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- Activist; Company; Target Controlled Company; Activism; Controlled Companies; Shareholder-Empowering; Shareholder-Empoyerment; Shareholder; Election; Minority Directors; Directors; Principal-Principal; Agency; De jure; De facto; Corporate Governance; Appointment; Board Representation; Institutional Investor; Board Representation; Controller; Non-activist; Shareholder Engagement (1)
- Compliance officer; compliance; enforcement; regulation; regulators; personal liability; protections; whistleblower; whistleblower protections; chief compliance officers; SEC; FinCEN; Dodd-Frank Act; workplace culture; management; organizational governance; chilling effect; retaliation protection; Bank Secrecy Act; BSA; National Society of Compliance Professionals; NSCP; FINRA; CCO; CEO; CFO; non-regulation; Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics; SCCE; Compliance Certification Board; CCB; Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Dodd-Frank 78u-6(h); Digital Realty Trust v. Somers; Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 (1)
- Eastman Dillon & Co. (1)
- Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights (1)
- Inc.; Tellabs (1)
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- Ltd. (1)
- Securities; traders; artificial intelligence; markets; regulation; machine learning; intent; scienter; price manipulation; enforcement action; deep learning; artificial neural networks; ANN; financial modeling; The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; black box; autonomous trading; wash sale; 10(b); SEC; 10(b)-5; 20(a); CFTC; FINRA; broker-dealer; SEC v. Masri; SROs; GAAP; financial reporting; recklessness; circumstantial evidence; misstatements; omissions; Facebook; Rolf v. Blyth (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Compliance Officers: Personal Liability, Protections, And Posture, Jennifer M. Pacella
Compliance Officers: Personal Liability, Protections, And Posture, Jennifer M. Pacella
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
This Symposium Article will explore the evolving nature of the regulatory and enforcement landscape as it pertains to compliance officers, specifically regarding their susceptibility to personal liability. It will examine the posture of compliance officers in three contexts: i) as a possible target for enforcement activity by regulators; ii) as a quasi-professional subject to a current regime of “non-regulation”; and iii) as an employee in need of ample whistleblower protections, each of which create implications for a compliance officer’s risk of personal liability and protections as a constituent of the organization monitored. After considering the current guidance surrounding enforcement activity …
Artificial Intelligence & Artificial Prices: Safeguarding Securities Markets From Manipulation By Non-Human Actors, Daniel W. Slemmer
Artificial Intelligence & Artificial Prices: Safeguarding Securities Markets From Manipulation By Non-Human Actors, Daniel W. Slemmer
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Securities traders are currently competing to use Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) in order to make more profitable decisions in the marketplace. While A.I. provides superior abilities in recognizing market patterns, its complexity can obscure its decision-making process beyond human comprehension. Problematically, the current securities laws prohibiting manipulation of securities prices rest liability for violations on a trader’s intent. In order to prepare for A.I. market participants, both courts and regulators need to accept that human concepts of decision-making will be inadequate in regulating A.I. behavior. However, the wealth of case law in the market manipulation doctrine need not be cast aside. …
Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp
Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Activist campaigns are likely to increasingly target controlled companies. Studies concerning activism at controlled companies focus on shareholder-empowering tools, such as the right to nominate and elect minority directors on the board, as a pathway for limiting the principal-principal agency problem. However, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between de jure and de facto controlled companies. Building on a recent case concerning a leading Italian corporation, this Article analyzes the possible unexpected corporate governance consequences of successful activist intervention at de facto controlled companies, showing that, where minority shareholders are granted the right to appoint directors on …