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Articles 1 - 18 of 18
Full-Text Articles in Physics
High Consequence Scenarios For North Korean Atmospheric Nuclear Tests With Policy Recommendations For The U.S. Government, Thomas S. Popik, Jordan T. Kearns, George H. Baker Iii, Henry F. Cooper, William R. Harris
High Consequence Scenarios For North Korean Atmospheric Nuclear Tests With Policy Recommendations For The U.S. Government, Thomas S. Popik, Jordan T. Kearns, George H. Baker Iii, Henry F. Cooper, William R. Harris
George H Baker
The government of North Korea has declared high-altitude EMP-capability to be a “strategic goal” and has also threatened an atmospheric test of a hydrogen bomb. Atmospheric nuclear tests have the potential to cripple satellites and the undersea cable networks critical to communication, and navigation necessary for trans-Pacific trade among the U.S., China, and other nations. When a nuclear warhead is detonated at high altitude, a series of electromagnetic pulses radiate downward within the line of sight of the blast. These pulses can disable equipment with miniature electronics and long conductors. Electric grid controls and transmission systems are especially vulnerable. Intense …
Damage Analysis Modified Trac Computer Program (Damtrac), George H. Baker Iii, Alan D. Mcnutt, G. Bradford Shea, David M. Rubenstein
Damage Analysis Modified Trac Computer Program (Damtrac), George H. Baker Iii, Alan D. Mcnutt, G. Bradford Shea, David M. Rubenstein
George H Baker
A computer program tailored for EMP damage analysis of solid-state circuitry has been developed by modifying the existing TRAC network analysis program. Modification of the TRAC diode and transistor models to include breakdown parameters and the addition of a semiconductor device parameter library have greatly simplified the analyst's task. An added feature is a subroutine that automatically calculates the amplitude and duration of transient power dissipated in electronic circuit components.
Evolution And Rationale For United States Department Of Defense Electromagnetic Pulse Protection Standard, George H. Baker Iii
Evolution And Rationale For United States Department Of Defense Electromagnetic Pulse Protection Standard, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
The United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) protection standard offers a solid basis for protecting commercial communication, data, and control facilities. Because of the standard’s shielded barrier and test requirements, it is not surprising that there is a strong temptation within industry and government to dismiss the MIL-STD 188-125 approach in favor of less rigorous protection methods. It is important to understand that US DoD EMP protection standard for fixed facilities, MIL-STD-188-125, reflects an evolution by trial and error that spanned a period of decades beginning with the acquisition of the Minuteman Missile System in the …
Proposal For A Dod Combined Battlefield Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Initiative, George H. Baker Iii
Proposal For A Dod Combined Battlefield Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Initiative, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
The presentation emphasizes the growing importance of electromagnetic survivability and compatibility. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the clear military advantage provided by sophisticated electronic weapon and communication systems. In addition, the offensive tactic of taking out the enemy's eyes and ears during the air war paid off, giving our military decisive air superiority. The lessons for the future are clear. High-tech electronics now so dominates the battlefield that the outcome of future conflicts could well be decided by electronics attrition rather than human casualties. Our Desert Storm experience thus accentuates the importance of guaranteeing that our electronic systems will not be …
Testimony Of Dr. George H. Baker, Senior Advisor To The Congressional Emp Commission, George H. Baker Iii
Testimony Of Dr. George H. Baker, Senior Advisor To The Congressional Emp Commission, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
This is the script of testimony before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. It offers a vision for a future in which our electric power systems will be able to operate through or quickly recover from catastrophic failure due to electromagnetic pulse (EMP), cyber, and physical attacks. The scope of the term ‘EMP’ used in this testimony includes both naturally occurring solar storms and the more energetic man-made EMP hazards. The vision has been discussed with members of the electric power industry, and prominent EMP/cyber/physical protection advocates who find it to be supportable and actionable. The nature of EMP, cyber, and …
Emp And Geomagnetic Storm Protection Of Critical Infrastructure, George H. Baker Iii
Emp And Geomagnetic Storm Protection Of Critical Infrastructure, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
EMP and solar storm wide geographic coverage and ubiquitous system effects beg the question of “Where to begin?” with protection efforts. Thus, in addressing these “wide area electromagnetic (EM) effects,” we must be clever in deciding where to invest limited resources. Based on simple risk analysis, the electric power and communication infrastructures emerge as the highest priority for EM protection. Programs focused on these highest risk infrastructures will go a long way in lessoning societal impact. Given the national scope of the effects, such programs must be coordinated at the national level but implemented at local level. Because wide-area EM …
Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii
Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
Two electromagnetic phenomena have the potential to create continental-scale disasters. The first, nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP), results from a nuclear detonation high above the tropopause. The second, a major solar storm, or "solar tsunami" occurs naturally when an intense wave of charged particles from the sun perturbs the earth's magnetic field. Both phenomena can debilitate electrical and electronic systems necessary for the operation of infrastructure systems and services. One reason why a U.S. protection program has yet to be initiated is that policy makers continue to wrestle with the question of where to begin, given the Department of Homeland Security’s …
Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Protection Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii
Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Protection Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack has provided a compelling case for protecting civilian infrastructure against the effects of EMP. As with protecting infrastructure against any hazard, it will be important to take a risk-based priority approach for EMP, recognizing that it is fiscally impracticable to protect everything. In this regard, EMP is particularly challenging in that it interferes with electrical and electronic data, control, transmission, and communication systems organic to nearly all infrastructures in a simultaneous and wide-scale manner. And, for nuclear burst altitudes of 100s of kilometers, the exposed geography …
Emp: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii
Emp: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
A nuclear detonation at altitudes from about 30 to 500 kilometers generates a strong electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that propagates to points on the ground within the line-of-sight of the burst. For bursts above 100 kilometers, electronics can be affected over continental scale areas. The EMP induces large voltages and currents in antennas and cables of electronic systems that will upset operation or damage circuit components if protection measures are not present. The article provides a brief tutorial on EMP environments, effects and protection.
High Power Electromagnetic Weapons: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii
High Power Electromagnetic Weapons: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
High power electromagnetic weapons, also referred to as high power radiofrequency (HPRF) weapons, are a type of directed energy weapons. The system effects of high power electromagnetic environments are well recognized by world scientific and military communities. Former CIA Director John Deutch has said that, "the electron is the ultimate precision-guided weapon." In the course of the investigation ofnuclear EMP effects on electronics during the Cold War period, it became evident that garden variety, unprotected electronics would malfunction, in some cases burn out, in the presence of electromagnetic fields in the hundreds to thousands of volts per meter. The EMP …
Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle
Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle
George H Baker
Because the operation and control of most critical infrastructures are highly dependent on electronics, it is important to understand the vulnerability of those electronics to intentional electromagnetic interference (EMI). The possibility of interference using readily available consumer devices is a particular concern. We investigated the feasibility and effectiveness of using compact stun guns to intentionally interfere with electronic systems. Test articles included individual computers and computers networked through a central hub. 60KV and 600KV devices were used in the experiments. Results indicate that stun guns are effective in disabling digital electronic systems.
Report Of The Commission To Assess The Threat To The United States From Emp Attack: Critical National Infrastructures, William R. Graham
Report Of The Commission To Assess The Threat To The United States From Emp Attack: Critical National Infrastructures, William R. Graham
George H Baker
The physical and social fabric of the United States is sustained by a system of systems; a complex and dynamic network of interlocking and interdependent infrastructures (“critical national infrastructures”) whose harmonious functioning enables the myriad actions, transactions, and information flow that undergird the orderly conduct of civil society in this country. The vulnerability of these frastructures to threats — deliberate, accidental, and acts of nature — is the focus of greatly heightened concern in the current era, a process accelerated by the events of 9/11 and recent hurricanes, including Katrina and Rita. This report presents the results of the Commission’s …
Cascading Infrastructure Failures: Avoidance And Response, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
Cascading Infrastructure Failures: Avoidance And Response, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
George H Baker
No critical infrastructure is self-sufficient. The complexity inherent in the interdependent nature of infrastructure systems complicates planning and preparedness for system failures. Recent wide-scale disruption of infrastructure on the Gulf Coast due to weather, and in the Northeast due to electric power network failures, dramatically illustrate the problems associated with mitigating cascading effects and responding to cascading infrastructure failures once they have occurred.
The major challenge associated with preparedness for cascading failures is that they transcend system, corporate, and political boundaries and necessitate coordination among multiple, disparate experts and authorities. This symposium brought together concerned communities including government and industry …
Mil-Std-188-125-2, High-Altitude Emp Protection For Transportable Systems
Mil-Std-188-125-2, High-Altitude Emp Protection For Transportable Systems
George H Baker
This standard establishes minimum requirements and design objectives for high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) hardening of transportable1 ground-based systems that perform critical, time-urgent command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) missions. Systems required to fully comply with the provisions of the standard will be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Military Department Headquarters, or a Major Command.
The standard prescribes minimum performance requirements for low-risk protection from mission-aborting damage or upset due to HEMP threat environments. The standard also addresses minimum testing requirements for demonstrating that prescribed performance has been achieved and for verifying that the installed protection measures …
A Unified Topological Approach To Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker, J. Philip Castillo, Edward F. Vance
A Unified Topological Approach To Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker, J. Philip Castillo, Edward F. Vance
George H Baker
The presentation recommends an approach for unifying electronic system protection designs for a wide spectrum of electromagnetic environments. A general electromagnetic topological construct is developed as the basis for a consistent shielding and terminal protection methodology. Spectral characteristics of multiple interfering electromagnetic sources, both internal and external, are described. Effects addressed include EMI/EMC, lightning, nuclear EMP, and RF weapons. Protection practices for individual effects are discussed and means for integrating these into a single protection topology.
Nuclear Emp Hardening Approach As The Basis For Unified Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker Iii
Nuclear Emp Hardening Approach As The Basis For Unified Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated the clear military advantage that was provided by our sophisticated electronic C4I and weapons systems. High tech means so dominate the battlefield that the outcome of future conflicts could be decided by electronics attrition rather than human casualties. However, the electromagnetic threat landscape is highly complex. The already formidable list of environments (EMI, lighting, ESD, EMP, HERO, TEMPEST, EW, etc.) is lengthened by emerging threats from high power microwave (HPM) and ultra-wide band (UWB) electromagnetic weapons. Many of these environments overlap in the frequency and amplitude of the electrical stresses they create.
The large number of …
Electro-Optics Applications For Alleviating Emi/Emc/Emp Problems, George H. Baker, Walter H. Hardwick
Electro-Optics Applications For Alleviating Emi/Emc/Emp Problems, George H. Baker, Walter H. Hardwick
George H Baker
No abstract provided.
Emp Analysis Of An Fm Communications Radio With A Long Wire Antenna, George H. Baker Iii, Werner J. Stark
Emp Analysis Of An Fm Communications Radio With A Long Wire Antenna, George H. Baker Iii, Werner J. Stark
George H Baker
A Norton equivalent circuit is developed for a long-wire antenna used with a VHF man-pack FM radio exposed to an incident electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The required short-circuit current and antenna impedance are computed by use of a transmission-line model for the antenna, and the computations are compared with measurements of the short-circuit current and antenna impedance. The comparison shows that the transmission-line model for the antenna is adequate for performing a vulnerability analysis of the radio. A network model is developed for a portion of the radio and is used as the load in the Norton equivalent circuit. Load currents …