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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Analyzing Performance Skewness In Public Agencies: The Case Of Urban Mass Transit, Herman L. Boschken
Analyzing Performance Skewness In Public Agencies: The Case Of Urban Mass Transit, Herman L. Boschken
Herman L. Boschken
Previous studies of public organizational performance have focused mostly on operating efficiency, without dealing with the complex accountability problems associated with plural public interests. The fact that an agency exhibits multiple and often paradoxical performances has not been of comparable concern. This failure to account for performance in a multiple-constituencies context has led to a narrow view of how well agencies do. To broaden the research on agency performance, a multiple-constituencies model is introduced and tested for statistically significant variances. The findings confirm the model's robustness in structuring a dependent variable for empirical research on why agencies perform toward different …
Trends In Foreign Direct Investment, Karl P. Sauvant
Trends In Foreign Direct Investment, Karl P. Sauvant
Karl P. Sauvant
No abstract provided.
High Profile Athlete Endorsements Vs Doping In Sports, Yanni D. Afthinos, Terry Furst
High Profile Athlete Endorsements Vs Doping In Sports, Yanni D. Afthinos, Terry Furst
Yanni D Afthinos
No abstract provided.
From Libertarianism To Egalitarianism, Justin Schwartz
From Libertarianism To Egalitarianism, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
A standard natural rights argument for libertarianism is based on the labor theory of property: the idea that I own my self and my labor, and so if I "mix" my own labor with something previously unowned or to which I have a have a right, I come to own the thing with which I have mixed by labor. This initially intuitively attractive idea is at the basis of the theories of property and the role of government of John Locke and Robert Nozick. Locke saw and Nozick agreed that fairness to others requires a proviso: that I leave "enough …
Gender And The Relationship Between Perceived Fairness Of Pay/Promotion And Job Satisfaction
Gender And The Relationship Between Perceived Fairness Of Pay/Promotion And Job Satisfaction
L. A. Witt
No abstract provided.
Strikes And Holdouts In Wage Bargaining: Theory And Data, Peter Cramton, Joseph Tracy
Strikes And Holdouts In Wage Bargaining: Theory And Data, Peter Cramton, Joseph Tracy
Peter Cramton
We develop a private-information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm’s willingness to pay. Previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike. Yet a prominent feature of U.S. collective bargaining is the holdout: negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired. Production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract. We analyze the union’s decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity. Strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment.
Strategic Delay In Bargaining With Two-Sided Uncertainty, Peter Cramton
Strategic Delay In Bargaining With Two-Sided Uncertainty, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
The role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite-horizon alternating-offer model of bargaining. A buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object. Both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly. An equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by delaying prior to making an offer. A bargainer expecting large gains from trade is more impatient than one expecting small gains, and hence makes concessions earlier on. Trade occurs whenever gains from trade exist, but due to the private …