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Articles 1 - 30 of 118
Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
Allocating Vehicle Registration Permits, Massimiliano Landi, Domenico Menicucci
Allocating Vehicle Registration Permits, Massimiliano Landi, Domenico Menicucci
Research Collection School Of Economics
We compare social welfare, consumer surplus and profits in two different institutional settings in which an item whose quantity is fixed and controlled (vehicle registration permit) is allocated to the buyers of a complementary good (car). In the first setting, which resembles the way in which vehicle registration permits are allocated in Singapore, the central planner runs a uniform price auction for permits in which the consumers who bid the highest receive the permits and pay the highest losing bid. Then each winning consumer purchases a car from a seller. In the alternative setting, the central planner first allocates the …
A Computational And Experimental Examination Of The Fcc Incentive Auction, Logan Gantner
A Computational And Experimental Examination Of The Fcc Incentive Auction, Logan Gantner
Computational and Data Sciences (PhD) Dissertations
In 2016, the Federal Communications Commission debuted a new auction mechanism, the Incentive Auction, with the intention of obtaining high frequency television broadcasting spectrum, repurposing it for cellular use, and reselling these licenses at profitable prices. In designing this process, the traditional mechanism used for spectrum auctions, the Simulta- neous Multiple Round Auction (SMR), was modified in order to speed the process. This new mechanism, the Incentive Forward Auction (IFA), intended to reduce the number of rounds per auction by lumping similar spectrum licenses together. However, the IFA discourages straightforward bidding strategies and can result in bidders committing more in …
Are Subjects Making Financial Decisions In Lab Auctions Or Are They Just Gambling?, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes
Are Subjects Making Financial Decisions In Lab Auctions Or Are They Just Gambling?, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Optimal bidding strategies in first-price and Dutch auctions are theoretically isomorphic but depend on bidder risk attitudes. However, laboratory experiments consistently find different behaviour between auction formats. This article explores whether the notion in psychology that financial and gambling risks are viewed differently can explain the discrepancy. Ultimately, the evidence does not support this hypothesis, but a bidder's propensity to gamble is associated with how much risk he takes in both auctions whereas his propensity to take financial risks is not. The results suggest that subjects may view themselves as gambling in laboratory auctions rather than making financial decisions.
Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Jesse A. Schwartz
This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids …
Theoretical And Experimental Analysis Of Auctions With Negative Externalities, Youxin Hu, John Kagel, Xiaoshu Xu, Lixin Ye
Theoretical And Experimental Analysis Of Auctions With Negative Externalities, Youxin Hu, John Kagel, Xiaoshu Xu, Lixin Ye
Youxin Hu
We investigate a private value auction in which a single “entrant” on winning imposes a negative externality on two “regular” bidders. In an English auction, when all bidders are active “regulars” free ride, exiting before price reaches their value. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, limiting free riding. We find substantial, though incomplete, free riding in the clock auction. In first-price auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the “entrant” and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality. Predictions regarding revenue, efficiency, and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied.
First Price Auctions, Lotteries, And Risk Preferences Across Institutions, Russell P. Engel
First Price Auctions, Lotteries, And Risk Preferences Across Institutions, Russell P. Engel
WCBT Faculty Publications
There is an unsettled debate in experimental economics literature regarding the consistency of individuals' risk preferences in varying institutions. Much of this debate stems from observations of subjects' bids in sealed-bid auctions and the implications of those bids. In this paper, I have subjects participate in a sealed-bid auction experiment and then examine if the ostensible risk parameter that one can back out from subjects' bids matches up with their elicited risk preference from a separate task in the experiment. I find that subjects do exhibit consistent risk preferences. The aggregate measure of the subjects' risk parameter is stable across …
Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1
Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1
Peter Cramton
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.
Theoretical And Experimental Analysis Of Auctions With Negative Externalities, Youxin Hu, John Kagel, Lixin Ye
Theoretical And Experimental Analysis Of Auctions With Negative Externalities, Youxin Hu, John Kagel, Lixin Ye
Youxin Hu
We investigate a model in which a single bidder (the “entrant”), on winning the auction, imposes a negative externality on two “regular” bidders. In an ascending price clock auction, in equilibrium when all bidders are active a regular bidder free rides, dropping out before reaching his private value. Despite this free riding problem, in almost all cases, the item is ex post efficiently assigned. In contrast, in a first-price sealed bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, leading to a lower ex post efficiency. The experiment shows minimal free riding in the clock auction, but as predicted, …
Virtual Power Plant Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence Ausubel
Virtual Power Plant Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets.
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Argues that consumers and suppliers are better off with the clearing-price auction in electricity markets.
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take …
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.
Hybrid Allocation Mechanisms For Publicly Provided Goods, Mary F. Evans, Christian A. Vossler, Nicholas E. Flores
Hybrid Allocation Mechanisms For Publicly Provided Goods, Mary F. Evans, Christian A. Vossler, Nicholas E. Flores
CMC Faculty Publications and Research
Motivated by efficiency and equity concerns, public resource managers have increasingly utilized hybrid allocation mechanisms that combine features of commonly used price (e.g., auction) and non-price (e.g., lottery) mechanisms. This study serves as an initial investigation of these hybrid mechanisms, exploring theoretically and experimentally how the opportunity to obtain a homogeneous good in a subsequent lottery affects Nash equilibrium bids in discriminative and uniform price auctions. The lottery imposes an opportunity cost to winning the auction, systematically reducing equilibrium auction bids. In contrast to the uniform price auction, equilibrium bids in the uniform price hybrid mechanism vary with bidder risk …
Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton
Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes. The purpose of this short note, an addendum to “A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,” is to describe an auction mechanism suitable for injections of capital into banks. The auctions would price the equity purchases through a competitive process.
Auctioning Long-Term Gas Contracts In Colombia, Peter Cramton
Auctioning Long-Term Gas Contracts In Colombia, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
This paper presents an approach to auctioning long-term gas contracts in Colombia. I propose an annual auction for long-term firm gas contracts. The auction would assign and price all firm gas contracts, with the exception of gas from the Guajira field, which is assigned administratively at a regulated price. The proposal is a partial market design in that it does not address the transportation of gas from producer to consumer.
The goal of the approach is to improve the transparency and efficiency of the gas market with a coordinated auction for long-term gas contracts. Currently, gas contracts are sold in …
A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton
A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz auction, in which each of the ten bidders won spectrum, in the L-band auction there was a single winner—Qualcomm won all the lots. This note briefly reviews the auction.
A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
The US Treasury has proposed purchasing $700 billion of troubled assets to restore liquidity and solve the current financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions where appropriate. This paper presents a high-level design for a troubled asset reverse auction and discusses the auction design issues. We assume that the key objectives of the auction are to: 1) provide a quick and effective means to purchase troubled assets and increase liquidity; 2) protect the taxpayer by yielding a price for assets related to their value; and 3) offer a transparent rules-based process that minimizes discretion and favoritism. We propose …
The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day
The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day
Peter Cramton
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe, and proposed for use in the FAA’s landing-slot auctions in the United States. Specifically, we compute a unique point “in the core” that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties, adding to the perceived “fairness” of this payment rule. Further, we discuss the many benefits of this combinatorial auction paradigm.
A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton
A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
In February 2008, Ofcom’s 10-40 GHz auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s first combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 27 lots. Each of the ten bidders won one or more lots. All 27 lots were assigned. This note briefly reviews the auction.
Market Design: Auctions And Matching, Peter Cramton
Market Design: Auctions And Matching, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competition is another driver of innovation seen in all of the applications. Market design fosters innovation in other ways as well by addressing other potential market failures.
Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
A forward reliability market is presented. The market coordinates new entry through the forward procurement of reliability options—physical capacity bundled with a financial option to supply energy above a strike price. The market assures adequate generating resources and prices capacity from the bids of competitive new entry in an annual auction. Efficient performance incentives are maintained from a load-following obligation to supply energy above the strike price. The capacity payment fully hedges load from high spot prices, and reduces supplier risk as well. Market power is reduced in the spot market, since suppliers enter the spot market with a nearly …
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
Peter Cramton
This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier’s participation in two simultaneously conducted auctions: one set-aside for non-incumbents and one open to all carriers. This paper estimates the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of incumbents. This paper also estimates what prices would have been in the open auction had incumbents been excluded from bidding in the closed. It is found that an incumbent’s participation in the closed auction through a front, Alaska Native, enabled it to win more licenses at lower prices in FCC Auction 35. In contrast, non-incumbents won fewer …
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Comments On The Rggi Market Design, Peter Cramton
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
This paper is provided in connection with the 2007 Telecommunications Symposium – Voice, Video and Broadband: The Changing Competitive Landscape and Its Impact on Consumers, sponsored by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“the Division”). Our focus is on the state of competition in the wireless sector. Maintaining a competitive wireless sector is particularly critical if, as the Division’s agenda indicates, wireless services are to function as a competitive alternative to wireline technologies. Strengthening competition is especially important now after recent mergers that consolidated the wireless industry into a few dominant firms (two to four depending on …
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton
Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.