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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Selected Works

Ted C Bergstrom

Hamilton's rule

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Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Evolution Of Social Behavior: Individual And Group Selection, Ted Bergstrom Dec 2001

Evolution Of Social Behavior: Individual And Group Selection, Ted Bergstrom

Ted C Bergstrom

How selfish does our evolutionary history suggest that humans will be? We explore models in which groups are formed and dissolved and where reproduction of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. If groups are formed ``randomly'' and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multi-person prisoners' dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models exist in which ``group selection'' sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity, and punishment-based group norms.


On The Evolution Of Altruistic Ethical Rules For Siblings, Ted Bergstrom Feb 1995

On The Evolution Of Altruistic Ethical Rules For Siblings, Ted Bergstrom

Ted C Bergstrom

This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends biologists' kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. It shows that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a "semi-Kantian" utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists invasion by dominant and also by recessive mutants. (JEL C70, D10, D63)