Industrial Organization Commons^™

Antisocial Innovation, Christopher Buccafusco, Samuel N. Weinstein

Georgia Law Review

Innovation is a form of civic religion in the United States. In the popular imagination, innovators are heroic figures. Thomas Edison, Steve Jobs, and (for a while) Elizabeth Holmes were lauded for their vision and drive and seen to embody the American spirit of invention and improvement. For their part, politicians rarely miss a chance to trumpet their vision for boosting innovative activity. Popular and political culture alike treat innovation as an unalloyed good. And the law is deeply committed to fostering innovation, spending billions of dollars a year to make sure society has enough of it. But this sunny …

Public Interests And Economic Regulation Of Gambling, Rein Halbersma, Joost Poort

International Conference on Gambling & Risk Taking

In the Netherlands, the Betting and Gaming Act from 1964 largely determines the current structure of gambling markets. The policy was to channel consumers to a limited number of licensed operators. This led to state-owned monopolies for lotteries, sports betting and casinos, a private monopoly for horse race betting, a limited number of privately owned charity lotteries, and a large number of private slot machines operators.

Pending legislation proposes an online market without a limit on the number of operators. Furthermore, state ownership will be phased out, and introduced legislation to privatizing and expanding the number of casinos. The current …

Regulation And The Marginalist Revolution, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The marginalist revolution in economics became the foundation for the modern regulatory State with its “mixed” economy. Marginalism, whose development defines the boundary between classical political economy and neoclassical economics, completely overturned economists’ theory of value. It developed in the late nineteenth century in England, the Continent and the United States. For the classical political economists, value was a function of past averages. One good example is the wage-fund theory, which saw the optimal rate of wages as a function of the firm’s ability to save from previous profits. Another is the theory of corporate finance, which assessed a corporation’s …

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …

Administrative Procedures, Bureaucracy, And Transparency: Why Does The Fcc Vote On Secret Texts?, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) does not reveal the text of regulations on which it votes. Instead, after the vote the Commission grants the relevant bureau “editorial privileges” to continue drafting the order. It then releases the final version days, weeks, or even months after the vote. As a result, it is not possible to know if everything in the final rule was actually subject to a vote. In particular, it raises the question of whether the delay between vote and publication is truly for “editorial” changes or if more substantive changes occur after the vote.

In this paper, …

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.

As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to …

The Evolution Of Innovation And The Evolution Of Regulation: Emerging Tensions And Emerging Opportunities In Communications, John W. Mayo

John W Mayo

Changes to an industry’s core technologies inevitably create tension for regulatory institutions. This is true for any sector experiencing persistent disruptive innovation, and that has been the defining feature of the communications industry for the last two decades or longer. In very short order, a century of switched voice communication networks have been supplanted by new, packet-based voice, video and data networks, rendering both the legal and regulatory framework hammered out for the switched-voice era increasingly strained. This incongruity has created tangible regulatory asymmetries. Wireline telephony provided by a “telco” is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission under Title II …

Social Media And Entrepreneurship: The Case Of Food Trucks, Scott J. Wallsten, Corwin Rhyan

Scott J. Wallsten

While the use of social media by firms is nearly ubiquitous, there has been little analysis of its effectiveness in helping small businesses succeed in a highly competitive market. To begin studying this question, we created an extensive dataset on over 250 mobile food trucks—a dynamic, somewhat homogenous, and low-entry cost business that is highly dependent on social media for its business model—which operated in the Washington, DC metro area from 2009 to 2013. We explore how their use of social media and Internet services like Twitter, Facebook, and business webpages effect their ability to stay in business. We find …

New Powers- New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis Of Market Inquiries Performed By Competition Authorities, Tamar Indig, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their Competition Authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: attempting to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the Competition Authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firm(s), but rather allow the Authority to use a broad prism …

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”

This article is an effort to help courts and …

Unrepentent Policy Failure: Universal Service Subsidies In Voice And Broadband, Thomas Hazlett, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

In the first half of 2013, the Universal Service Fund levied a nearly 16 percent tax on users of fixed, mobile, and VoIP communications, spending nearly $9 billion to extend networks. Yet, USF expenditures – about $110 billion (in 2013 dollars) since 1998, of which $64 billion went for telephone carrier subsidies – extend voice services to, at most, one-half of one percent of U.S. households. This generous estimate of about 600,000 residences implies a cost-per-home of $106,000, just counting the federal carrier subsidies. Entrenched interests make the program exceedingly difficult to change. These interests include hundreds of rural telephone …

Two Cheers For The Fcc's Mobility Fund Reverse Auction, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

The United States held its first competitive bidding, or “reverse auction,” for universal service subsidies in September 2012. While it is far too early to investigate whether this national auction generated improvements in mobile voice and broadband service in underserved areas, it is not too soon to evaluate the auction itself. This paper investigates the outcome of the Mobility Fund Phase 1 Auction (Auction 901) and considers what we could learn from it for universal service and for future planned reverse auctions, such as the upcoming incentive auction, which aims to reallocate spectrum from broadcasters to those who place a …

Antitrust And The 'Filed Rate' Doctrine: Deregulation And State Action, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In its Keogh decision the Supreme Court held that although the Interstate Commerce Act did not exempt railroads from antitrust liability, a private plaintiff may not recover treble damages based on an allegedly monopolistic tariff rate filed with a federal agency. Keogh very likely grew out of Justice Brandeis's own zeal for regulation and his concern for the protection of small business — in this case, mainly shippers whom he felt were protected from discrimination by filed rates. The Supreme Court's Square D decision later conceded that Keogh may have been “unwise as a matter of policy,” but reaffirmed it …

What Gets Measured Gets Done: Stop Focusing On Irrelevant Broadband Metrics, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

Concerns regarding the state of U.S. broadband arises from a combination of focusing on the wrong metrics, a misguided interpretation of consumer preferences, and a popular obsession with rankings. These misperceptions translate into misdirected, if well-intentioned, public policies that waste scarce resources and distract from real issues like a large income-based digital divide.

How To Create A More Efficient Broadband Universal Service Program By Incorporating Demand And Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

The existing high-cost fund suffers from two inherent flaws: it does not incorporate how much consumers value the services being subsidized, and does not measure the incremental, rather than average, effects of the program. This paper proposes a way to incorporate those factors into the Connect America Fund—the proposed high-cost broadband support program—to enable it to operate more efficiently than the existing high-cost program ever could.

In particular, decisions about where to provide subsidies should be based on cost-effectiveness analyses that explicitly take into account not just the cost of providing service but also how much consumers would value the …

Secondary Spectrum Markets As Complements To Incentive Auctions, Scott J. Wallsten, John W. Mayo

Scott J. Wallsten

No abstract provided.

The Universal Service Fund: What Do High-Cost Subsidies Subsidize?, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

The universal service program in the United States currently transfers about $7.5 billion per year from telephone subscribers to certain telephone companies. Those funds are intended to help achieve particular policy goals, such as subsidizing telephone service in rural areas and making phone service more affordable to low-income people. The bulk of the funds, about $4.5 billion per year, subsidizes firms operating in high-cost areas. A large literature documents the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of these subsidies, raising the question of where the money goes. This paper uses data submitted by about 1,400 recipients of high-cost subsidies from 1998 – 2008 …

Advertising Competition In Retail Markets, Kyle Bagwell, Gea Myoung Lee

Research Collection School Of Economics

We consider non-price advertising by retail firms that are privately informed as to their respective production costs. We construct an advertising equilibrium, in which informed consumers use an advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising firm. Consumers are rational in using the advertising search rule, since the lowest-cost firm advertises the most and also selects the lowest price. Even though the advertising equilibrium facilitates productive efficiency, we establish conditions under which firms enjoy higher expected profit when advertising is banned. Consumer welfare falls in this case, however. Under free entry, social surplus is higher when advertising is allowed. …

Advertising Competition In Retail Markets, Kyle Bagwell, Gea M. Lee

Research Collection School Of Economics

We consider non-price advertising by retail firms that are privately informed as to their respective production costs. We construct an advertising equilibrium, in which informed consumers use an advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising firm. Consumers are rational in using the advertising search rule, since the lowest-cost firm advertises the most and also selects the lowest price. Even though the advertising equilibrium facilitates productive effi ciency, we establish conditions under which firms enjoy higher expected profit when advertising is banned. Consumer welfare falls in this case, however. Under free entry, social surplus is higher when advertising is …

Regulatory Harmonisation And Its Impact On Trade In Services, Henk Lm Kox

Henk LM Kox

* Impact of domestic regulation on volume of bilateral services trade * Impact domestic regulation on choice between FDI and exports (GATS modes 3 and 1)

Testimony On Reforming The Universal Service High Cost Fund, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

No abstract provided.

Wobbling Back To The Fire: Economic Efficiency And The Creation Of A Retail Market For Set-Top Boxes, T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak, Michael Stern

GEORGE S FORD

Under Section 629 of the Communications Act, Congress directed the FCC to adopt regulations to promote a retail market for set-top boxes. The Commission’s first attempt was the ill-fated CableCard experiment, which—by the Commission’s own admission—was a dismal failure. In response, the Commission is now contemplating an aggressive new “AllVid” regime, whereby the agency would mandate multichannel video program distributors (“MVPDs”) to provide an adapter to serve as a “common interface for connection to televisions, DVRs, and other smart video devices.” Because the FCC is again proceeding without any formal economic analysis of the nature of the service-equipment relationship in …

The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak

GEORGE S FORD

In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) began to grant incumbent local exchange carriers (“LECs”) pricing flexibility on special access services in some Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSAs”) when specific evidence of competitive alternatives is present. The propriety of that deregulatory move by the FCC has been criticized by the purchasers of such services ever since. Proponents of special access price regulation rely on three central arguments to support a retreat to strict price regulation: (1) the market(s) for special access and similar services is unduly concentrated; (2) rates of return on special access services, computed using FCC ARMIS data, are …

The Dtv Coupon Program: A Boon To Retailers, Not Consumers, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

No abstract provided.

Testimony For Fcc En Banc Hearing At Carnegie Mellon University On Broadband And The Digital Future, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

No abstract provided.

Reverse Auctions And Universal Telecommunications Service: Lessons From Global Experience, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

The United States now spends around $7 billion on universal service programs—subsidies intended to ensure that the entire country has access to telecommunications services. Most of this money supports telecommunications service in “high cost” (primarily rural) areas, and the High Cost fund is growing quickly. In response to this growth, policymakers are considering using reverse auctions, or bids for the minimum subsidy, as a way to reduce expenditures. While the U.S. has not yet distributed funds for universal service programs using reverse auctions, the method has been used widely. First, reverse auctions are akin to standard government procurement procedures, which …

A Regulatory Play In Two Acts, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

No abstract provided.

Broadband And Unbundling Regulations In Oecd Countries, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

Broadband penetration and available speeds vary widely across OECD countries. Policymakers around the world, and especially in countries like the U.S. that lag in the rankings, are searching for policies to narrow those gaps. Relatively little empirical work tests possible reasons for these differences. In this paper I test the impacts of regulations and demographics on broadband development in a panel dataset across countries. In addition to adding to the meager empirical literature on broadband across countries, this paper is novel in two ways. First, it explicitly takes into account the many different types of unbundling regulations that countries have …

Telecommunications Regulation In U.S. States: Its Rise And Impacts In The Early Twentieth Century, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

No abstract provided.