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Mergers, Market Dominance And The Lundbeck Case, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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In Lundbeck the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment that a merger involving the only two drugs approved for treating a serious heart condition in infants was lawful. Although the drugs treated the same condition they were not bioequivalents. The Eighth Circuit approved the district court’s conclusion that they had not been shown to be in the same relevant market.

Most mergers that are subject to challenge under the antitrust laws occur in markets that exhibit some degree of product differentiation. The Lundbeck case illustrates some of the problems that can arise when courts apply ideas derived from models …

The Marginalist Revolution In Corporate Finance: 1880-1965, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fundamental changes in economic thought revolutionized the theory of corporate finance, leading to changes in its legal regulation. The changes were massive, and this branch of financial analysis and law became virtually unrecognizable to those who had practiced it earlier. The source of this revision was the marginalist, or neoclassical, revolution in economic thought. The classical theory had seen corporate finance as an historical, relatively self-executing inquiry based on the classical theory of value and administered by common law courts. By contrast, neoclassical value theory was forward looking and as a result …

A Preface To Neoclassical Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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Most legal historians speak of the period following classical legal thought as “progressive legal thought.” That term creates an unwarranted bias in characterization, however, creating the impression that conservatives clung to an obsolete “classical” ideology, when in fact they were in many ways just as revisionist as the progressives legal thinkers whom they critiqued. The Progressives and New Deal thinkers whom we identify with progressive legal thought were nearly all neoclassical, or marginalist, in their economics, but it is hardly true that all marginalists were progressives. For example, the lawyers and policy makers in the corporate finance battles of the …

When The Government Is The Controlling Shareholder, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock

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As a result of the 2008 bailouts, the United States Government is now the controlling shareholder in AIG, Citigroup, GM, GMAC, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Corporate law provides a complex and comprehensive set of standards of conduct to protect non-controlling shareholders from controlling shareholders who have goals other than maximizing firm value. In this article, we analyze the extent to which these existing corporate law structures of accountability apply when the government is the controlling shareholder, and the extent to which federal “public law” structures substitute for displaced state “private law” norms. We show that the Delaware restrictions on …

Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility And Greenwashing After The Bp Oil Disaster, Miriam A. Cherry, Judd F. Sneirson

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The explosion of the BP-leased Deepwater Horizon and subsequent oil spill stands as an indictment not just of our national energy priorities and environmental law enforcement; it equally represents a failure of Anglo-American corporate law and what passes for corporate social responsibility in business today. Using BP and the disaster as a compelling case study, this Article examines green marketing and corporate governance and identifies elements of each that encourage firms to engage only superficially in corporate social responsibility yet trumpet those efforts to eager consumers and investors. The Article then proposes reforms and protections designed to increase corporate social …

Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax

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Corporate governance scandals inevitably raise concerns about the extent to which corporate directors failed in their responsibility to monitor the corporation and its managers, especially in terms of the latter's’ misdeeds. Corporate governance reforms strive to shore up directors' roles by seeking to ensure that boards have sufficient incentives to engage in effective oversight and to hold the boards more accountable. The current financial crisis has ushered in an era of significant government reform of the financial system and involvement in corporate governance matters. Such involvement has increased board of directors' responsibilities but has not reconciled those responsibilities with board …

The Insignificance Of Proxy Access, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock

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No abstract provided.

Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, Elizabeth Pollman

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Why is a corporation a “person” for purposes of the Constitution? This old question has become new again with public outrage over Citizens United, the recent campaign finance case which expanded corporate constitutional speech rights. This Article traces the historical and jurisprudential developments of corporate personhood and concludes that the doctrine’s origins had the limited purview of protecting individuals’ property and contract interests. Over time, the Supreme Court expanded the doctrine without a coherent explanation or consistent approach. The Court has relied on the older cases that were decided in different contexts and on various flawed conceptions of the corporation. …

The Model Business Corporation Act At Sixty: Shareholders And Their Influence, Lisa Fairfax

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In the sixty years since the Committee on Corporate Laws (Committee) promulgated the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), there have been significant changes in corporate law and corporate governance. One such change has been an increase in shareholder activism aimed at enhancing shareholders’ voting power and influence over corporate affairs. Such increased shareholder activism (along with its potential for increase in shareholder power) has sparked considerable debate. Advocates of increasing shareholder power insist that augmenting shareholders’ voting rights and influence over corporate affairs is vital not only for ensuring board and managerial accountability, but also for curbing fraud and other …

At The Conjunction Of Love And Money: Comment On Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (Or Not) From Economics And Law, William W. Bratton

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No abstract provided.

The Political Economy Of Fraud On The Market, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

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No abstract provided.

The Uncorporation And The Unraveling Of 'Nexus Of Contracts' Theory, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

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This is a review of The Rise of the Uncorporation, by Larry E. Ribstein (Oxford University Press 2010). The Rise of the Uncorporation gives a compelling account of the increasing reliance on business forms other than the corporation. These new organizational forms - such as limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, partnerships, and the like - give businesses greater freedom to structure themselves in ways that best facilitate their particular needs. And this, according to Ribstein, is an unqualified good, for it allows firms to operate more efficiently than if they were forced to assume an intensely regulated form.

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