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Full-Text Articles in Political Science
On The Evasion Of Executive Term Limits, Tom Ginsburg
On The Evasion Of Executive Term Limits, Tom Ginsburg
Tom Ginsburg
Executive term limits are pre-commitments through which the polity restricts its ability to retain a popular executive down the road. But in recent years, many presidents around the world have chosen to remain in office even after their initial maximum term in office has expired. They have largely done so by amending the constitution, or sometimes by replacing it entirely. The practice of revising higher law for the sake of a particular incumbent raises intriguing issues that touch ultimately on the normative justification for term limits in the first place. This article reviews the normative debate over term limits and …
Assuming Bosnia: Taking The Polity Seriously In Ethnically Divided Societies, Timothy W. Waters
Assuming Bosnia: Taking The Polity Seriously In Ethnically Divided Societies, Timothy W. Waters
Timothy W Waters
This essay is a reflection on democracy, justice and intervention. It focuses on the Bosnian experience, where since the Dayton Accords the indispensable context for reform has been the international protectorate. This essay examines the assumptions used by the international community to govern Bosnia, which suggest a policy premised upon resistance to the fragmentation of the state under any circumstances, and a belief that the international intervention is simultaneously morally justified and a purely technical process for increasing efficiency. How necessary – indeed, how related at all – are those commitments to the dictates of justice? What is their relationship …
Making Market Democracies? The Contingent Loyalties Of Post-Privatization Elites In Azerbaijan, Georgia And Serbia, John A. Gould, Carl Lee Sickner
Making Market Democracies? The Contingent Loyalties Of Post-Privatization Elites In Azerbaijan, Georgia And Serbia, John A. Gould, Carl Lee Sickner
John A Gould
Neoliberal market reformers stress the ‘market building instincts’ of private owners to justify rapid forms of property transformation under illiberal political conditions. Private owners demand the institutions of the selfrestraining state to protect property from various forms of expropriation and to enforce contracts. Legacy theorists counter that under illiberal political conditions, economic insiders are more likely to capture the benefits of privatization programs and then seek exemption from the rule of law rather than application of it. We employ a ‘path contingency’ approach to show that under illiberal, competitive authoritarian conditions, privatization recipients and other private economic agents are unlikely …
Democracy On Stilts: Bolivia's Democracy From Stability To Crisis, Miguel Centellas
Democracy On Stilts: Bolivia's Democracy From Stability To Crisis, Miguel Centellas
Miguel Centellas
Bolivia’s recent political crisis starkly contrasts to the preceding two decades of relative democratic stability. Though a unique system of “parliamentarized” presidentialism together with lingering consensus on the national project inherited from the 1952 Revolution supported democratic stability, using qualitative and quantitative methods, this study shows that seemingly benign changes in institutional design made in the 1990s contributed to the acceleration of already existing tendencies towards divisive sectoral, regional, and ethnic politics. A key observation is that successful long-term democratization requires institutions for adequately channeling and representing social demands as well as a shared vision of a political “imagined community” …
Distrust Breeds Bureaucracy: Democratization And The Formal Regulation Of Electoral Governance In Mexico, Andreas Schedler
Distrust Breeds Bureaucracy: Democratization And The Formal Regulation Of Electoral Governance In Mexico, Andreas Schedler
Andreas Schedler
In contemporary Mexico, political parties have subject electoral authorities to tight legal regulation. Their reliance on “bureaucratic” control sheds light on a crucial premise of “post-bureaucratic” approaches: deregulation presupposes trust. The article describes the distrust-driven regulation of three areas of electoral governance: record keeping, the identification of voters and ballots, and time rules. It concludes with reflections on the potential costs of bureaucratizing electoral governance.
A Burguesia Contra O Estado? Crise Política, Ação De Classe E Os Rumos Da Transição, Adriano Codato
A Burguesia Contra O Estado? Crise Política, Ação De Classe E Os Rumos Da Transição, Adriano Codato
Adriano Codato
This article discusses the bourgeoisie struggles against "nationalization" (1975-1976), and for "democracy" (1977-1978) and their relation to the transformations of the state system in Brazil after 1974. My objective here is to determine in what way certain organizational formats promoted by the Geisel government (1974-1979) significantly altered the current system of representation of "private" interests, based on corporatism, and its relation to the political conflicts from the "distension" period and the "political opening".