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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization
The Economic Impact Of Olympic Games: Effects Of Host Country Announcements On Stock Market Returns, Bryan Engelhardt, Victor Matheson, Alex Yen, Max Chisholm
The Economic Impact Of Olympic Games: Effects Of Host Country Announcements On Stock Market Returns, Bryan Engelhardt, Victor Matheson, Alex Yen, Max Chisholm
Economics Department Working Papers
Roughly seven years before an Olympic Games, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) accepts bids from countries to host an Olympics. Subsequently, the IOC determines and announces to the world who has won (and lost) the right to host. Contrary to prior evidence, we find the announcements do not affect the bidding countries’ stock markets. We complement prior studies by including additional, more recent, years of announcements, by investigating whether there are effects prior to the announcement, and by testing for an effect both parametrically and non-parametrically.
Corruption In The Bidding, Construction, And Organization Of Mega-Events: An Analysis Of The Olympics And World Cup, Victor Matheson, Daniel Schwab, Patrick Koval
Corruption In The Bidding, Construction, And Organization Of Mega-Events: An Analysis Of The Olympics And World Cup, Victor Matheson, Daniel Schwab, Patrick Koval
Economics Department Working Papers
In the processes required to host a sports mega-event, corruption has been prevalent on numerous occasions, leading to unnecessary costs becoming the ultimate responsibility of a host government’s taxpayers. Little progress has been made in the prevention of such behavior. In this chapter, we examine the history of corruption in sports mega-events, namely the Olympics and World Cup, to identify parts of the bidding and preparation processes that are vulnerable to illicit behavior. We propose potential solutions to be implemented at various levels in order to prevent further corruption.
Hidden Subsidies And The Public Ownership Of Sports Facilities: The Case Of Levi’S Stadium In Santa Clara, Robert Baumann, Victor Matheson, Debra O'Connor
Hidden Subsidies And The Public Ownership Of Sports Facilities: The Case Of Levi’S Stadium In Santa Clara, Robert Baumann, Victor Matheson, Debra O'Connor
Economics Department Working Papers
Levi’s Stadium in Santa Clara, California is an example of a private financing / public ownership arrangement. While the stadium’s construction resulted in no direct tax increases, this ownership arrangement allows the San Francisco 49ers to avoid many types of taxes on the income generated from Levi’s Stadium. We estimate the total tax savings to the 49ers at between $106 and $213 million over the first 20 years of Levi’s Stadium compared with a privately financed and owned option. We argue that tax savings inherent in private financing / public ownership arrangements represent indirect and hidden subsidies.
Mega-Events And Tourism: The Case Of Brazil, Robert Baumann, Victor Matheson
Mega-Events And Tourism: The Case Of Brazil, Robert Baumann, Victor Matheson
Economics Department Working Papers
Mega-sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup are expensive affairs. Host countries often justify the spending required to stage these events by predicting that mega-events will draw large numbers of tourists. This paper analyzes monthly foreign tourist arrivals into Brazil between 2003 and 2015 and finds that the 2014 FIFA World Cup increased foreign tourism by roughly one million visitors. This number far exceeded expectations, but we show that roughly a quarter of this increase in foreign tourism was caused by the fortuitous advancement of Argentina’s national team, and potential hosts should not count on the event to consistently …
Beyond Moneyball: Changing Compensation In Mlb, Joshua Congdon-Hohman, Jonathan A. Lanning
Beyond Moneyball: Changing Compensation In Mlb, Joshua Congdon-Hohman, Jonathan A. Lanning
Economics Department Working Papers
This study examines the changes in player compensation in Major League Baseball during the last three decades. Specifically, we examine the extent to which recently documented changes in players’ compensation structure based on certain types of productivity fits in with the longer term trends in compensation, and identify the value of specific output activities in different time periods. We examine free agent contracts in three-year periods across three decades and find changes to which players’ performance measures are significantly rewarded in free agency. We find evidence that the compensation strategies of baseball teams increased the rewards to “power” statistics like …
Monopoly Power With A Short Selling Constraint, Robert Baumann, Bryan Engelhardt, David L. Fuller
Monopoly Power With A Short Selling Constraint, Robert Baumann, Bryan Engelhardt, David L. Fuller
Economics Department Working Papers
We show if a speculator can benefit from reducing a monopoly’s rents through short selling, then a speculator may take a short position in a monopoly, overcome the barriers to entry, and compete with the monopoly. The competition drives down the monopoly’s rents, and as a result, the short position becomes profitable and covers the cost of entry. If entry is impossible, then the speculator may coordinate and pay the firm’s counter-parties to stop trading with the monopoly rather than entering. Either way, increasing a speculator’s ability to short a firm’s rents results in a constraint on the monopoly and …
Going For The Gold: The Economics Of The Olympics, Victor Matheson, Robert Baade
Going For The Gold: The Economics Of The Olympics, Victor Matheson, Robert Baade
Economics Department Working Papers
In this paper, we explore the costs and benefits of hosting the Olympic Games. On the cost side, there are three major categories: general infrastructure such as transportation and housing to accommodate athletes and fans; specific sports infrastructure required for competition venues; and operational costs, including general administration as well as the opening and closing ceremony and security. Three major categories of benefits also exist: the short-run benefits of tourist spending during the Games; the long-run benefits or the "Olympic legacy" which might include improvements in infrastructure and increased trade, foreign investment, or tourism after the Games; and intangible benefits …