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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Securities Fraud As Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, Robert B. Thompson, Hillary A. Sale
Securities Fraud As Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, Robert B. Thompson, Hillary A. Sale
Vanderbilt Law Review
State law gives corporate managers extremely broad power to direct increasingly large pools of collective business assets. Not surprisingly, economic incentives, norms, markets, and law all work to constrain the breadth of the power and the potential for abuse of what is other people's money.' State corporate law has occupied the center stage in the legal portion of this landscape, with federal securities law playing a supporting role-at least in the academic presentation of the debate. The New Deal's securities legislation eschewed a general federal corporations statute in favor of a more focused federal role emphasizing disclosure and antifraud protections …
Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard
Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard
Other Publications
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-technology industry, accountants, and investment bankers thought that they had been unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based on little more than declines in a company’s stock price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free rein to use the discovery process to troll for evidence to support its claims. Moreover, the high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce companies to settle claims. The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have called …
Too Busy To Mind The Business? Monitoring By Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, Adam C. Pritchard
Too Busy To Mind The Business? Monitoring By Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.