamc), Alexander Nye
Journal of Financial Crises
Slovenia weathered the initial shock of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 well enough to return to growth in 2010. However, non-performing loans continued mounting, banks experienced significant losses, and credit growth turned negative in a credit crunch. Slovenia entered a recession in 2011, experiencing the second largest GDP decline in the euro area. It was not certain whether Slovenia had the fiscal space to resolve these problems without requesting a Troika bailout from the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF). In late 2012 the government tried to prevent such a program by …
The Resolution And Collection Corporation Of Japan, Mallory Dreyer
The Resolution And Collection Corporation Of Japan, Mallory Dreyer
Journal of Financial Crises
Though the Japanese real estate and stock market bubble burst in the early 1990s, the ensuing financial crisis in Japan did not reach a systemic level until 1997, when four large financial institutions failed in a single month. Because of their heavy exposure to real estate and equity markets, Japanese banks had a nonperforming loan (NPL) problem, which was prolonged, and private sector estimates of the scale of the NPL problem differed significantly from the official estimates. In response, the Japanese government created multiple asset management companies; the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) was the result of the merger of …
Us Resolution Trust Corporation, Aidan Lawson, Lily S. Engbith
Us Resolution Trust Corporation, Aidan Lawson, Lily S. Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
The savings and loan (S&L) industry experienced a period of turbulence at the end of the 1970s as sharply increasing interest rates caused much of the value of the industry’s net worth to evaporate due to its focus on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. As a result, a period of rapid deregulation followed, and S&Ls, also called thrifts, engaged in increasingly risky behavior despite many being clearly insolvent. This trend of yield-seeking growth on the part of zombie thrifts forced the government’s hand as huge losses rendered the insurance fund backing the industry, called the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), …