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A House Divided: When State And Lower Federal Courts Disagree On Federal Constitutional Rights, Wayne A. Logan 2014 Florida State University College of Law

A House Divided: When State And Lower Federal Courts Disagree On Federal Constitutional Rights, Wayne A. Logan

Scholarly Publications

Despite their many differences, Americans have long been bound by a shared sense of federal constitutional commonality. As this article demonstrates, however, federal constitutional rights do in fact often differ — even within individual states — as a result of state and lower federal court concurrent authority to interpret the Constitution and the lack of any requirement that they defer to one another’s positions. The article provides the first in-depth examination of intra-state, state-federal court conflicts on federal constitutional law and the problems that they create. Focusing on criminal procedure doctrine in particular, with its unique impact on individual liberty …


Table Annexed To Article: Surveying The 831 Unique Words In The Philadelphia Constitution, Peter Aschenbrenner 2014 Purdue University

Table Annexed To Article: Surveying The 831 Unique Words In The Philadelphia Constitution, Peter Aschenbrenner

Peter J. Aschenbrenner

Of the 831 unique words in the Philadelphia Constitution, what were the most frequently used words? The least? OCL lists all unique words in rank order with and without frequencies, accounting for the word total of 4,321 words in the Philadelphia Constitution.


The Colony-Making Power Of Congress Priced In The Purchase Of Alaska, Peter Aschenbrenner 2014 Purdue University

The Colony-Making Power Of Congress Priced In The Purchase Of Alaska, Peter Aschenbrenner

Peter J. Aschenbrenner

There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure, Our Constitutional Logic paraphrases the immediate cause of the Civil War, with citation to Dred Scott’s case at 60 U.S. 393, 446 (1857). That, however, is not the only defect in the purchase of Alaska from the Czar of the Russias. Our Constitutional Logic investigates the non-Euclidean geometry pertinent to the treaty’s boundaries such as they might appear on the sphere near you.


Madison's Redans, Ravelins And Bastions: A Short History Of The War Of 1812, Peter Aschenbrenner 2014 Purdue University

Madison's Redans, Ravelins And Bastions: A Short History Of The War Of 1812, Peter Aschenbrenner

Peter J. Aschenbrenner

The employment of earthworks and breastworks in defense of dense communities is considered in light of the advice of Baron Henri de Jomini which the Secretary of Defense transmitted before Madison appointed. Because the Secretary failed to follow the Baron’s advice – which the Secretary had transmitted into print culture as Hints to Young Generals – Madison sacked him after the battle of Bladensburg.


Los Sindicatos, La Convención Colectiva Y El Derecho A La Pensión En El Marco Constitucional Actual, Fernando Castillo Cadena 2014 Pontificia Universidad Javeriana

Los Sindicatos, La Convención Colectiva Y El Derecho A La Pensión En El Marco Constitucional Actual, Fernando Castillo Cadena

Fernando Castillo Cadena

No abstract provided.


Religious Freedom & Closely Held Corporations: The Hobby Lobby Case & Its Ethical Implications, Corey A. Ciocchetti 2014 University of Denver

Religious Freedom & Closely Held Corporations: The Hobby Lobby Case & Its Ethical Implications, Corey A. Ciocchetti

Corey A Ciocchetti

Hobby Lobby and its quest for religious freedom captured the attention of a nation for a few moments in late June 2014. The country homed in on the Supreme Court as the justices weighed the rights of an incorporated, profit-making entity run by devout individuals that objected to particular entitlements granted to women under the Affordable Care Act. The case raised important legal issues such as whether the law allows for-profit corporations to exercise religion (yes!) and whether protection for religious freedom trumps the rights of third parties to cost free preventive care (sort of!). The Supreme Court’s decision also …


Perpetuities And The Genius Of A Free State, Joshua C. Tate 2014 Vanderbilt University Law School

Perpetuities And The Genius Of A Free State, Joshua C. Tate

Vanderbilt Law Review

Legal history, like all history, is inevitably a speculative affair. No one can be sure what the editors of Justinian's Digest might have excised from long-lost works of classical Roman law; nor can one know for certain what went through the minds of certain justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century when they formed and reformed their views on Roosevelt's New Deal. Of course, scholars can try to chip away at this uncertainty: great progress can be made through educated guesses and learned theories. But certainty about the past is reserved for those who lived in it. …


Parting The Chevron Sea: An Argument For Chevron's Greater Applicability To Cabinet Than Independent Agencies, Andrew T. Bond 2014 Notre Dame Law School

Parting The Chevron Sea: An Argument For Chevron's Greater Applicability To Cabinet Than Independent Agencies, Andrew T. Bond

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues that cabinet agencies are better suited to receive Chevron deference than independent agencies because voters should desire such policy decisions to be made by those closest to electoral accountability, rather than unelected Article III judges with life-tenure. In other words, the judiciary should accept the countermajoritarian difficulty as fundamentally true and review cabinet agency decisions in light of Chevron deference. Part I examines the revolutionary decision of Chevron and its aftermath. Central to Part I is an inquiry into whether Chevron should be applied on a case-by-case or across-the-board basis, and whether Chevron has usurped the judiciary’s …


Procedural Rights At Sentencing, Carissa Byrne Hessick, F. Andrew Hessick 2014 S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah

Procedural Rights At Sentencing, Carissa Byrne Hessick, F. Andrew Hessick

Notre Dame Law Review

In determining which constitutional procedural rights apply at sentencing, courts have distinguished between mandatory and discretionary sentencing systems. For mandatory systems—systems that limit sentencing factors and specify particular punishments based on particular facts—defendants enjoy important rights including the right to a jury, the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to notice of potential sentencing aggravators, and the right not to be sentenced based on ex post facto laws. By contrast, for discretionary systems—systems that leave the determination of sentencing factors and how much punishment to impose based on particular facts to the judge’s discretion—defendants do not enjoy …


Due Process Disaggregation, Jason Parkin 2014 Pace University School of Law

Due Process Disaggregation, Jason Parkin

Notre Dame Law Review

One-size-fits-all procedural safeguards are becoming increasingly suspect under the Due Process Clause. Although the precise requirements of due process vary from context to context, the Supreme Court has held that, within any particular context, the Due Process Clause merely requires one-size-fits-all procedures that are designed according to the needs of the average or typical person using the procedures. As the Court explained when announcing the modern approach to procedural due process in Mathews v. Eldridge, the due process calculus must be focused on “the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.” A more granular approach to due process rules, the …


A House Divided: When State And Lower Federal Courts Disagree On Federal Constitutional Rights, Wayne A. Logan 2014 Florida State University College of Law

A House Divided: When State And Lower Federal Courts Disagree On Federal Constitutional Rights, Wayne A. Logan

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article provides the first in-depth examination of state-federal concurrent constitutional authority and does so by focusing on a context in which its consequences are most problematic: within individual states. While a handful of articles over the years have examined state court power vis-a-vis federal constitutional questions more generally, no systematic effort has been undertaken to examine intrastate, state-federal conflict on federal constitutional questions. This Article redresses this deficit, using as its doctrinal locus federal constitutional criminal procedure, with its unique impact on government power and individual liberty and privacy.


In Re Sanders And The Resurrection Of Stanley V. Illinois, Josh Gupta-Kagan 2014 University of South Carolina

In Re Sanders And The Resurrection Of Stanley V. Illinois, Josh Gupta-Kagan

Faculty Publications

In 1972, the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois declared that parents are entitled to a hearing on their fitness before the state places their children in foster care. Somewhat oddly, Stanley went on to be cited as a leading case regarding the rights of unwed fathers to object to private adoptions favored by mothers -- an issue not present in Stanley. Odder still, most states routinely violated Stanley in child welfare cases -- the context in which the Stanley rule arose. Most states apply the "one parent doctrine," which holds that finding one parent unfit justifies taking the child …


Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford 2014 William & Mary Law School

Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford

William & Mary Law Review

One of the most common objections to originalism is that it cannot cope with cultural change. One of the most commonly invoked examples of this claimed weakness is the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whose original meaning would (it is argued) authorize barbaric punishment practices like flogging and branding, and disproportionate punishments like the death penalty for relatively minor offenses. This Article shows that this objection to originalism is inapt, at least with respect to the Cruel and Unusual punishments Clause. As I have shown in prior articles, the original meaning of “cruel and unusual” is “cruel and contrary to …


A Process Failure Theory Of Statutory Interpretation, Mark Seidenfeld 2014 William & Mary Law School

A Process Failure Theory Of Statutory Interpretation, Mark Seidenfeld

William & Mary Law Review

Despite all that has been written about the choice between purposivist, intentionalist, and textualist approaches to statutory interpretation, to date the literature has not provided a justification for the common judicial practice of relying on intent-based inquiries in some cases and disavowing those approaches for textualism in others. This Article fills that void and, in doing so, lays out a new “legislative process failure” theory of statutory interpretation that has the potential to move the debate beyond a simple choice between textual and intent-based interpretation. This Article argues that Congress and the courts comprise different linguistic communities when they interpret …


Two Tests Unite To Resolve The Tension Between The First Amendment And The Right Of Publicity, Dora Georgescu 2014 Fordham University School of Law

Two Tests Unite To Resolve The Tension Between The First Amendment And The Right Of Publicity, Dora Georgescu

Fordham Law Review

The right of publicity is an established legal doctrine that grants individuals the exclusive right to control the commercial use of their image. Though it has many important and laudable uses, one unfortunate consequence of the right of publicity is that it restricts artists’ abilities to portray real persons in their works. In so doing, the right of publicity directly conflicts with the First Amendment protections of an individual’s freedom of expression.

While the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this tension in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court did not create a clear standard for balancing the interests of …


Calling Them As He Sees Them: The Disappearance Of Originalism In Justice Thomas's Opinions On Race, Joel K. Goldstein 2014 University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

Calling Them As He Sees Them: The Disappearance Of Originalism In Justice Thomas's Opinions On Race, Joel K. Goldstein

Maryland Law Review

During his first two decades on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas has been associated with originalism and is often viewed as its leading judicial proponent. Justice Thomas has linked originalism with the effort to limit judicial discretion and to promote judicial impartiality. In cases dealing with many constitutional provisions, Justice Thomas has shown his commitment to originalism by often writing solitary concurrences and dissents advocating an originalist analysis of a problem. Yet in constitutional cases dealing with race, Justice Thomas routinely abandons originalism and embraces the sort of constitutional arguments based on morality or consequentialism that he often discounts. These …


Rights Speech, Timothy Zick 2014 William & Mary Law School

Rights Speech, Timothy Zick

Faculty Publications

Freedom of expression has a complex and dynamic relationship with a number of other constitutional rights, including abortion, the right to bear arms, equal protection, the franchise, and religious liberty. This Article discusses one aspect of that relationship. It critically analyzes the regulation of "rights speech" - communications about or concerning the recognition, scope, or exercise of constitutional rights. As illustrative examples, the Article focuses on regulation of speech about abortion and the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Governments frequently manage, structure, and limit how individuals discuss constitutional rights. For example, laws and regulations compel physicians to convey information …


Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford 2014 University of Florida Levin College of Law

Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford

UF Law Faculty Publications

One of the most common objections to originalism is that it cannot cope with cultural change. One of the most commonly invoked examples of this claimed weakness is the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whose original meaning would (it is argued) authorize barbaric punishment practices like flogging and branding, and disproportionate punishments like the death penalty for relatively minor offenses. This Article shows that this objection to originalism is inapt, at least with respect to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. As I have shown in prior articles, the original meaning of “cruel and unusual” is “cruel and contrary to …


Judicial Review And Non-Enforcement At The Founding, Matthew J. Steilen 2014 University at Buffalo School of Law

Judicial Review And Non-Enforcement At The Founding, Matthew J. Steilen

Journal Articles

This Article examines the relationship between judicial review and presidential non-enforcement of statutory law. Defenders of non-enforcement regularly argue that the justification for judicial review that prevailed at the time of the founding also justifies the president in declining to enforce unconstitutional laws. The argument is unsound. This Article shows that there is essentially no historical evidence, from ratification through the first decade under the Constitution, in support of a non-enforcement power. It also shows that the framers repeatedly made statements inconsistent with the supposition that the president could refuse to enforce laws he deemed unconstitutional. In contrast, during this …


The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel 2014 Notre Dame Law School

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Michigan Law Review

The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta. This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward- looking effect should not depend on the …


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