Special Justifications, 2019 Notre Dame Law School
Special Justifications, Randy J. Kozel
Randy J Kozel
The Supreme Court commonly asks whether there is a “special justification” for departing from precedent. In this Response, which is part of a Constitutional Commentary symposium on Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent, I examine the existing law of special justifications and describe its areas of uncertainty. I also compare the Court’s current doctrine with a revised approach to special justifications designed to separate the question of overruling from deeper disagreements about legal interpretation. The aspiration is to establish precedent as a unifying force that enhances the impersonality of the Court and of the law, promoting values the ...
Consequences Of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 2019 University of California, Berkeley
Consequences Of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, Jesse H. Choper
Jesse H Choper
The thrust of this Article is to attempt to ascertain just what differences the Court's judgments upholding individual constitutional rights have made for those who fall within the ambit of their protection. It seeks to address such questions as: What were the conditions that existed before the Court's ruling? How many people were subject to the regime that was invalidated by the Justices? Was the Court's mandate successfully implemented? What were the consequences for those affected? At a subjective level, were the repercussions perceived as salutary by those (or at least most of those) who were the ...
Regulating White Desire, 2019 Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University
Regulating White Desire, Reginald Oh
This Article contends that segregationist justifications for miscegenation and segregation laws shows that those laws effectively imposed a legal duty on whites to adhere to cultural norms of endogamy. Dominant social groups enforce rules of endogamy—the cultural practice of encouraging people to marry within their own social group—to protect the dominant status of their individual members and of the social group in general. Thus, laws prohibiting interracial marriages regulated white desire in order to protect the dominant status of whites as a group. The Loving Court, therefore, ultimately was correct in declaring that miscegenation laws denied blacks equal ...
The Rhetoric Of Constitutional Law, 2019 University of Southern California Law School
The Rhetoric Of Constitutional Law, Erwin Chemerinsky
I spend much of my time dealing with Supreme Court opinions. Usually, I download and read them the day that they are announced by the Court. I edit them for my casebook and teach them to my students. I write about them, lecture about them, and litigate about them. My focus, like I am sure most everyone's, is functional: I try to discern the holding, appraise the reasoning, ascertain the implications, and evaluate the decision's desirability. Increasingly, though, I have begun to think that this functional approach is overlooking a crucial aspect of Supreme Court decisions: their rhetoric ...
The Supreme Court And Public Schools, 2019 University of California, Berkeley School of Law
The Supreme Court And Public Schools, Erwin Chemerinsky
Review of Justin Driver's The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind.
Thinking About The Supreme Court's Successes And Failures, 2019 Selected Works
Thinking About The Supreme Court's Successes And Failures, Erwin Chemerinsky
The Supreme Court often has failed at its most important tasks and at the most important times. I set out this thesis at the beginning the book:
To be clear, I am not saying that the Supreme Court has failed at these crucial tasks every time. Making a case against the Supreme Court does not require taking such an extreme position. I also will talk about areas where the Court has succeeded in protecting minorities and in enforcing the limits of the Constitution. My claim is that the Court has often failed where and when it has been most needed ...
Comparing Supreme Court Jurisprudence In Obergefell V. Hodges And Town Of Castle Rock V. Gonzales: A Watershed Moment For Due Process Liberty, Jill C. Engle
“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.” -- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015)(emphasis ...
Peña-Rodriguez V. Colorado: Carving Out A Racial-Bias Exception To The No-Impeachment Rule, 2019 St. Mary's University School of Law
Peña-Rodriguez V. Colorado: Carving Out A Racial-Bias Exception To The No-Impeachment Rule, John Austin Morales
St. Mary's Law Journal
The Sixth Amendment safeguards an accused in criminal proceedings and affords them “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” Consistent with this right, the no-impeachment rule prohibits a juror from testifying after a verdict has been handed down about the jurors’ deliberations. While there are limited exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, juror expressed racial bias is not one of them. When presented with the dilemma of a juror using racial bias in deliberations, courts must weigh two competing doctrines that serve as the foundation to our judicial system: (1) affording a defendant his or her ...
The Mosaic Theory Of The Fourth Amendment, 2019 George Washington University Law School
The Mosaic Theory Of The Fourth Amendment, Orin S. Kerr
In the Supreme Court's recent decision on GPS surveillance, United States v. Jones, five justices authored or joined concurring opinions that applied a new approach to interpreting Fourth Amendment protection. Before Jones, Fourth Amendment decisions had always evaluated each step of an investigation individually. Jones introduced what we might call a "mosaic theory" of the Fourth Amendment, by which courts evaluate a collective sequence of government activity as an aggregated whole to consider whether the sequence amounts to a search. This Article considers the implications of a mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. It explores the choices and puzzles ...
Leidos And The Roberts Court's Improvident Securities Law Docket, 2019 Indiana University
Leidos And The Roberts Court's Improvident Securities Law Docket, Matthew C. Turk, Karen E. Woody
For its October 2017 term, the U.S. Supreme Court took up a noteworthy securities law case, Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Public Retirement System. The legal question presented in Leidos was whether a failure to comply with a regulation issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Item 303 of Regulation S-K (Item 303), can be grounds for a securities fraud claim pursuant to Rule 10b-5 and the related Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Leidos teed up a significant set of issues because Item 303 concerns one of the more controversial corporate disclosures mandated by the ...
Justice Kavanaugh, Lorenzo V. Sec, And The Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 2019 Indiana University
Justice Kavanaugh, Lorenzo V. Sec, And The Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, Matthew C. Turk, Karen E. Woody
This Article analyzes a recent Supreme Court case, Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, and explains why it provides a valuable window into the Court's future now that Justice Kennedy has retired and his seat filled by Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Lorenzo is an important case that raises fundamental interpretative questions about the reach of federal securities statutes. But most significant is its unique procedural posture: when the Supreme Court issues its decision on Lorenzo in 2019, Justice Kavanaugh will be recused while the other eight Justices rule on a lower court opinion from the D.C. Circuit in which ...
Capturing The Judiciary: Carhart And The Undue Burden Standard, 2019 Boston Univeristy School of Law
Capturing The Judiciary: Carhart And The Undue Burden Standard, Khiara Bridges
Khiara M Bridges
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court replaced the trimester framework, first articulated nineteen years earlier in Roe v. Wade, with a new test for determining the constitutionality of abortion regulations — the “undue burden standard.” The Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart was its most recent occasion to use the undue burden standard, as the Court was called upon to ascertain the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, a federal statute proscribing certain methods of performing second- and third-trimester abortions. A majority of the Court held that the regulation was constitutionally permissible, finding ...
Article Iii, Judicial Restraint, And This Supreme Court, 2019 Husch Blackwell LLP
Article Iii, Judicial Restraint, And This Supreme Court, Joseph S. Diedrich
SMU Law Review
Article III of the U.S. Constitution establishes a federal judiciary with powers and functions separate and distinct from the other branches. During its October 2017 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases that turned on an interpretation of Article III power: Patchak v. Zinke, Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, and Gill v. Whitford.
This Article argues that in each of those three cases, a majority of the
Court coalesced around a unifying principle of judicial restraint. By “judicial restraint,” this Article refers to the principle that the judiciary should respect and defer to ...
To Compare Or Not To Compare? Reading Justice Breyer, 2019 Washington and Lee University School of Law
To Compare Or Not To Compare? Reading Justice Breyer, Russell A. Miller
Russell A. Miller
Justice Breyer's new book The Court and the World presents a number of productive challenges. First, it provides an opportunity to reflect generally on extra-judicial scholarly activities. Second, it is a major and important - but also troubling - contribution to debates about comparative law broadly, and the opening of domestic constitutional regimes to external law and legal phenomena more specifically. I begin by suggesting a critique of the first of these points. These are merely some thoughts on the implications of extra-judicial scholarship. The greater portion of this essay, however, is devoted to a reading of Justice Breyer's book ...
A Constellation Of Benefits And A Universe Of Equal Protection: The Extension Of The Right To Marry Under Pavan V. Smith, 2019 University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
A Constellation Of Benefits And A Universe Of Equal Protection: The Extension Of The Right To Marry Under Pavan V. Smith, Brad Aldridge
Arkansas Law Review
In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States in Obergefell v. Hodges recognized the constitutional right of all persons, including same-sex couples, to lawfully marry. In 2017, in Pavan v. Smith, the Court recognized that Obergefell extends that right to much more than the act of marriage in itself. Any person who would have been denied the right to marry the person of her choice before Obergefell now enjoys not only the rights of marriage licensing and recognition, but also the full “constellation” of rights and responsibilities that attend marriage among traditional opposite-sex couples. The Court believed that this ...
Defying Mcculloch? Jackson’S Bank Veto Reconsidered, 2019 University of Wisconsin, Madison
Defying Mcculloch? Jackson’S Bank Veto Reconsidered, David S. Schwartz
Arkansas Law Review
On July 10, 1832, President Andrew Jackson issued the most famous and controversial veto in United States history. The bill in question was “to modify and continue” the 1816 “act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States. This was to recharter of the Second Bank of the United States whose constitutionality was famously upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland. The bill was passed by Congress and presented to Jackson on July 4. Six days later, Jackson vetoed the bill. Jackson’s veto mortally wounded the Second Bank, which would forever close its doors four years later at ...
Overruling Mcculloch?, 2019 University of Marlyand, Baltimore
Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber
Arkansas Law Review
Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress. This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster was a close association of Justice Joseph Story. The justices at this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial sentiments on the issues of the day. Even if Webster lacked first-hand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig pessimism ...
M'Culloch In Context, 2019 University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck
Arkansas Law Review
M’Culloch v. Maryland is rightly regarded as a landmark opinion, one that affirmed the ability of Congress to exercise implied powers, articulated a rule of deference to Congressional judgments about whether given legislative actions were in fact “necessary,” and limited the ability of the states to impair or restrict the operations of the federal government. Most scholarly discussions of the case and its legacy emphasize these aspects of the decision. Less common are attempts to place M’Culloch within the ebb and flow of the Marshall Court and the political and social realities of the time. So, for example ...
The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, 2019 University of Texas, Austin
The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson
Arkansas Law Review
All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition ...
Mcculloch At 200, 2019 University of Wisconsin, Madison
Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz
Arkansas Law Review
March 6, 2019 marked the 200th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, the successor to Alexander Hamilton’s national bank. McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge by the Second Bank of the United States to a Maryland tax on the banknotes issued by the Bank’s Baltimore branch. The tax was probably designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing loans and thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own state-chartered banks. Marshall’s opinion famously rejected the ...