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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
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- Dispute resolution (Law) (2)
- Investments (2)
- Treaties (2)
- World Trade Organization (2)
- Actions and defenses (1)
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- Adaptability (Psychology) (1)
- Arbitration (Administrative law) (1)
- Communication (1)
- Consensus (Social sciences) (1)
- Decision making (1)
- Executive power (1)
- Foreign investments (1)
- Foreign investments--Law and legislation (1)
- Foreign trade regulation (1)
- Investments--Law and legislation (1)
- Remedies (Law) (1)
- Reputation (1)
- Sanctions (Law) (1)
- United States. Congress (1)
- Well-being (1)
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Differentiating Among International Investment Disputes, Julie A. Maupin
Differentiating Among International Investment Disputes, Julie A. Maupin
Faculty Scholarship
Can investor-state arbitration tribunals, which exercise jurisdiction over limited claims involving discrete parties, render awards that deliver individualized justice while also promoting systemic fairness, predictability and coherence? The answer, I argue, is a qualified yes – provided that the methods employed are tailored to the particular characteristics of each dispute. Using three well-known investment arbitrations as case studies, I illustrate that investor-state disputes vary widely in terms of their socio-legal, territorial, and political impacts. Significant variances along these three dimensions call for a differentiated approach to investor-state dispute resolution. I outline what such an approach might look like and analyze …
Supplying Compliance: Why And When The United States Complies With Wto Rulings, Rachel Brewster, Adam Chilton
Supplying Compliance: Why And When The United States Complies With Wto Rulings, Rachel Brewster, Adam Chilton
Faculty Scholarship
In studies of compliance with international law, the focus is usually on the “demand side” – that is, how to increase the pressure on the state to comply. Less attention has been paid, however, to the consequences of the “supply side” – who within the state is responsible for the compliance. This Article is the first study to systematically address the issue of how different actors within the United States government alter national policy in response to the violations of international law. The Article does so by examining cases initiated under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). …
Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, Rachel Brewster
Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, Rachel Brewster
Faculty Scholarship
The conventional wisdom in international law is that dispute resolution institutions sharpen the reputational costs to states. This article challenges this understanding by examining how the inclusion of dispute resolution tribunals and remedy regimes can alter reputational analysis by shifting the audience¹s understanding of how mandatory a treaty's substantive obligations are. Drawing on the distinction between prices and sanctions, this article contests the assumption that the introduction of a remedy regime in international agreements will regularly increase compliance with the treaty¹s substantive terms. Instead, some remedy regimes may 'price' deviations from the treaty¹s terms and thereby facilitate breaches of the …
Making Talk Cheap (And Problems Easy): How Legal And Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Nicholas Weller
Making Talk Cheap (And Problems Easy): How Legal And Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Nicholas Weller
Faculty Scholarship
In many legal, political, and social settings, people must reach a consensus before particular outcomes can be achieved and failing to reach a consensus may be costly. In this article, we present a theory and conduct experiments that take into account the costs associated with communicating, as well as the difficulty of the decisions that groups make. We find that when there is even a small cost (relative to the potential benefit) associated with sending information to others and/or listening, groups are much less likely to reach a consensus, primarily because they are less willing to communicate with one another. …
Describing The Effect Of Adaptation On Settlement, John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, Jonathan Masur
Describing The Effect Of Adaptation On Settlement, John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, Jonathan Masur
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.