Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler Approach To Dominant Firms Under The Antitrust Laws?, 2017 University of Maine School of Law
Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler Approach To Dominant Firms Under The Antitrust Laws?, Edward D. Cavanagh
Maine Law Review
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. The § 2 prohibitions are rooted in concerns "that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone." At the same time, courts have recognized that size alone cannot be the basis of condemnation under § 2, for as Learned Hand observed in Alcoa, "[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to ...
Activating Actavis, 2017 University of California - Berkeley
Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”
This article is an effort to help ...
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, 2017 University of California - Berkeley
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply ...
A Rose By Any Other Name: Elucidating The Intersection Of Patent And Antitrust Laws In Tying Arrangement Cases, 2017 University of Maine School of Law
A Rose By Any Other Name: Elucidating The Intersection Of Patent And Antitrust Laws In Tying Arrangement Cases, Kyle R. Friedman
Maine Law Review
In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., an ink manufacturer sought to invalidate patents held by a printing system manufacturer by alleging that the patents resulted in illegal tying and monopolization in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. This action was preceded by an infringement action brought by Illinois Tool Works (ITW), which was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Independent Ink (Independent) responded by seeking a judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of patents against ITW. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ITW on both counts. The court of appeals reversed ...
Uber, Lyft, And Regulating The Sharing Economy, 2017 Seattle University School of Law
Uber, Lyft, And Regulating The Sharing Economy, Brett Harris
Seattle University Law Review
The “sharing economy” goes by many names such as the “gig economy,” the “1099 economy,” and the “on-demand economy,” all of which describe the economic system that uses online platforms to connect workers and sellers with clients and consumers, primarily through smartphone applications. Many of the sharing economy companies are also called the “tech disruptors.” They earned this title because they have changed the way that people do business. But in changing the way that people do business, they have also created unique regulatory challenges for governments across the country. The news is rife with stories about when these regulations ...
A Critical Discourse Analysis Of The Intellectual Property Chapter Of The Tpp: Confirming What The Critics Fear, Karyn Hollis
A host of organizations and citizens groups have convincingly pointed out that so called “Free Trade Agreements” have done more harm than good to the U.S. and other countries involved. Thanks to their protests, for the moment, the most ambitious multinational, neoliberal project of our young century, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), has been defeated. If the agreement had been adopted, the TPP would have shaped new rules of trade for over 8 million people, spanning 40% of the global economy. Using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), my study shows how the complex language of the actual treaty compared to its ...
Progressive Antitrust, 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School
Progressive Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Several American political candidates and administrations have both run and served under the “progressive” banner for more than a century, right through the 2016 election season. For the most part these have pursued interventionist antitrust policies, reflecting a belief that markets are fragile and in need of repair, that certain interest groups require greater protection, or in some cases that antitrust policy is an extended arm of regulation. This paper argues that most of this progressive antitrust policy was misconceived, including that reflected in the 2016 antitrust plank of the Democratic Party. The progressive state is best served by a ...
Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, And Burdens Of Proof, 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School
Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, And Burdens Of Proof, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark 1963 decision in Philadelphia National Bank, antitrust challengers have mounted prima facie cases against horizontal mergers that rested on the level and increase in market concentration caused by the merger, with proponents of the merger then permitted to rebut by providing evidence that the merger will not have the feared anticompetitive effects. Although the way that concentration is measured and the triggering levels have changed over the last half century, the basic approach has remained intact. This longstanding structural presumption, which is well supported by economic theory and evidence, has been critical to effective ...
Horizontal Shareholding And Antitrust Policy, 2017 Yale University
Horizontal Shareholding And Antitrust Policy, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
“Horizontal shareholding” occurs when one or more equity funds own shares of competitors operating in a concentrated product market. For example, the four largest mutual fund companies might be large shareholders of all the major United States air carriers. A growing body of empirical literature concludes that under these conditions market output in the product market is lower and prices higher than they would otherwise be.
Here we consider how the antitrust laws might be applied to this practice, identifying the issues that courts are likely to encounter and attempting to anticipate litigation problems. We assume that neither the mutual ...
Antitrust Policy And Inequality Of Wealth, 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School
Antitrust Policy And Inequality Of Wealth, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Why would anyone want to use antitrust law as a wealth distribution device when far more explicit statutory tools are available for that purpose? One feature of antitrust is its open-textured, nonspecific statutes that are interpreted by judges. As a result, using antitrust to redistribute wealth may be a way of invoking the judicial process without having to go to Congress or a state legislature that is likely to be unsympathetic. Of course, a corollary is that someone attempting to use antitrust law to redistribute wealth will have to rely on the existing antitrust statutes rather than obtaining a new ...
United States Versus Microsoft: A Case Study, 2017 University of Oklahoma College of Law
United States Versus Microsoft: A Case Study, Michael Betts
Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology
No abstract provided.
Standardization In Information Technology Industries: Emerging Issues Under Section Two Of The Sherman Antitrust Act, 2017 University of Oklahoma College of Law
Standardization In Information Technology Industries: Emerging Issues Under Section Two Of The Sherman Antitrust Act, Michael Betts
Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology
No abstract provided.
Plunging Into The Information Age: The Effect Of Current Competition Policy On United States Science And Technology Policy, 2017 University of Oklahoma College of Law
Plunging Into The Information Age: The Effect Of Current Competition Policy On United States Science And Technology Policy, Michael Betts
Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology
No abstract provided.
Extraterritoriality Of The Regulations And Interconnections Of The Derivatives Market: Legal Implications For East And Southeast Asia, 2017 Singapore Management University
Extraterritoriality Of The Regulations And Interconnections Of The Derivatives Market: Legal Implications For East And Southeast Asia, Christopher C. H. Chen
Research Collection School Of Law
This article examines the legal implications of the interconnections of the global derivatives market, such as the exchange and over-the-counter (OTC) markets, in East and Southeast Asia. First, we introduce the interconnectedness of the global derivatives market. We then examine some legal implications of such interconnectedness from several angles, such as the extraterritoriality of relevant regulations (notably the reporting, clearing and trading mandates prescribed by the G20 and the new initial margin rule), standard product documentation, the effect of substituted compliance, the potential competition effect due to shifting OTC trades to exchange trading and the effect of consolidating exchanges and ...
Antitrust And The Design Of Production, 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School
Antitrust And The Design Of Production, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Both economics and antitrust policy have traditionally distinguished “production” from “distribution.” The former is concerned with how products are designed and built, the latter with how they are placed into the hands of consumers. Nothing in the language of the antitrust laws suggests much concern with production as such. Although courts do not view it that way, even per se unlawful naked price fixing among rivals is a restraint on distribution rather than production. Naked price fixing assumes a product that has already been designed and built, and the important cartel decision is what should be each firm’s output ...
Intellectual Property And Competition, 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School
Intellectual Property And Competition, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
A legal system that relies on private property rights to promote economic development must consider that profits can come from two different sources. First, both competition under constant technology and innovation promote economic growth by granting many of the returns to the successful developer. Competition and innovation both increase output, whether measured by quantity or quality. Second, however, profits can come from practices that reduce output, in some cases by reducing quantity, or in others by reducing innovation.
IP rights and competition policy were traditionally regarded as in conflict. IP rights create monopoly, which was thought to be inimical to ...
Reasonable Patent Exhaustion, 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School
Reasonable Patent Exhaustion, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
A lengthy tug of war between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals may have ended when the Supreme Court held that the sale of a patented article exhausts the patentee seller’s rights to enforce restrictions on that article through patent infringement suits. Further, reversing the Federal Circuit, the parties cannot bargain around this rule through the seller’s specification of conditions stated at the time of sale, no matter how clear. No inquiry need be made into the patentee’s market power, anticompetitive effects, or other types of harms, whether enforcement of the condition is ...
A Property Rights Approach To Temporary Work Visas, 2017 NYU School of Law
A Property Rights Approach To Temporary Work Visas, Adam B. Cox, Alessandra Casella
New York University Law and Economics Working Papers
Temporary labor visa rules in the United States are criticized on three grounds: for failing to allocate visas efficiently, for failing to adequately protect domestic workers, and for exposing migrant workers to exploitation. We argue that it is possible to address all three problems by re-configuring the property rights associated with the visas and carefully designing the mechanism for allocating those rights. Our core insight is to unbundle the two rights that today are typically combined: the firm’s right to employ a foreign worker, and the worker’s right to reside and work in the country during that time ...
Let The State Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer And The Avoidance Of Anticompetitive Remedies, 2017 Pepperdine University
Let The State Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer And The Avoidance Of Anticompetitive Remedies, Andrew J. Fuller
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
If the antitrust remedy a private party pursues would likely have anticompetitive consequences, would only the government constitute an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Imagine that a plaintiff sues for a remedy so large that the award of the remedy would meaningfully increase market concentration by sending the defendants into bankruptcy. Is such a plaintiff an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Should courts hold that in this situation only the government should be able to challenge the alleged conduct? These questions have gone unaddressed in academic literature because litigation rarely raises the specter of the anticompetitive remedy. Recently ...
The Rule Of Reason, 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School
The Rule Of Reason, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust’s rule of reason was born out of a thirty year (1897-1927) division among Supreme Court Justices about the proper way to assess multi-firm restraints on competition. By the late 1920s the basic contours of the rule for restraints among competitors was roughly established. Antitrust policy toward vertical restraints remained much more unstable, however, largely because their effects were so poorly understood.
This article provides a litigation field guide for antitrust claims under the rule of reason – or more precisely, for situations when application of the rule of reason is likely. At the time pleadings are drafted and even ...