Perfect Hedge: Adding Precision To The Proposed Sec Rule On Investment Company Use Of Derivatives With A Hedging Exception, 2018 Boston College Law School
Perfect Hedge: Adding Precision To The Proposed Sec Rule On Investment Company Use Of Derivatives With A Hedging Exception, David Miller
Boston College Law Review
Derivatives are complex financial instruments that derive their value from an underlying asset. Used and valued by commercial and financial institutions, derivatives are booming. Indeed, the growing $600 trillion derivative market dwarfs the $67 trillion stock market. Yet, the magnification effect of derivative leverage on losses has well-documented ties to the 2008 Financial Crisis when AIG, Lehman Brothers, and other financial institutions found themselves indebted on hundreds of billions of dollars in derivative transactions. Since the crisis, investment companies and funds constrained by the Investment Company Act to protect unsophisticated and vulnerable investors have increased their use of derivatives. In ...
Securities Fraud Embedded In The Market Structure Crisis: High-Frequency Traders As Primary Violators, 2018 College of William & Mary Law School
Securities Fraud Embedded In The Market Structure Crisis: High-Frequency Traders As Primary Violators, Stanislav Dolgopolov
William & Mary Business Law Review
This Article analyzes approaches to attaching liability for securities fraud to high-frequency traders as primary violators in connection with the current market structure crisis. One of the manifestations of this crisis pertains to inadequate disclosure of advanced functionalities offered by trading venues, as exemplified by the order type controversy. The Article’s analysis is applied to secret arrangements between trading venues and preferred traders, glitches and gaming, and the reach of the doctrine of market manipulation, and several relevant issues are also viewed from the standpoint of the integrity of the trading process. The Article concludes by arguing for a ...
Reputational Economies Of Scale, 2018 USC Law School
Reputational Economies Of Scale, Daniel M. Klerman
University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series
For many years, most scholars have assumed that the strength of reputational incentives is positively correlated with the frequency of repeat play. Firms that sell more products or services were thought more likely to be trustworthy than those that sell less because they have more to lose if consumers decide they have behaved badly. That assumption has been called into question by recent work that shows that, under the standard infinitely repeated game model of reputation, reputational economies of scale will occur only under special conditions, such as monopoly, because larger firms not only have more to lose from behaving ...
Third-Party Institutional Proxy Advisors: Conflicts Of Interest And Roads To Reform, 2018 University of Michigan Law School
Third-Party Institutional Proxy Advisors: Conflicts Of Interest And Roads To Reform, Matthew Fagan
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
With the rise of institutional activist investors in recent decades—including a purported 495 activist campaigns against U.S. corporations in 2016 alone—the role that third-party institutional proxy advisors play in corporate governance has greatly increased. The United States Office of Government Accountability estimates that clients of the top five proxy advisory firms account for about $41.5 trillion in equity throughout the world. For several years, discussions have developed regarding conflicts of interest faced by proxy advisors. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, the top proxy advisory firm in the world, frequently provides advice to institutional investors on how ...
Insider Trading Law And The Ambiguous Quest For Edge, 2018 University of Michigan Law School
Insider Trading Law And The Ambiguous Quest For Edge, A. C. Pritchard
Michigan Law Review
A review of Sheelah Kolhatkar, Black Edge.
The Shadow Of Free Enterprise: The Unconstitutionality Of The Securities & Exchange Commission’S Administrative Law Judges, Linda D. Jellum, Moses M. Tincher
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
Six years ago, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), for the first time giving the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to seek monetary penalties through its in-house adjudication. The SEC already had the power to seek such penalties in federal court. With the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC’s enforcement division could now choose between an adjudication before an SEC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or a civil action before an Article III judge. With this new choice, the SEC realized a significant home-court advantage. For example, in 2014, the SEC’s enforcement ...
Unicorns, Guardians, And The Concentration Of The U.S. Equity Markets, 2018 University at Buffalo Law School
Unicorns, Guardians, And The Concentration Of The U.S. Equity Markets, Amy Deen Westbrook, David A. Westbrook
No abstract provided.
Selective Disclosure And Insider Trading, 2018 University of Florida Levin College of Law
Selective Disclosure And Insider Trading, Michael Guttentag
Florida Law Review
Determining when the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information should trigger insider trading liability is a deeply problematic aspect of insider trading doctrine.
The current rule is that a selective disclosure can only trigger insider trading liability if “the insider [making the selective disclosure] personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” Dirks v. SEC introduced this “personal benefit” test in 1983 to balance four competing rationales for determining when a tip should trigger insider trading liability. Two developments since Dirks have made problems with this personal benefit test insurmountable. First, the SEC’s enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure ...
Insider Tainting: Strategic Tipping Of Material Nonpublic Information, 2018 Northwestern Pritzker School of Law
Insider Tainting: Strategic Tipping Of Material Nonpublic Information, Andrew Verstein
Northwestern University Law Review
Insider trading law is meant to be a shield, protecting the market and investors from unscrupulous traders, but it can also be a sword. Insofar as we penalize trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information, it becomes possible to share information strategically in order to disable or constrain innocent investors. A hostile takeover can be averted, or a bidding war curtailed, because recipients of such information must then refrain from trading. This Article offers the first general account of “insider tainting,” an increasingly pervasive phenomenon of weaponizing insider trading law.
Mom Approval In A World Of Active Shareholders, 2018 NYU School of Law
Mom Approval In A World Of Active Shareholders, Edward Rock
New York University Law and Economics Working Papers
Majority of Minority (MOM) approval is a common mechanism used in many jurisdictions to control conflicts of interest in related party transactions. Recently, in M & F Worldwide, the Delaware Supreme Court held that MOM approval in a controlling shareholder freezeout shifted the standard of review from Entire Fairness to Business Judgement Rule. In this article, I investigate how MOM approval functions in the presence of active shareholders (both hedge funds and actively managed mutual funds).
After reviewing the potential benefits and problems with MOM approval, I review the use of MOM provisions in controlling shareholder freezeouts in the U.S. between 2010 and 2017. I combine this with three case studies involving MOM approval: the Dell MBO; the Oracle/NetSuite merger; and the unsuccessful effort by the Dolan family to take Cablevision private in 2007. I then briefly consider a quite different sort of MOM approval: the EU Takeover Directive’s requirement that conditions mandatory freezeouts on achieving a very high level of ownership (90-95%), typically through a tender offer.
The principal lessons of this investigation are ambiguous. First, I do not find significant evidence that the use of MOM conditions in ...
The Risk Of Regulatory Arbitrage: A Response To Securities Regulation In Virtual Space, 2018 University of Idaho College of Law
The Risk Of Regulatory Arbitrage: A Response To Securities Regulation In Virtual Space, Wendy Gerwick Couture
Washington and Lee Law Review Online
In Securities Regulation in Virtual Space, Eric. C. Chaffee explores the potential applicability of the securities laws to virtual transactions based on virtual activity and argues that, although many of these transactions likely qualify as “investment contracts” under S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., they should be excluded under the context clause because, among other reasons, application of the securities laws would stifle creativity within this innovative space. This Response proposes a reframing of the Howey test as a response to the risk of regulatory arbitrage, argues that the context clause should only exclude transactions that do not ...
What Happens In Delaware Need Not Stay In Delaware: How Trulia Can Strengthen Private Enforcement Of The Federal Securities Laws, 2018 Brigham Young University Law School
What Happens In Delaware Need Not Stay In Delaware: How Trulia Can Strengthen Private Enforcement Of The Federal Securities Laws
BYU Law Review
Class-action lawsuits have been used by private plaintiffs to enforce the federal securities laws since those laws were enacted in the 1930s. With the SEC retaining concurrent authority to enforce federal securities laws, a debate has emerged as to whether the private right of action helps or hinders public enforcement. The primary criticism of private securities litigation is that rent-seeking attorneys abuse the system by bringing frivolous litigation aimed at achieving a settlement and a fee. In the public merger context, the potentially disastrous consequences of failing to close an announced deal on time make corporations eager to settle potentially ...
Central Clearing Of Financial Contracts: Theory And Regulatory Implications, 2018 Duke Law School
Central Clearing Of Financial Contracts: Theory And Regulatory Implications, Steven L. Schwarcz
To protect economic stability, post-crisis regulation requires financial institutions to clear and settle most of their derivatives contracts through central counterparties, such as clearinghouses associated with securities exchanges. This Article asks whether regulators should expand the central clearing requirement to non-derivative financial contracts, such as loan agreements. The Article begins by theorizing how and why central clearing can reduce systemic risk. It then examines the theory’s regulatory and economic efficiency implications, first for current requirements to centrally clear derivatives contracts and thereafter for deciding whether to extend those requirements to non-derivative contracts. The inquiry has real practical importance because ...
Regulating Robo Advice Across The Financial Services Industry, 2018 University of Pennsylvania Law School
Regulating Robo Advice Across The Financial Services Industry, Tom Baker, Benedict G. C. Dellaert
Automated financial product advisors – “robo advisors” – are emerging across the financial services industry, helping consumers choose investments, banking products, and insurance policies. Robo advisors have the potential to lower the cost and increase the quality and transparency of financial advice for consumers. But they also pose significant new challenges for regulators who are accustomed to assessing human intermediaries. A well-designed robo advisor will be honest and competent, and it will recommend only suitable products. Because humans design and implement robo advisors, however, honesty, competence, and suitability cannot simply be assumed. Moreover, robo advisors pose new scale risks that are different ...
The Logic And Limits Of Event Studies In Securities Fraud Litigation, 2018 University of Pennsylvania Law School
The Logic And Limits Of Event Studies In Securities Fraud Litigation, Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach, Jonathan Klick
Event studies have become increasingly important in securities fraud litigation after the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton II. Litigants have used event study methodology, which empirically analyzes the relationship between the disclosure of corporate information and the issuer’s stock price, to provide evidence in the evaluation of key elements of federal securities fraud, including materiality, reliance, causation, and damages. As the use of event studies grows and they increasingly serve a gatekeeping function in determining whether litigation will proceed beyond a preliminary stage, it will be critical for courts to use them correctly.
This Article explores an array ...
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, 2018 Duke Law School
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Critiques of specific investor behavior often assume an ideal investor against which all others should be compared. This ideal investor figures prominently in the heated debates over the impact of investor time horizons on firm value. In much of the commentary, the ideal is a longterm investor that actively monitors management, but the specifics are typically left vague. That is no coincidence. The various characteristics that we might wish for in such an investor cannot peacefully coexist in practice.
If the ideal investor remains illusory, which of the real-world investor types should we champion instead? The answer, I argue, is ...
The Hausmann-Gorky Effect, 2018 Duke Law School
The Hausmann-Gorky Effect, Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza
For over a century, legal scholars have debated the question of what to do about the debts incurred by despotic governments; asking whether successor non-despotic governments should have to pay them. That debate has gone nowhere. This paper examines whether an Op Ed written by Harvard economist, Ricardo Hausmann, in May 2017, may have shown an alternative path to the goal of increasing the cost of borrowing for despotic governments. Hausmann, in his Op Ed, had sought to produce a pricing penalty on the entire Venezuelan debt stock by trying to shame JPMorgan into removing Venezuelan bonds from its emerging ...
The Regulation Of Trading Markets: A Survey And Evaluation, 2018 University of Virginia School of Law
The Regulation Of Trading Markets: A Survey And Evaluation, Paul G. Mahoney, Gabriel V. Rauterberg
This chapter was prepared for a conference exploring the desirability and structure of a new special study of the securities markets. Our objective is not to resolve all of the questions that commentators have raised about the new equity markets, but to lay the groundwork for a new special study by surveying the state of market regulation, identifying issues, and offering preliminary evaluations.
Investors' Paradox, 2018 University of Washington School of Law
Investors' Paradox, Anita K. Krug
For the first time in an era, new investment products for smaller ("retail ") investors are emerging. These products are mutual funds that engage in the types of trading and investment activities that have long been the province of sophisticated investors. Accordingly, the new funds (called "alternative funds") promise to reduce the gulf between retail investors and their sophisticated counterparts, in terms of portfolio diversification and investment results.
This Article describes the complex mix of factors that spawned alternative funds and critically evaluates the funds' potential, the first scholarly work to do so. It additionally unearths the paradox that impedes the ...
Whistling Loud And Clear: Applying Chevron To Subsection 21f Of Dodd–Frank, 2018 Washington and Lee University School of Law
Whistling Loud And Clear: Applying Chevron To Subsection 21f Of Dodd–Frank, Shaun M. Bennett
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.