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Revolutionary Coalition Strength And Collective Failure As Determinants Of Status Reallocation, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler Jul 2017

Revolutionary Coalition Strength And Collective Failure As Determinants Of Status Reallocation, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler

Edward J Lawler

This experiment investigated the effects of collective performance and coalition strength on the redistribution of status prerogatives in triads. A status hierarchy was established within triads, such that one person held higher control status and the two others held lower status. Each group performed an ambiguous, decision-making task over two trials. Collective performance (i.e., success vs failure) was manipulated via bogus feedback regarding the group’s performance, while coalition strength was manipulated by varying the extent to which the two low-status members, acting together as a revolutionary coalition, could damage the outcomes received by the high-status member. Results indicate ...


The Impact Of Status Differences On Coalitional Agreements: An Experimental Study, Edward J. Lawler Jul 2017

The Impact Of Status Differences On Coalitional Agreements: An Experimental Study, Edward J. Lawler

Edward J Lawler

This experiment investigated the impact of status differences between subordinates and face-to-face coalition negotiations on insurgent coalitional action. The effects of these variables were examined in stratified groups, where a leader established inequitable pay-rates, and subordinates could coalesce and destroy a portion of the leader’s outcomes. The results showed that status differences (as opposed to status similarity) undermined the sense of common interests between subordinates and reduced the severity of coalitional action against the leader. Face-to-face negotiations engendered a more cautious approach to coalition negotiations and also reduced the severity of insurgent action. The results suggest that status differences ...


Cooptation And Coalition Mobilization, Edward J. Lawler, George A. Youngs Jr., Michael D. Lesh Jul 2017

Cooptation And Coalition Mobilization, Edward J. Lawler, George A. Youngs Jr., Michael D. Lesh

Edward J Lawler

The question addressed by this research was, “When structural circumstances make revolutionary action likely, under what conditions will a cooptation strategy prevent subordinate revolts?” Experimental procedures established a group status hierarchy consisting of a leader and two subordinates. Groups earned collective outcomes, and the leader usurped an inequitable portion of these outcomes. In this context, the first experiment shows that a cooptation strategy (i.e., offer of a promotion to one of two subordinates) inhibits subordinate revolts. Two additional experiments indicate that the cooptation strategy is most effective (a) if the offer (strategy) provides the target of cooptation a source ...


Endorsement Of Formal Leaders: An Integrative Model, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler Jul 2017

Endorsement Of Formal Leaders: An Integrative Model, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler

Edward J Lawler

This experiment develops an integrative, path-analytic model for the endorsement accorded formal leaders. The model contains four independent variables reflecting aspects of group structure (i.e., group success-failure, the payoff distribution, the degree of support by others members for the leader, and the vulnerability of the leader). Also included are two intervening variables reflecting perceptual processes (attributed competence and attributed fairness), and one dependent variable (endorsement). The results indicate that endorsement is greater when the group's success is high, when the payoff distribution is flat rather than hierarchical, and when the leader is not vulnerable to removal from office ...