Economic Theory Commons^™

In Favor Of Bringing Game Theory Into Urban Studies And Planning Curriculum: Reintroducing An Underused Method For The Next Generation Of Urban Scholars, Brian Mcdonald Gardner

Dissertations and Theses

By looking at some historical examples of Urban Studies literature and theory (and a detailed dive into Neil Smith's "Toward a theory of gentrification…") this thesis makes the case that Game Theory has valid insights to add to the foundation of Urban Studies and Planning and should be included in Masters and Doctorate level curriculums. As a discipline Game Theory has revolutionized multiple other fields, and can be used both mathematically and/or non-mathematically. It is postulated below that the inclusion of Game Theory would help scholars and practitioners arrive at better outcomes. This case is made by reviewing various areas …

The Art Of Concession In General Lotto Games, Rahul Chandan, Keith Paarporn, Dan Kovenock, Mahnoosh Alizadeh, Jason R. Marden

ESI Working Papers

Success in adversarial environments often requires investment into additional resources in order to improve one’s competitive position. But, can intentionally decreasing one’s own competitiveness ever provide strategic benefits in such settings? In this paper, we focus on characterizing the role of “concessions” as a component of strategic decision making. Specifically, we investigate whether a player can gain an advantage by either conceding budgetary resources or conceding valuable prizes to an opponent. While one might na¨ıvely assume that the player cannot, our work demonstrates that – perhaps surprisingly – concessions do offer strategic benefits when made correctly. In the context of …

Characterizing The Value And Effect Of Perceptiveness In Various Game-Theoretic Settings, Terrence Adam Rooney

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

This thesis investigates the value and effect that perceptiveness has in three game-theoretic settings. I consider a player to be expert if they know the value of a particular payoff-relevant parameter in the models I study. If the player does not know such value, I consider the player to be inexpert. A player is perceptive if they know with certainty whether their opponent is expert. Otherwise, the player is imperceptive. The goal of this thesis is to provide insight regarding the potential value and effect that perceptiveness has in the game-theoretic settings I study.

The first model I …

Mechanisms Study: Using Game Theory To Assess The Effects Of Social Norms And Social Networks On Adolescent Smoking In Schools—Study Protocol, Ruth F. Hunter, Felipe Montes, Jennifer M. Murray, Sharon C. Sanchez-Franco, Shannon C. Montgomery, Joaquín Jaramillo, Christopher Tate, Rajnish Kumar, Laura Dunne, Abhijit Ramalingam, Erik O. Kimbrough, Erin Krupka, Huiyu Zhou, Laurence Moore, Linda Bauld, Blanca Llorente, Olga L. Sarmiento, Frank Kee

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This proof of concept study harnesses novel transdisciplinary insights to contrast two school-based smoking prevention interventions among adolescents in the UK and Colombia. We compare schools in these locations because smoking rates and norms are different, in order to better understand social norms based mechanisms of action related to smoking. We aim to: (1) improve the measurement of social norms for smoking behaviors in adolescents and reveal how they spread in schools; (2) to better characterize the mechanisms of action of smoking prevention interventions in schools, learning lessons for future intervention research. The A Stop Smoking in Schools Trial (ASSIST) …

Hedonic Games And Monte Carlo Simulation, Sheida Etemadidavan, Andrew J. Collins

Engineering Management & Systems Engineering Faculty Publications

Hedonic games have applications in economics and multi-agent systems where the grouping preferences of an individual is important. Hedonic games look at coalition formation, amongst the players, where players have a preference relation over all the coalition. Hedonic games are also known as coalition formation games, and they are a form of a cooperative game with a non-transferrable utility game. Some examples of hedonic games are stable marriage, stable roommate, and hospital/residence problem. The study of hedonic games is driven by understanding what coalition structures will be stable, i.e., given a coalition structure, no players have an incentive to deviate …

Nonbinding Goals In Teams: A Real Effort Coordination Experiment, James Fan, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres

ESI Publications

Problem definition: We investigate the impact of nonbinding (wage-irrelevant) goals, set by a manager, on a team of workers with “weak-link” production technology. Can nonbinding goals improve team production when team members face production complementarity? Academic/practical relevance: Nonbinding goals are easy to implement and ubiquitous in practice. These goals have been shown to improve individual performance, but it remains to be seen if such goals are effective in team production when there is production complementarity among workers. Methodology: We first develop a theoretical model where goals act as reference points for workers’ intrinsic motivation to complete the …

Local Food Policy & Consumer Food Cooperatives: Evolutionary Case Studies, Afton Hupper

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Darwin’s theory of natural selection has played a central role in the development of the biological sciences, but evolution can also explain change in human culture. Institutions, mechanisms that govern behavior and social order, are important subjects of cultural evolution. Institutions can help stabilize cooperation, defined as behavior that benefits others, often at a personal cost. Cooperation is important for solving social dilemmas, scenarios in which the interests of the individual conflict with those of the group. A number of mechanisms by which institutions evolve to support cooperation have been identified, yet theoretical models of institutional change have rarely been …

Establishing Cryptocurrency Equilibria Through Game Theory, Carey Caginalp, Gunduz Caginalp

ESI Publications

We utilize optimization methods to determine equilibria of cryptocurrencies. A core group, the wealthy, fears the loss of assets that can be seized by a government. Volatility may be influenced by speculators. The wealthy must divide their assets between the home currency and the cryptocurrency, while the government decides the probability of seizing a fraction the assets of this group. We establish conditions for existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria. Also examined is the separate timescale problem in which the government policy cannot be reversed, while the wealthy can adjust their allocation in reaction to the government’s designation of probability.

Dynamic Pricing With Fairness Concerns And A Capacity Constraint, Matthew Selove

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Although some firms use dynamic pricing to respond to demand fluctuations, other firms claim that fairness concerns prevent them from raising prices during periods when demand exceeds capacity. This paper explores conditions in which fairness concerns can or cannot cause shortages. In our model, a firm announces a price policy that states its prices during high and low demand, and customers must travel to a venue to learn the current price. We show that the interaction of fairness concerns with travel costs can cause the firm to set stable prices, which leads to shortages during high demand. However, if the …

Counterfactual Conditional Analysis Using The Centipede Game, Ahmed Bilal

CMC Senior Theses

The Backward Induction strategy for the Centipede Game leads us to a counterfactual reasoning paradox, The Centipede Game paradox. The counterfactual reasoning proving the backward induction strategy for the game appears to rely on the players in the game not choosing that very same backward induction strategy. The paradox is a general paradox that applies to backward induction reasoning in sequential, perfect information games. Therefore, the paradox is not only problematic for the Centipede Game, but it also affects counterfactual reasoning solutions in games similar to the Centipede Game. The Centipede Game is a prime illustration of this paradox in …

Economics Of Recruiting Interactions In Collegiate Sport: An Analysis In Game Theory And Matching Markets, Jessica Twaddle

Murray State Theses and Dissertations

This paper seeks to explain the interactions involved in recruiting prospective student-athletes to universities, particularly in the sport of softball. By employing the concepts of Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Matching Markets, the market for recruiting is explored and explained. Recent legislative changes in the market are then examined as well as possible outcomes as a result. Research on commitments in softball and lacrosse was collected in order to make claims in regard to incentives. The market for recruiting is compared to the residency placement matching system. Ideas are presented on ways to achieve a market that clears where outcomes …

Does A Better Running Back Mean More Rushing? Game Theory And The Nfl, Eric Lofquist

Honors Scholar Theses

In this paper I attempt to answer the question of whether or not teams in the National Football League (NFL) rush less with a better running back. This seems counterintuitive, but game theory supposes that this is true. Defenses facing a better running back will generally expect the offense to rush more and therefore defend the run more often. The offense, foreseeing the defense’s actions, will choose to pass more to counteract the run defense. This is the basis of the difference between the strategic effect and the direct effect in mixed strategies. The direct effect is when a player …

Multiple Openings And Competitiveness Of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence, José Luis Ferreira, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We test the competition enhancing effect of selling forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly with multiple forward markets. We find that two forward periods yields competitive outcomes and that the results are very close to the predicted theoretical results for quantity setting duopolies and quadropolies. Our experiments lend strong support to the hypothesis that forward markets are competition enhancing. We then test a new market that allows for endogenously determined indefinitely many forward periods that only close when sellers coordinate on selling a zero amount in a forward market. We find that the outcomes under an endogenous close rule …

Essays On Theories Of Social Influence, Jiemai Wu

Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations

This dissertation studies strategic social influence from a theoretical perspective.

The first chapter extends Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welchs informational cascade model by introducing two types of players: experts with high signal accuracy and laymen with low signal accuracy. If a small enough fraction of laymen are present in the population, the probability of having a correct cascade is strictly higher than if no laymen are present. This is because the presence of laymen makes experts less eager to follow suit, which increases the amount of private information revealed.

The second chapter asks the following question: when a decision makers (DM) …

Price Signaling In A Two-Market Duopoly, Matthew Hughes

Williams Honors College, Honors Research Projects

Within any industry, firms typically produce related products over multiple subsequent periods in an attempt to build consumer loyalty and achieve continued sales. Apple releases new iPhones and car companies produce new models every year, relying on consumers believing each new product is of high quality. Firms rely on the spillover effects from previous markets, where firms are able to more easily demonstrate their product's quality to the consumers before purchase. The goal is to find a range of prices which allows the high quality firm to distinguish its type to consumers via the price pH and if spillover effects …

Barriers To Resolving Transboundary Pollution, Ian A. Thaure

Senior Projects Spring 2015

Senior Project submitted to The Division of Social Studies of Bard College.

Collusion In Peer Evaluation, Suo Wang

Honors Scholar Theses

The exact consensual and impartial division function by DeClippel et al (2008) offers a procedure for dividing a fixed award among partners. The peer evaluation mechanism proposed by DeClippel et al (2008) offers participating partners incentives to tell the truth. This paper examines and demonstrates that, when agents form at most one coalition and report wrong values of the relative shares, they capture the total amount of money being divided and their share improves by exactly the same percentage. When multiple coalitions emerge, the division function fails to assign payoffs to each partner. This paper also includes a discussion of …

A Household Model Of Careers And Education Investment, Jessica F. Young

Undergraduate Economic Review

This paper develops a two-stage non-cooperative household game, in which parents make career decisions and an investment into their child’s human capital. The model is solved for Nash equilibrium outcomes and extended for a cooperative solution. In non-cooperative pure strategies, both parents choosing to work is a Nash equilibrium, though there are alternative outcomes when the conditions underlying the career decision are varied. The investment behaviour of agents is analysed. We find that choices are critically affected by the magnitude of the cost (and reflected quality) of a high education investment relative to a low investment, and the intrinsic value …

Systems Views Of The Economics Of Sustainable Development, Joshua Hughes

Systems Science Friday Noon Seminar Series

The mainstream economics of the 20th century (and now 21st century) has often failed to predict what will happen--or explain what has happened--in the real world, even with (or because of?) an ever-increasing reliance on quantitative and computational methods. Since the mid-20th century a number of people part of, or closely associated with, the systems community--economists among them--have provided insights about what is wrong with "traditional" economics. Systems science offers a number of alternative methods for understanding economic systems that take heed of these criticisms, especially in the context of sustainable development. Yet, while promising, few of these alternatives …

The Strength Of The Veblenian Critique Of Neoclassical Economics, Svetoslav I. Semov

Gettysburg Economic Review

More than one hundred years ago, Thorstein Veblen wrote a powerful critique of neoclassical economics that castigated the discipline for turning the individual into a “lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule”, or equivalently, for the individual’s static maximization of utility based on exogenous preferences. His critique is relevant even today, since there are economists who still continue to criticize the assumptions of homo economicus and exogenous preferences, and insist on introducing more realism to economic theory. Furthermore, recent developments in game theory and experimental economics, which stand at the cutting-edge of economics today, are …

Counterfeiting Truth: Statistical Reporting On The Basis Of Trust, David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Semantics and game theory offer modern approaches to very old problems.¹ David Lewis introduced game theoretic concepts into the study of language in his examination of conventions.² In this chapter we study the language of a specific sort of conventions: statistical estimators. Such estimators have the important property of being both well-defined mathematical objects and devices that form the basis of factual claims asserted and, perhaps, believed by rational agents.³ The convention we analyze allows econometric reporting to proceed on the basis of trust.⁴ In contrast with Lewis, we shall demonstrate that such a convention is …

Fun, Games & Economics: An Appraisal Of Game Theory In Economics, Jamus Jerome Lim

University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics

Game theory has had a profound influence on many fields of the social sciences since its rise to prominence more than fifty years ago. This paper provides an overview of the main concepts in game theory and studies four main areas of its application in economic problems – oligopolistic competition, externalities & public goods, market equilibrium and general equilibrium. The conclusion is that game theory has found a natural place in economics and will continue to contribute to it for many years to come.

On Game Theory And The Law, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Jeffrey E. Stake, Robert H. Heidt, Eric Rasmusen, Michael Alexeev

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

The Generality Of Neutral Principles: A Game-Theoretic Perspective, Robert L. Birmingham

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Eleven years ago Professor Wechsler first argued that constitutional adjudication should be based on neutral principles of general applicability that transcend the factual contexts of the cases in which they are announced. Since that time, legal scholars have been engaged in a continuing debate over both the meaning and the validity of Wechsler's thesis. Professor Birmingham adds a new perspective to this debate by analyzing neutrality and generality in terms of game theory.