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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Relation Between Variance And Information Rents In Auctions, Brett Katzman, Julian Reif, Jesse Schwartz
The Relation Between Variance And Information Rents In Auctions, Brett Katzman, Julian Reif, Jesse Schwartz
Jesse A. Schwartz
This paper examines the conventional wisdom, expressed in McAfee and McMillan's (1987) widely cited survey paper on auctions, that links increased variance of bidder values to increased information rent. We find that although the conventional wisdom does indeed hold in their (1986) model of a linear contract auction, this relationship is an artifact of that particular model and cannot be generalized. Using Samuelson's (1987) model, which is similar but allows for unobservable costs, we show that increased variance does not always imply increased information rent. Finally, we give the appropriate measure of dispersion (different from variance) that provides the link …
Wage Bargaining Under The National Labor Relations Act, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen
Wage Bargaining Under The National Labor Relations Act, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen
Jesse A. Schwartz
Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibit the management of a firm from unilaterally increasing the wage during contract negotiations without the union's approval. We show how the management can strategically increase the wage during negotiations without violating the NLRA. Increasing the wage during negotiations will upset the union's incentive to strike and decrease the union's bargaining power, thereby shrinking the set of equilibrium contracts in the firm's favor. Indeed, as the union becomes more patient, the set of equilibrium wages converges to the best equilibrium outcome to the firm.
Dominant Strategy Implementation With A Convex Product Space Of Valuations, Katherine Cuff, Sunghoon Hong, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen, John Weymark
Dominant Strategy Implementation With A Convex Product Space Of Valuations, Katherine Cuff, Sunghoon Hong, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen, John Weymark
Jesse A. Schwartz
A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for every individual i and every choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation graph have nonnegative length for every integer k ≥ 2. Saks and Yu (Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC'05), pp 286-293, 2005) have shown that when the number of outcomes is finite and i's valuation type space is convex, nonnegativity of the length of all 2-cycles is sufficient for the nonnegativity of the length of all k-cycles. In this article, it is …
Wage Negotiation Under Good Faith Bargaining, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen
Wage Negotiation Under Good Faith Bargaining, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen
Jesse A. Schwartz
We study the wage negotiation model of Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) under the "Good Faith Bargaining" (GFB) rule, where a party may not demand more than it has previously demanded. The GFB rule significantly restricts feasible strategies, but at the same time, makes the game non-stationary and the analysis complicated. We introduce a state-dependent backward induction that generalizes Shaked and Sutton (1984) to characterize the equilibrium payoffs. We find that the GFB rule eliminates the union's credibility to strike. Without the strikes, the union's strategic opportunities during disagreement disappear, so that there is a unique …
Intangible Investments And The Pricing Of Corporate Sga Expenses, Rongbing Huang, Gim S. Seow, Joe S. Shangguan
Intangible Investments And The Pricing Of Corporate Sga Expenses, Rongbing Huang, Gim S. Seow, Joe S. Shangguan
Rongbing Huang
This study examined whether the market fully prices the reported Selling, General, and Administrative (SGA) expenses when this item includes an intangible investment component. For a sample of intangible investment-intensive firms, we showed that their SGA expenses benefit future operating performances. Evidence suggests some degree of market inefficiency in the pricing of SGA expenses and the intangible investment component. Furthermore, the financial analysts do not appear to appreciate fully the future benefits of the component in their earnings forecasts. Finally, the pertinent disclosures in firms’ annual reports are so inadequate as to attenuate the market mispricing, suggesting a significant room …