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2016

Business Organizations Law

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Articles 1 - 30 of 37

Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

The Hostile Poison Pill, A. Christine Hurt Dec 2016

The Hostile Poison Pill, A. Christine Hurt

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, Or Both?, James Fanto Dec 2016

Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, Or Both?, James Fanto

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

This Article poses the basic question that is reflected in its title and that was the subject of the conference where the Article was initially presented: whether technology poses any threats to the mission of compliance and the position of compliance officers, whether it is just another useful tool for them, or whether it is something of both. It begins by explaining the origin of compliance in broker-dealers and investment advisers and its important current position in those firms. It then discusses why compliance officers have always been drawn to technology, particularly to keep up with the business sides of …


The 5th Annual Professor Anthony J. Santoro Business Law Lecture: Enforcing Insider Trading Laws: The Changing Landscape, Stephen L. Cohen, Roger Williams University School Of Law Sep 2016

The 5th Annual Professor Anthony J. Santoro Business Law Lecture: Enforcing Insider Trading Laws: The Changing Landscape, Stephen L. Cohen, Roger Williams University School Of Law

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.


Financial Hospitals: Defending The Fed’S Role As A Market Maker Of Last Resort, José Gabilondo Aug 2016

Financial Hospitals: Defending The Fed’S Role As A Market Maker Of Last Resort, José Gabilondo

José Gabilondo

During the last financial crisis, what should the Federal Reserve (the Fed) have done when lenders stopped making loans, even to borrowers with sterling credit and strong collateral? Because the central bank is the last resort for funding, the conventional answer had been to lend freely at a penalty rate against good collateral, as Walter Bagehot suggested in 1873 about the Bank of England. Acting thus as a lender of last resort, the central bank will keep solvent banks liquid but let insolvent banks go out of business, as they should. The Fed tried this, but when the conventional wisdom …


The Role Of Corporate Governance In Curbing Foreign Corrupt Business Practices, Poonam Puri, Andrew Nichol Jul 2016

The Role Of Corporate Governance In Curbing Foreign Corrupt Business Practices, Poonam Puri, Andrew Nichol

Poonam Puri

The role of corporate and securities laws in addressing foreign corrupt business practices has, to date, received limited consideration. Departing from the substantial literature on the criminal and public law response to international corruption, the authors analyze Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act in comparison with British and American legislation and conclude that the Canadian regime relies too heavily on the use of criminal sanctions and fails to contemplate the role of behaviour modification in its legislative structure. Recognizing that multinational corporations are well placed to identify, expose and prevent corrupt business practices, the authors propose a private law …


The Judicial Role In Extraterritorial Application Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934: Vesco, William A. Aileo Jun 2016

The Judicial Role In Extraterritorial Application Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934: Vesco, William A. Aileo

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


Carrot Or Stick? The Shift From Voluntary To Mandatory Disclosure Of Risk Factors, Karen K. Nelson, Adam C. Pritchard Jun 2016

Carrot Or Stick? The Shift From Voluntary To Mandatory Disclosure Of Risk Factors, Karen K. Nelson, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This study investigates risk factor disclosures, examining both the voluntary, incentive-based disclosure regime provided by the safe harbor provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act as well as the SEC's subsequent mandate of these disclosures. Firms subject to greater litigation risk disclose more risk factors, update the language more from year to year, and use more readable language than firms with lower litigation risk. These differences in the quality of disclosure are pronounced in the voluntary disclosure regime, but converge following the SEC mandate as low-risk firms improved the quality of their risk factor disclosures. Consistent with these findings, …


Keeping Shareholder Activism Alive: A Comparative Approach To Outlawing Dead Hand Proxy Puts In Delaware, Danielle A. Rapaccioli May 2016

Keeping Shareholder Activism Alive: A Comparative Approach To Outlawing Dead Hand Proxy Puts In Delaware, Danielle A. Rapaccioli

Fordham Law Review

Current trends in shareholder activism have brought to light the competing interests of management and stockholders. With a rise in shareholder activism, firms are continuing to include change in control provisions, known as proxy puts, in their debt agreements to counter activist success. Recent litigation regarding the use of these provisions has created a debate as to whether these provisions are valid under Delaware law. Moreover, companies and lending institutions have morphed these provisions into a more restrictive form, known as “dead hand proxy puts.” The controversy analyzed in this Note arises out of the use of dead hand proxy …


A Critique Of Saudi M&A Laws, Mulhim Hamad Almulhim Apr 2016

A Critique Of Saudi M&A Laws, Mulhim Hamad Almulhim

SJD Dissertations

This dissertation aims to elucidate Saudi Arabia’s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) laws. The dissertation studies and analyzes current Saudi M&A laws with reference to comparative models from different countries and provides recommendations to improve the transparency and efficiency of Saudi Arabia’s M&A laws. Such improvements may help companies attempting to conduct M&A activity in Saudi Arabia address certain barriers and difficulties, which may in turn help to stimulate the Saudi Arabian economy.

Saudi Arabia is considered one of the world’s foremost emerging markets. Since Saudi Arabia joined the World Trade Organization, its stock market has been growing quickly, including rapid …


Credit Default Swaps And The Empty Creditor Hypothesis—If It Ain’T Broke, Don’T Fix It, Florian Gamper Apr 2016

Credit Default Swaps And The Empty Creditor Hypothesis—If It Ain’T Broke, Don’T Fix It, Florian Gamper

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

An empty creditor is a creditor who, through the use of derivatives, especially credit default swaps (CDSs), takes a position where she retains the legal rights of a creditor but has little or no economic exposure to a borrower. Thus far, the debate on empty creditors has focused mainly on how the law should react to the perceived problem of empty creditors. The debate also covers the prominent argument that empty creditors violate the underlying corporate law assumption that creditors and shareholders hold their legal rights in proportion to their economic exposure to a company. This article argues that the …


The Conscious Parallelism Of Wolf Packs: Applying The Antitrust Conspiracy Framework To Section 13(D) Activist Group Formation, William R. Tevlin Apr 2016

The Conscious Parallelism Of Wolf Packs: Applying The Antitrust Conspiracy Framework To Section 13(D) Activist Group Formation, William R. Tevlin

Fordham Law Review

Section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires all persons and groups that acquire 5 percent or more of an issuer’s outstanding stock to disclose their holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Whether a group is formed under section 13(d) often is unclear. The legal precedent is ambiguous; courts give more weight to certain forms of circumstantial evidence than others without explaining why. With the substantial increase of hedge fund activism—in particular, the wolf pack tactic—further clarity or uniformity is necessary. A “wolf pack” is a loose association of hedge funds that employs parallel activist strategies toward a target corporation …


Agency Theory As Prophecy: How Boards, Analysts, And Fund Managers Perform Their Roles, Jiwook Jung, Frank Dobbin Mar 2016

Agency Theory As Prophecy: How Boards, Analysts, And Fund Managers Perform Their Roles, Jiwook Jung, Frank Dobbin

Seattle University Law Review

In 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling published a paper reintroducing agency theory that explained how the modern corporation is structured to serve dispersed shareholders. They purported to describe the world as it exists but, in fact, they described a utopia, and their piece was read as a blueprint for that utopia. We take a page from the sociology of knowledge to argue that, in the modern world, economic theories function as prescriptions for behavior as much as they function as descriptions. Economists and management theorists often act as prophets rather than scientists, describing the world not as it is, …


Bringing Continuity To Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law As A Guide To The Asset Categorization Of Bitcoin, Evan Hewitt Mar 2016

Bringing Continuity To Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law As A Guide To The Asset Categorization Of Bitcoin, Evan Hewitt

Seattle University Law Review

This Note will undertake to analyze bitcoin under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)—two important sources of commercial law—to see whether any existing asset categories adequately protect bitcoin’s commercial viability. This Note will demonstrate that although commercial law dictates that bitcoin should—nay must—be regulated as a currency in order to sustain its existence, the very definition of currency seems to preclude that from happening. Therefore, this Note will recommend that we experiment with a new type of asset that receives currency-like treatment, specifically designed for cryptocurrencies, under which bitcoin can be categorized in order to …


Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …


The Role Of Comparative Law In Shaping Corporate Statutory Reforms, Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

The Role Of Comparative Law In Shaping Corporate Statutory Reforms, Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

This Essay discusses how comparative law played and plays a role in the statutory development of corporate laws. The influence of laws of other systems on the development of statutory law is common, explicit, and represents a tradition that accompanied legal reforms since the very beginning of the development of legislation. Focusing on modern corporate law, I argue (but the argument could be extended to many other legal fields) that it is necessary to distinguish two basic ways in which comparative law influences legal reforms in one particular jurisdiction. The first one is through regulatory competition among different systems. In …


Issuing New Shares And Preemptive Rights: A Comparative Analysis, Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Issuing New Shares And Preemptive Rights: A Comparative Analysis, Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

The question of whether the corporate law of Europe and America are converging is still largely unanswered. One fundamental area in which the two systems diverge concerns how they regulate the issuing of new shares, in particular preemptive rights, a problem rarely addressed by comparative corporate law scholars. This essay fills that gap by examining the major comparative differences between the approaches followed on the two sides of the Atlantic, and offers some possible explanations for this divergence.


Experiments In Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform And The Dubious Virtues Of A Market For Rules In The Absence Of Effective Regulatory Competition, Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Experiments In Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform And The Dubious Virtues Of A Market For Rules In The Absence Of Effective Regulatory Competition, Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

The article addresses a sweeping Reform of corporate law which was enacted by the Italian government in 2003 and came into effect on January 1, 2004. The new statutory regulation significantly increases freedom of contract in corporate law, relying on the idea that the development of an efficient market for rules will allow the "natural selection" of the rules that better suit the need of the different stakeholders. Together - and to some extent to compensate for - this greater freedom of contract, new protections for minority shareholders have also been implemented. The reform also imports into the Italian legal …


Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …


Europe's Thirteenth Directive And U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means And Political Economic Ends, Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Europe's Thirteenth Directive And U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means And Political Economic Ends, Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Cross-border acquisitions, especially through hostile takeovers, represent one of the most dramatic consequences of the growing integration, both within Europe, and when considering the economic balance of power between the US and the European industries. This Article focuses on the single most important piece of legislation on European takeover law, the Thirteenth Directive of the European Union on Takeover Regulation, which was approved on April, 21 2004 and must be implemented by Member States before the end of 2006. Passage of the Thirteenth Directive is no minor event. Earlier versions were embroiled in arresting political controversies that generated significant Member …


Economic Crisis And The Integration Of Law And Finance: The Impact Of Volatility Spikes, Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson Mar 2016

Economic Crisis And The Integration Of Law And Finance: The Impact Of Volatility Spikes, Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson

Articles

The 2008 financial crisis raised puzzles important for understanding how the capital market prices common stocks and in turn, for the intersection between law and finance. During the crisis, there was a dramatic five-fold spike, across all industries, in “idiosyncratic risk”—the volatility of individual-firm share prices after adjustment for movements in the market as a whole.

This phenomenon is not limited to the most recent financial crisis. This Article uses an empirical review to show that a dramatic spike in idiosyncratic risk has occurred with every major downturn from the 1920s through the recent financial crisis. It canvasses three possible …


Sec Investigations And Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard Mar 2016

Sec Investigations And Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Using actions with both an SEC investigation and a class action as our baseline, we compare the targeting of SEC-only investigations with class-action-only lawsuits. Looking at measures of information asymmetry, we find that investors in the market perceive greater information asymmetry following the public announcement of the underlying violation for class-action-only lawsuits compared with SEC-only investigations. Turning to sanctions, we find that the incidence of top officer resignation is greater for class-action-only lawsuits relative to SEC-only investigations. Our findings are consistent with the private enforcement targeting disclosure violations at least as precisely as (if not more so than) SEC enforcement.


3(A)(10) Financing: New Predatory Financing Using The Securities Act, Thomas S. Glassman Feb 2016

3(A)(10) Financing: New Predatory Financing Using The Securities Act, Thomas S. Glassman

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The Section 3(a)(10) exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 is meant to exempt securities transactions where a fairness hearing by a judge or government agency’s ruling replaces the usual SEC registration requirements. Recently, there has been a rise in 3(a)(10) financing schemes, where a third party investor, what I call a “3(a)(10) financier,” will offer to purchase the outstanding debts of a company from its creditors in exchange for discounted, and unregistered, shares of stock. In many cases these exchanges are done with no notification to current shareholders whose value falls precipitously when the 3(a)(10) financier begins not only …


Dual-Class Capital Structures: A Legal, Theoretical & Empirical Buy-Side Analysis, Christopher C. Mckinnon Feb 2016

Dual-Class Capital Structures: A Legal, Theoretical & Empirical Buy-Side Analysis, Christopher C. Mckinnon

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

“The advantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of ordinary shareholders. The disadvantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of shareholders.” Issuing dual classes of stock has become hotly debated since two major events transpired in 2014: (1) Facebook acquired WhatsApp for $19 billion and (2) Alibaba chose to list its shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) instead of the Hong Kong Exchange. Because dual-class managers, like those at Facebook and Alibaba, retain a controlling voting block, their decisions are immune from …


The Enduring Legacy Of Modern Efficient Market Theory After Halliburton V. John, Mark Klock Jan 2016

The Enduring Legacy Of Modern Efficient Market Theory After Halliburton V. John, Mark Klock

Georgia Law Review

In 1988 the U.S. Supreme Court approved the fraud on the market theory for securities trading in an efficient market thus enabling securities class action plaintiffs to establish their required reliance element of the case through a rebuttable presumption. Basic v. Levinson held that efficient markets incorporate publicly disseminated information and investors who purchased or sold securities in an efficient market therefore relied on any publicly disseminated misinformation. For more than a quarter century since Basic, the efficient market theory has sustained a barrage of assaults from commentators who object to the use of economic theory in legal decision making …


Dual Class Shares, Katie Bentel, Gabriel Walter Jan 2016

Dual Class Shares, Katie Bentel, Gabriel Walter

Comparative Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

No abstract provided.


Securities Regulation In Germany And The U.S., Marvin Fechner, Travis Tipton Jan 2016

Securities Regulation In Germany And The U.S., Marvin Fechner, Travis Tipton

Comparative Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

No abstract provided.


A Cautionary Look At A Cautionary Doctrine, Andrew W. Fine Jan 2016

A Cautionary Look At A Cautionary Doctrine, Andrew W. Fine

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Optimism is an indispensable element of effective salesmanship. It is therefore quite natural for the directors of public companies to want to optimistically tout the potential long-term benefits of investing in their companies. After all, directors of public companies must be empowered to attract the attention and money of American investors. But what happens if these long-term projections fail to come true? Who is to blame for long-term projections that are simply unrealistic? A doctrine called the “bespeaks caution” doctrine has emerged in order to govern these inquiries, and holds that these optimistic forward-looking statements are legally immunized provided that …


The Challenge Of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisors Act After Seventy-Five Years, Roberta S. Karmel Jan 2016

The Challenge Of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisors Act After Seventy-Five Years, Roberta S. Karmel

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Seventy-five years after its enactment the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 has advanced from a relatively weak statute merely registering advisers with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to a more robust law imposing fiduciary responsibilities on advisers. Over the years, the number of investment advisers and the number of their clients have increased greatly. The SEC therefore has been pressured by Congress to develop a harmonized fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and advisers and also to develop and enforce a greater degree of oversight over the advisory industry. These developments have raised the questions of how to fund such efforts …


Justice Stevens And Securities Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Jason A. Cantone Jan 2016

Justice Stevens And Securities Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Jason A. Cantone

Scholarly Articles

In this Article, we tell the overlooked story of Justice Stevens's important role in Supreme Court securities law decisions. In Part I, where we briefly highlight Stevens's career before his 1975 appointment to the Supreme Court, we observe that we can identify no evident interest in or connection to federal securities law or the securities industry, making his contributions all the more remarkable. The only foreshadowing of his prolific opinion-writing on the subject of securities law was his voluminous writing of opinions, in general, while serving on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This commitment to authoring opinions stemmed, in …


Disciplining Corporate Boards And Debtholders Through Targeted Proxy Access, Michelle M. Harner Jan 2016

Disciplining Corporate Boards And Debtholders Through Targeted Proxy Access, Michelle M. Harner

Indiana Law Journal

Corporate directors committed to a failed business strategy or unduly influenced by the company’s debtholders need a dissenting voice—they need shareholder nominees on the board. This Article examines the biases, conflicts, and external factors that impact board decisions, particularly when a company faces financial distress. It challenges the conventional wisdom that debt disciplines management, and it sug-gests that, in certain circumstances, the company would benefit from having the shareholders’ perspective more actively represented on the board. To that end, the Article proposes a bylaw that would give shareholders the ability to nominate direc-tors upon the occurrence of predefined events. Such …