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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Communication And Conflict, Mara Olekalns, Linda Putnam, Laurie Weingart
Communication And Conflict, Mara Olekalns, Linda Putnam, Laurie Weingart
Mara Olekalns
Communication is central to the experience and management of conflict. It is through communication that people express their desires, realize differences, and attempt to resolve those differences. While there is a rich tradition of research on conflict in organizational settings, the focus on the role communication is more recent. In 1987, Putnam and Poole wrote one of the first reviews of this literature, noting that “communication constitutes the essence of conflict in that it undergirds the formation of opposing issues, frames perceptions of the felt conflict, translates emotions and perceptions into conflict behaviors, and sets the stage for future conflicts” …
The Relational Foundations Of Strategic Choice In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith
The Relational Foundations Of Strategic Choice In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith
Mara Olekalns
Representing negotiations as social exchanges highlights negotiators’ implicit obligations to honor exchanges and the risk that they will fail to do so. Based on their representation of the underlying relationship, negotiators are oriented to one of four relational risks (failures in reliability, predictability, benevolence or integrity). The salience of a specific relational risk shifts negotiators’ strategic focus and elicits a distinct strategic cluster (deterrence, co-ordination, obligation, collaboration) aimed at offsetting or neutralizing these relational risks.
Conflicting Social Motives In Negotiating Groups, Laurie Weingart, Jeanne Brett, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith
Conflicting Social Motives In Negotiating Groups, Laurie Weingart, Jeanne Brett, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith
Mara Olekalns
Negotiators’ social motives (cooperative versus individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. This study used multi-level modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators’ social motives and the composition of the group influence group members’ negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5 issue mixed-motive decision making task were videotaped, transcribed, and coded. Group composition included two homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and three heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators/1 individualist; 2 cooperators/2 individualists; 1 cooperator/3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social motive composition of the …
Resolving The Empty Core: Trust As A Determinant Of Outcomes In Three-Party Negotiations, Mara Olekalns, Feyona Lau, Philip Smith
Resolving The Empty Core: Trust As A Determinant Of Outcomes In Three-Party Negotiations, Mara Olekalns, Feyona Lau, Philip Smith
Mara Olekalns
This research examined how trust affected resource allocation in a 3-party negotiation. Negotiators were presented with an empty core problem in which their theoretical share of resources exceeded the resources available for distribution. We tested which of three components of trust – reliability, predictability and empathy – predicted negotiators’ outcomes. We distinguished between absolute and relative trust. We found that relative trust was a more consistent predictor of individual outcomes than absolute trust and that the most trusted party in a network obtained the highest individual outcomes. This finding highlights the importance of social context in shaping trust judgements. The …
Loose With The Truth: Predicting Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith
Loose With The Truth: Predicting Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith
Mara Olekalns
Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the actor, target, and situation affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties (indifference issue). We found support for an opportunistic betrayal model of deception: deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent, trustworthy and as having integrity. Negotiators’ goals also affected the use of deception. Individualistic, cooperative and mixed dyads responded differently to information about the other party’s trustworthiness, benevolence and integrity when deciding to either misrepresent or leverage their indifference issue. Mixed dyads displayed opportunistic …