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Conscience And Complicity: Assessing Pleas For Religious Exemptions In Hobby Lobby's Wake, Amy Sepinwall 2015 Legal Studies & Business Ethics/Wharton University of Pennsylvania

Conscience And Complicity: Assessing Pleas For Religious Exemptions In Hobby Lobby's Wake, Amy Sepinwall

Amy J. Sepinwall

In the paradigmatic case of conscientious objection, the objector claims that his religion forbids him from actively participating in a wrong (e.g., by fighting in a war). In the religious challenges to the Affordable Care Act’s employer mandate, on the other hand, employers claim that their religious convictions forbid them from merely subsidizing insurance through which their employees might commit a wrong (e.g., by using contraception). The understanding of complicity underpinning these challenges is vastly more expansive than what standard legal doctrine or moral theory contemplates. Courts routinely reject claims of conscientious objection to taxes that fund ...


Wink, Wink, Nudge Judge: Persuading U.S. Courts To Take Accountants Seriously In Federal Securities Cases With Help From The U.K. Companies Act, Kurt S. Schulzke 2015 Kennesaw State University

Wink, Wink, Nudge Judge: Persuading U.S. Courts To Take Accountants Seriously In Federal Securities Cases With Help From The U.K. Companies Act, Kurt S. Schulzke

Kurt S. Schulzke

The 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers reopened wounds many thought were healed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The Lehman litigation finally ended in late 2013 with audit firm Ernst & Young paying $99 million to investors who claimed the firm misled them with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and other defendants, including banks, officers, and directors, paying out more than $500 million. The bright line standards of GAAP and SOX were obviously not enough to protect Lehman plaintiffs or defendants. Why not? The 2006 fraud trial of Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling offers clues. When asked at trial whether U ...


Shareholder Wealth Maximization And Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, Bernard S. Sharfman 2015 University of Florida Levin College of Law

Shareholder Wealth Maximization And Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, Bernard S. Sharfman

Florida Law Review

This Article tackles the question of when courts should intervene in the decision-making of a corporation and review a corporate business decision for shareholder wealth maximization. This Article takes a very traditional approach to answering this question. It notes with approval that courts have historically been very hesitant to participate in the process of determining if a corporate decision is wealth maximizing. Courts have restrained themselves from interfering with board decision-making because they understand that it is the board of directors (the board) in coordination with executive management that has the best information and expertise to determine if a corporate ...


Facilitating Successful Failures, Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic Griffin 2015 University of Florida Levin College of Law

Facilitating Successful Failures, Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic Griffin

Florida Law Review

Approximately 80,000 businesses fail each year in the United States. This Article presents an original empirical study that surveys more than 400 business restructuring professionals. The study focuses on a critical factor that arguably contributes to these failures—the conduct of boards of directors and management. Anecdotal evidence suggests that management of distressed companies often bury their heads in the sand until it is too late to remedy the companies’ problems, a phenomenon commonly called “ostrich syndrome.” The data confirm this behavior, shows a prevalent use of loss framing, and suggest trends consistent with prospect theory. This Article draws ...


Deferred Prosecutions And Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach To Investigation And Reform, Lawrence A. Cunningham 2015 University of Florida Levin College of Law

Deferred Prosecutions And Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach To Investigation And Reform, Lawrence A. Cunningham

Florida Law Review

When evaluating how to proceed against a corporate investigative target, law enforcement authorities often ignore the target’s governance arrangements, while subsequently negotiating or imposing governance requirements, especially in deferred prosecution agreements. Ignoring governance structures and processes amid investigation can be hazardous, and implementing improvised reforms afterwards may have severe unintended consequences—particularly when prescribing standardized governance devices. Drawing, in part, on new lessons from three prominent cases—Arthur Andersen, AIG, and Bristol-Myers Squibb—this Article criticizes prevailing discord and urges prosecutors to contemplate corporate governance at the outset and to articulate rationales for prescribed changes. Integrating the role of ...


Confronting The Two Faces Of Corporate Fraud, Miriam H. Baer 2015 University of Florida Levin College of Law

Confronting The Two Faces Of Corporate Fraud, Miriam H. Baer

Florida Law Review

Some criminals engage in meticulous planning. Others commit crimes in the heat of the moment. Corporate fraud incorporates both planned and spur-of-the-moment misconduct. Although law and economics scholars have traditionally viewed corporate fraud as a manifestation of opportunism among the corporation’s agents, a new generation of scholars, influenced by findings in behavioral psychology, has focused on the temporal aspects of corporate misconduct. Wrongdoing comes about, not simply because an agent opportunistically takes advantage of her principal, but also because her short-term self falls prey to temptations and cognitive biases that effectively disable her law-abiding long-term self.

Although the law ...


The Joint Venture And Related Contract Laws Of Mainland China And Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis, Clyde D. Stoltenberg, David W. McClure 2015 University of Kansas

The Joint Venture And Related Contract Laws Of Mainland China And Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis, Clyde D. Stoltenberg, David W. Mcclure

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces 2015 Seattle University School of Law

Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces

Seattle University Law Review

For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader societal interests. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversation over eighty years ago, and it continues today, with voices at various places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost sight of whatever common ground they may be able ...


Lobbying, Pandering, And Information In The Firm, Adam B. Badawi 2015 Seattle University School of Law

Lobbying, Pandering, And Information In The Firm, Adam B. Badawi

Seattle University Law Review

In their classic and insightful article on team production in corporate law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout identify the minimization of rent-seeking as one of the chief benefits of vesting ultimate authority over a firm with the board of directors. In their analysis, this problematic rent-seeking arises when parties need to divide the gains from production after the fact. The squabbling that is likely to ensue may threaten to eat away most, or all, of the gains that come from productive activity. If parties know that this sort of rent-seeking will occur, they may not engage in productive activity in ...


Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair 2015 Seattle University School of Law

Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair

Seattle University Law Review

In June of 2014, the board of directors of Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc.—better known as Market Basket, a mid-sized chain of grocery stores in New England—decided to oust the man who had been CEO for the previous six years, Arthur T. Demoulas. Most likely, the board of directors did not anticipate what happened next: Thousands of employees, customers, and fans of Market Basket boycotted the stores and staged noisy public protests asking the board to reinstate “Arthur T.” The reaction by employees and customers made what had been a simmering, nasty, intrafamily feud within the closely held Market Basket ...


Choosing The Partnership: English Business Organization Law During The Industrial Revolution, Ryan Bubb 2015 Seattle University School of Law

Choosing The Partnership: English Business Organization Law During The Industrial Revolution, Ryan Bubb

Seattle University Law Review

For most of the period associated with the Industrial Revolution in Britain, English law restricted access to incorporation and the Bubble Act explicitly outlawed the formation of unincorporated joint stock companies with transferable shares. Furthermore, firms in the manufacturing industries most closely associated with the Industrial Revolution were overwhelmingly partnerships. These two facts have led some scholars to posit that the antiquated business organization law was a constraint on the structural transformation and growth that characterized the British economy during the period. Importantly, however, the vast majority of manufacturing firms in the modern sector were partnerships. An easy explanation for ...


The Boundaries Of "Team" Production Of Corporate Governance, Anthony J. Casey, M. Todd Henderson 2015 Seattle University School of Law

The Boundaries Of "Team" Production Of Corporate Governance, Anthony J. Casey, M. Todd Henderson

Seattle University Law Review

We examine the cooperative production of corporate governance. We explain that this production does not occur exclusively within a “team” or “firm.” Rather, several aspects of corporate governance are quintessentially market products. Like Blair and Stout, we view the shareholder as but one of many stakeholders in a corporation. Where we depart from their analysis is in our view of the boundaries of a firm. We suggest that they overweight the intrafirm production of control. Focusing on the primacy of a board of directors, Blair and Stout posit a hierarchical team that governs the economic enterprise. We observe, however, that ...


The Team Production Model As A Paradigm, Brian R. Cheffins 2015 Seattle University School of Law

The Team Production Model As A Paradigm, Brian R. Cheffins

Seattle University Law Review

Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout suggested a few years after the publication of their 1999 Virginia Law Review article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, that their team production model was poised to emerge as part of a new corporate law “paradigm.” In so doing, they specifically invoked Thomas Kuhn’s well-known analysis of scientific revolutions. This Article revisits Blair and Stout’s team production theory by offering a critique of their claim that their model is destined to become a new corporate law paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. In so doing the Article draws upon key corporate law ...


The Long Road To Reformulating The Understanding Of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, Thomas Clarke 2015 Seattle University School of Law

The Long Road To Reformulating The Understanding Of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, Thomas Clarke

Seattle University Law Review

In this Article, the historical evolution of corporate governance is considered, highlighting the different eras of governance, the dominant theoretical and practical paradigms, and the reformulation of paradigms and counter paradigms. Two alternative and sharply contrasting theorizations, one collective and collaborative (the work of Berle and Means), the other individualistic and contractual (agency theory and shareholder value) are focused upon. The explanatory potential of Blair and Stout’s team production theory is elaborated, along with its conception of the complexity of business enterprise, with a mediating hierarch (the board of directors) securing a balance between the interests of different stakeholders ...


Testing The Normative Desirability Of The Mediating Hierarch, Zachary J. Gubler 2015 Seattle University School of Law

Testing The Normative Desirability Of The Mediating Hierarch, Zachary J. Gubler

Seattle University Law Review

In their influential article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout explained how corporate law might be viewed as an attempt at solving what is known as the team production problem. At its core, this problem has to do with the opportunistic behavior that arises when multiple economic actors make investments—whether of labor, capital, or otherwise—in a business venture where these investments are said to be “firm specific” because they cannot be easily withdrawn and redeployed in other projects. The problem is how to construct a governance regime that will create incentives ...


Team Production & The Multinational Enterprise, Virginia Harper Ho 2015 Seattle University School of Law

Team Production & The Multinational Enterprise, Virginia Harper Ho

Seattle University Law Review

Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s path-breaking article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, advances a dual thesis: first, that team production theory does a better job than its competitors (in particular, principal–agent theory) of explaining the advantages of the public corporation and key features of corporate law; and second, that, as a matter of corporate law, corporate boards are charged with advancing the collective interest of all the contributors to the corporate enterprise rather than the shareholders’ interests alone. Its central insight is that the role of the independent, or insulated, corporate board is to serve as ...


The History Of Team Production Theory, Ron Harris 2015 Seattle University School of Law

The History Of Team Production Theory, Ron Harris

Seattle University Law Review

In this short Essay, the author consider the team production theory developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout1 from a historical perspective, in three senses. First, does the theory fit the historical use of the corporate form? Second, can it explain the development of corporation law doctrines? And third, can we place the development of the theory as such into the intellectual history of corporation theories at large? The author will state my bottom line up front: while the Article finds the team production theory insightful and useful for my historical research, for teaching corporation law, and for thinking about ...


The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Claire A. Hill, Brett H. McDonnell 2015 Seattle University School of Law

The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Claire A. Hill, Brett H. Mcdonnell

Seattle University Law Review

In the “managerialist” world that preceded our present shareholder value world, some corporate managers could, and did, help themselves when they should have been doing their jobs. The modern agency cost paradigm has focused attention on this problem, in part by conceptualizing the duty of corporate managers as maximizing shareholder value. This paradigm has had a variety of effects: some good, some bad, and some ugly. The agency cost paradigm has had a good effect by focusing on the problem of managerial enrichment and providing a simple, clear benchmark—shareholder value-- that may quickly indicate when managers are performing badly ...


A Theory Of The Just Corporation, Ronit Donyets-Kedar 2015 Seattle University School of Law

A Theory Of The Just Corporation, Ronit Donyets-Kedar

Seattle University Law Review

In their seminal article A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout hold that the modern corporation is best understood in terms of team production. Challenging the principal–agent model, Blair and Stout offer an analysis that considers the various stakeholders of the corporation as members of a team. Accordingly, they suggest, the purpose of corporate law is to provide a response to the problems created by collective production processes, in particular those pertaining to the distribution of profits stemming from the cooperation. According to Blair and Stout, the solution to this problem is to be ...


Hostile Takeovers And Overreliance, Anthony Niblett 2015 Seattle University School of Law

Hostile Takeovers And Overreliance, Anthony Niblett

Seattle University Law Review

Commentators have argued that employees should be compensated in the event of a hostile takeover; otherwise, the threat of such a takeover will fail to incentivize firm-specific investments by employees. Such deferred compensation is analogous to the payment of damages following a breach of contract. The analogous breach, here, is the breach of an implicit contract between management and employees. Employees trusted management to compensate them for firm-specific investments not explicitly contracted for. This Article uses a familiar result from the contract law literature: There is no measure of damages for breach of contract that can generate both efficient breach ...


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