Securities Law Commons^™

Sec V. Creditors: Why Sec Civil Enforcement Practice Demonstrates The Need For A Reprioritization Of Securities Fraud Claims In Bankruptcy, Sean Kelly

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Note examines how this tension has motivated the SEC to use receiverships as a preferred vehicle to maximize recovery for defrauded security holders and, in the process, create what amounts to an SEC-run bankruptcy proceeding. The use of these receiverships has triggered a high-stakes race to the courthouse among the SEC and creditors, where mere hours can be the difference between millions in recovery and nothing at all. To end this costly race, this Note proposes a solution that seeks to harmonize securities fraud enforcement with bankruptcy law, which starts with revisiting Bankruptcy Code § 510(b) to reprioritize …

Fraud And Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes Of Action, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

The passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has engendered a significant forum shift in class action securities fraud litigation, from federal to state court. This unintended by-product of the Act has reignited debate over our dual federal-state system of securities regulation and in turn has inspired a discussion as to whether Congress should now preempt state securities fraud causes of action. This article argues that preemption is an appropriate, but not the only, solution to these concerns. To support this argument, this article first traces the history of dual state-federal securities regulation within the context of …

The Pentium Papers: A Case Study Of Collective Institutional Investor Activism In Litigation, Joseph A. Grundfest, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

This article suggests that institutional investors have rational incentives to become more active in the litigation arena, but that the current debate is falsely constrained because it rests on the assumption that institutional investors must participate either by (1) assuming the formal role of lead plaintiff, class representative, or intervenor or, (2) not participating at all. This is a false dichotomy because, as this article demonstrates, institutions have available to them a rich array of flexible, informal, and relatively inexpensive mechanisms by which they can make their views known to litigants and courts alike.

Our hypothesis that institutional investor activism …