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Full-Text Articles in Other Political Science

Feasibility Analysis And Strategic Measures For Promoting Viable New Urban Development, Elizabeth J. Farr Jan 2015

Feasibility Analysis And Strategic Measures For Promoting Viable New Urban Development, Elizabeth J. Farr

CMC Senior Theses

This thesis demonstrates that New Urbanism is both an advisable and feasible method for reducing carbon emissions to mitigate global climate change. New Urban areas commonly generate lower carbon emissions compared to conventional suburban development due to lower car use and higher levels of walking and use of other forms of transportation. Economic and political feasibility of New Urban development is determined by analyzing case studies, housing price premia, financing, and fiscal impact. The many contexts and perspectives involved in the planning process are analyzed to determine if New Urbanism is advisable in the larger setting in which developers, advocates ...


Game Theory Meets The Humanities And Both Win Or Book Review: Game Theory And The Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds, By Steven J. Brams, Karl-Dieter Crisman Jan 2014

Game Theory Meets The Humanities And Both Win Or Book Review: Game Theory And The Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds, By Steven J. Brams, Karl-Dieter Crisman

Journal of Humanistic Mathematics

This review discusses Brams' wide-ranging book Game Theory and the Humanities and gives some basic examples of the methodology and style, including how the Theory of Moves contributes to understanding such games.


Do Political Contributions Purchase Regulatory Discretion In Mining Inspections?, Neil K. Malani Jan 2012

Do Political Contributions Purchase Regulatory Discretion In Mining Inspections?, Neil K. Malani

CMC Senior Theses

A vast literature acknowledges the corruptibility of regulators; however, empirical tests on the matter have been limited to two-agent models examining the rulemaking process and price regulation of natural monopolies. It remains an open question whether political contributions, by driving legislative pressure, can entice laxity from regulators in their application of the rules. To remedy this issue, I observe the highly-regulated coal mining industry for which there exists several points for inspector discretion. By comparing the outcomes with Congressional coal mining contribution levels, I am able to ascertain capture across several dimensions. Specifically, I find that contributions are associated with ...