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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Workers, Information, And Corporate Combinations: The Case For Non-Binding Employee Referenda In Transformative Transactions, Matthew T. Bodie
Workers, Information, And Corporate Combinations: The Case For Non-Binding Employee Referenda In Transformative Transactions, Matthew T. Bodie
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Employees present a curious puzzle for corporate law. The success of a corporation depends on its employees, from the chief executive officer down to the front-line production or service worker. But for the most part, corporate law relegates employees to the sidelines. Perhaps nowhere is this difference as dramatic as in the realm of mergers, acquisitions, and other transformative transactions. Such transactions are usually negotiated at the highest levels of management, approved by the board, and ultimately approved by the shareholders. In contrast, employees at most may be able to bargain about the effects of the merger through union representatives; …
Confusion And Unpredictability In Shareholder Derivative Litigation: The Delaware Courts' Response To Recent Corporate Scandals, Ann M. Scarlett
Confusion And Unpredictability In Shareholder Derivative Litigation: The Delaware Courts' Response To Recent Corporate Scandals, Ann M. Scarlett
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The Delaware courts responded to the recent wave of corporate scandals, exemplified by Enron and WorldCom, by changing their approach to shareholder derivative litigation. This Article analyzes the Delaware courts' response to these scandals and concludes that the courts have created doctrinal confusion and introduced unpredictability into derivative litigation. This Article also analyzes the future negative consequences for shareholders, corporations, directors, investors, and other litigants. Finally, this Article proposes improvements for derivative litigation that may alleviate the confusion and unpredictability created by the Delaware courts' response to the recent scandals.
Mother Jones Meets Gordon Gekko: The Complicated Relationship Between Labor And Private Equity, Matthew T. Bodie
Mother Jones Meets Gordon Gekko: The Complicated Relationship Between Labor And Private Equity, Matthew T. Bodie
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In 2007 private equity firms came under increasing scrutiny for the favorable tax treatment accorded to their fund managers' compensation. Labor, particularly the Service Workers International Union (SEIU), was instrumental in bringing this issue to the attention of the media and the public. However, SEIU's private equity campaign is just one way in which the union is pursuing its primary concern: increasing the ranks of its members. This Article examines the role that the SEIU private equity campaign plays both in the overall debate about private equity taxation as well as the union's negotiations with private equity firms. It argues …
Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, Henry Ordower
Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, Henry Ordower
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Describes and analyzes hedge fund structures in the context of the United States statutes and regulations that inform those structures.
A Better Approach For Balancing Authority And Accountability In Shareholder Derivative Litigation, Ann M. Scarlett
A Better Approach For Balancing Authority And Accountability In Shareholder Derivative Litigation, Ann M. Scarlett
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Corporations present an interesting illustration of the authority versus accountability dilemma. Shareholders elect the directors of the corporation and the law vests those directors with almost unlimited authority to manage the corporation. Yet, shareholders have few effective means for holding directors accountable for their decisions other than through shareholder derivative litigation. In such litigation, the business judgment rule serves as the mechanism by which courts attempt to balance directors' authority to make decisions for the corporation against shareholders' right to hold directors accountable for those decisions.
As this Article discusses, numerous theories exist as to the proper formulation of the …
The False Promise Of One Share, One Vote, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
The False Promise Of One Share, One Vote, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
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Shareholder democracy has blossomed. The once moribund shareholder franchise is now critical in takeover contests, merger decisions, and board oversight. However, the mechanisms of this vote remain largely under theorized. In this Article, we use voting rights and social choice theory to develop a new approach to the corporate franchise. Political democracies typically tie the right to vote to the level of a person's interest in the outcome of the election. Corporate democracies, on the other hand, tend to define the requisite institutional interest quite narrowly, and thus restrict the right to vote to shareholders alone. This restriction has found …