Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Transnational Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Transnational Law

United States Food Law Update: Shrouded By Election-Year Politics, State Initiatives And Private Lawsuits Fill In The Gaps Created By Congressional And Agency Ossification, A. Bryan Endres, Lisa R. Schlessinger, Rachel Armstrong May 2021

United States Food Law Update: Shrouded By Election-Year Politics, State Initiatives And Private Lawsuits Fill In The Gaps Created By Congressional And Agency Ossification, A. Bryan Endres, Lisa R. Schlessinger, Rachel Armstrong

Journal of Food Law & Policy

Observers of food law in the 2012 presidential election year witnessed a dramatic slowing of federal initiatives-perhaps arising from a desire by both Congress and the administration to avoid upsetting critical constituent groups during a year seemingly dominated by campaigns and endless talking points. For example, Congress failed to take action on a unique compromise between what some had considered mortal enemies-the Humane Society of the United States and United Egg Producers-that would implement a federal animal welfare standard for laying hens in return for abandoning ballot measures in various states. Similarly, the FDA waited until the early days of …


Regulatory Incentive Realignment And The Eu Legal Framework Of Bank Resolution, Andromachi Georgosouli Jan 2016

Regulatory Incentive Realignment And The Eu Legal Framework Of Bank Resolution, Andromachi Georgosouli

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Risks associated with incentive misalignment are liable to seriously jeopardize the effectiveness of bank resolution, when not properly contained. This Article considers the management of misaligned incentives between regulators that are found in a vertical relationship of public governance. Using the EU legal framework of bank resolution as its case study, this Article explores the effectiveness of the quasi-enforcement powers of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and, where relevant, of the European Banking Authority (EBA) as an incentive realignment legal technique. Two principal difficulties are identified: on the one hand, the problematic interinstitutional dynamic of the SRB and the EBA …