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Comparative and Foreign Law

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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Securities Laws As Foreign Policy, Karen E. Woody Jul 2019

Securities Laws As Foreign Policy, Karen E. Woody

Karen Woody

No abstract provided.


The Regulation Of Insider Trading In The European Community, Manning Gilbert Warren Iii Apr 2019

The Regulation Of Insider Trading In The European Community, Manning Gilbert Warren Iii

Manning G. Warren III

No abstract provided.


Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory Of Law In Market Transition, Robert B. Ahdieh Jun 2018

Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory Of Law In Market Transition, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

Securities markets are commonly assumed to spring forth at the intersection of an adequate supply of, and a healthy demand for, investment capital. In recent years, however, seemingly failed market transitions - the failure of new markets to emerge and of existing markets to evolve - have called this assumption into question. From the developed economies of Germany and Japan to the developing countries of central and eastern Europe, securities markets have exhibited some inability to take root. The failure of U.S. securities markets, and particularly the New York Stock Exchange, to make greater use of computerized trading, communications, and …


Shareholder Exit Signs On Us And Eu Highways, Raluca Papadima Sep 2016

Shareholder Exit Signs On Us And Eu Highways, Raluca Papadima

Raluca Papadima

This article discusses legal exit rights (referred to in the United States as appraisal rights and in civil law Europe as withdrawal rights), in the United States, France and Romania. We selected these three countries because they are representative of strong, average and respectively weak capital markets, with varying levels of shareholder activism and litigation (high, normal and respectively low). Additionally, the selection of these countries enabled us to compare the structure of legal exit rights in the United States and in Europe and, within Europe, between two politically, economically and culturally sister countries (France and Romania) which should be …


Takeover Regulation As A Wolf In Sheep's Clothing: Taking U.K Rules To Continental Europe, Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Takeover Regulation As A Wolf In Sheep's Clothing: Taking U.K Rules To Continental Europe, Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Aesop was an optimist. In his cautionary fable that inspired the famous admonition about wolves in sheep's clothing, the predator intentionally dons a sheep's fleece in order to sneak up on a lamb. His disguise, it turns out, is so effective that he ends up being mistaken for the real thing and killed by another wolf. According to Aesop, even the most effective fraud can turn against its perpetrator, and justice be done. The results are not always so salutary with other clandestine predators, including legal rules that appear aimed at protecting vulnerable groups, but instead provide valuable tools to …


Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …


The Role Of Comparative Law In Shaping Corporate Statutory Reforms, Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

The Role Of Comparative Law In Shaping Corporate Statutory Reforms, Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

This Essay discusses how comparative law played and plays a role in the statutory development of corporate laws. The influence of laws of other systems on the development of statutory law is common, explicit, and represents a tradition that accompanied legal reforms since the very beginning of the development of legislation. Focusing on modern corporate law, I argue (but the argument could be extended to many other legal fields) that it is necessary to distinguish two basic ways in which comparative law influences legal reforms in one particular jurisdiction. The first one is through regulatory competition among different systems. In …


Experiments In Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform And The Dubious Virtues Of A Market For Rules In The Absence Of Effective Regulatory Competition, Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Experiments In Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform And The Dubious Virtues Of A Market For Rules In The Absence Of Effective Regulatory Competition, Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

The article addresses a sweeping Reform of corporate law which was enacted by the Italian government in 2003 and came into effect on January 1, 2004. The new statutory regulation significantly increases freedom of contract in corporate law, relying on the idea that the development of an efficient market for rules will allow the "natural selection" of the rules that better suit the need of the different stakeholders. Together - and to some extent to compensate for - this greater freedom of contract, new protections for minority shareholders have also been implemented. The reform also imports into the Italian legal …


Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …


Europe's Thirteenth Directive And U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means And Political Economic Ends, Marco Ventoruzzo Mar 2016

Europe's Thirteenth Directive And U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means And Political Economic Ends, Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Cross-border acquisitions, especially through hostile takeovers, represent one of the most dramatic consequences of the growing integration, both within Europe, and when considering the economic balance of power between the US and the European industries. This Article focuses on the single most important piece of legislation on European takeover law, the Thirteenth Directive of the European Union on Takeover Regulation, which was approved on April, 21 2004 and must be implemented by Member States before the end of 2006. Passage of the Thirteenth Directive is no minor event. Earlier versions were embroiled in arresting political controversies that generated significant Member …


Legal Transplantation Or Legal Innovation? Equity-Crowdfunding Regulation In Taiwan After Title Iii Of The U.S. Jobs Act, Chang-Hsien Tsai Dec 2015

Legal Transplantation Or Legal Innovation? Equity-Crowdfunding Regulation In Taiwan After Title Iii Of The U.S. Jobs Act, Chang-Hsien Tsai

Chang-hsien (Robert) TSAI

Crowdfunding has caused a worldwide revolution in early-stage startup financing during recent years.  In the United States, the expansion of for-profit crowdfunding platforms to fund small businesses and startups prompted Congress to pass the game-changing law on equity crowdfunding, Title III of the JOBS Act in 2012 (“CROWDFUND Act”).  While its specific rules and regulations as adopted by the SEC takes effect this year, the substance of the JOBS Act as a whole is geared more towards the goal of capital formation, over the historically promoted goal of investor protection.  The use of equity crowdfunding has extended over to Taiwan …


Is Moderation The Highest Virtue? A Comparative Study Of A Middle Way Of Control Transaction Regimes, Yueh-Ping Yang, Pin-Hsien Lee Oct 2015

Is Moderation The Highest Virtue? A Comparative Study Of A Middle Way Of Control Transaction Regimes, Yueh-Ping Yang, Pin-Hsien Lee

Yueh-Ping Yang

Comparative studies of control transaction regimes mostly compare between the Market Rule as adopted in the U.S. and the General Offer Rule ad adopted in European Union, while paying less attention to the Partial Offer Rule, a middle way model adopted in many East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, etc. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by highlighting the Partial Offer Rule adopted in these countries, analyzing this rule’s theoretical foundation and observing its implementation in practice. Our theoretical analyses of the Partial Offer Rule are comprised of two parts. First, by adding …


Law And Finance: The Case Of Stock Market Development In China, Zhong Zhang Dr Aug 2015

Law And Finance: The Case Of Stock Market Development In China, Zhong Zhang Dr

Zhong Zhang Dr

Having grown to one of the largest in the world in just over two decades, the stock market of China is cited as a counterexample to the significance of law for financial market development. A thorough examination of the development of China’s stock market however finds that law is actually critical to sustaining market growth and law did play a role in the growth of the market. On the other hand, the trajectory of development in China is growth first followed by law, and the improvement of law is caused by market growth. The experience of China hence suggests that …


Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang Aug 2015

Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Professor Mark Roe explained that the shareholder wealth maximization norm (“the norm”) is not fit for a country with a (quasi) monopoly, because the norm encourages managers to maximize monopoly rents, to the detriment of the national economy. This Article provides new findings and counter-intuitive arguments as to the tension created by the norm and (quasi) monopoly by exploring three key corporate governance concepts that Roe did not examine—(1) “controlling minority structure” (CMS), where dominant shareholders hold a fractional ownership in their controlled-corporations, (2) “tunneling” (i.e., illicit transfer of corporate wealth to controlling shareholders), and (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). …


Regulatory Effectiveness In Ofcs, Andrew Morriss, Clifford Henson Jul 2015

Regulatory Effectiveness In Ofcs, Andrew Morriss, Clifford Henson

Andrew P. Morriss

The claim that OFCs are lax regulators has two weaknesses. First, it ignores differences between OFCs and onshore jurisdictions that influence the effectiveness of regulatory measures, such as their relative need to protect retail investors and the effectiveness of informal constraints. Second, leading OFCs deploy resources that are comparable to leading onshore jurisdictions by many measures.


Law In Regression? Impacts Of Quantitative Research On Law And Regulation, David C. Donald Dec 2014

Law In Regression? Impacts Of Quantitative Research On Law And Regulation, David C. Donald

David C. Donald

Quantitative research (QR) has undeniably improved the quality of law- and rulemaking, but it can also present risks for these activities. On the one hand, replacing anecdotal assertions regarding behavior or the effects of rules in an area to be regulated with objective, statistical evidence has advanced the quality of regulatory discourse. On the other hand, because the construction of such evidence often depends on bringing the complex realities of both human behavior and rules designed to govern it into simple, quantified variables, QR findings can at times camouflage complexity, masking real problems. Deceptively objective findings can in this way …


Market Collaboration: Finance, Culture, And Ethnography After Neoliberalism, Annelise Riles Dec 2014

Market Collaboration: Finance, Culture, And Ethnography After Neoliberalism, Annelise Riles

Annelise Riles

In the wake of the disasters of March 2011, financial regulators and financial-risk management experts in Japan expressed little hope that much could be done nor did they take great interest in defining possible policy interventions. This curious response to regulatory crisis coincided with a new fascination with culturalist explanations of financial markets, on the one hand, and a resort to what I term “data politics”—a politics of intensified data collection—on the other. In this article, I analyze these developments as being exemplary of a new regulatory moment characterized by a loss of faith in both free market regulation and …


Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang Jan 2014

Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Unfair self-dealing and expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder are common business practices in developing countries (“bad-law countries”). Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, there are many questions unanswered in relation to behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. For example, a puzzle is that some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries voluntarily extract minority shareholders less than other controlling shareholders. Applying Mancur Olson’s framework of political theory of “banditry” to the context of corporate governance, this Article proposes that there are at least two categories of controlling shareholders. “Roving controllers” are dominant shareholders with …


Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang Jul 2013

Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

According to conventional corporate governance scholarship, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions where minority shareholders are not well protected by controlling shareholders’ expropriation. However, Professor Ronald Gilson raises a critical point against the conventional view; if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do we observe any minority shareholders at all in such “bad-law” countries? One possible reason is that in response to controlling shareholders’ expropriation, minority shareholders discount severely shares that corporations issue. Then, a related question is: if it is true, why do some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries have many …


The Regulation Of U.S. Money Market Funds: Lessons From Europe, Latoya C. Brown Jan 2013

The Regulation Of U.S. Money Market Funds: Lessons From Europe, Latoya C. Brown

Latoya C. Brown, Esq.

The recent financial crisis challenged long held perceptions of money market funds (“MMFs”) as stable and highly liquid instruments. Regulators in the US and in Europe now seek to impose additional rules on MMFs to avoid another significant failure as happened to the Reserve Fund. In the US, the debate is drawing even more media attention as question of which regulatory body - such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treasury Department, and the Financial Stability Oversight Council – should lead the way has taken interesting twists and turns. This paper examines primary reform options being proposed in the …


The Resolution Of The Structured Notes Fiasco In Hong Kong, Singapore, And Taiwan, Christopher Chao-Hung Chen Dec 2012

The Resolution Of The Structured Notes Fiasco In Hong Kong, Singapore, And Taiwan, Christopher Chao-Hung Chen

Christopher Chao-hung CHEN

This article argues that alternative dispute resolution is not a panacea for settling massive investor complaints. Regulators must create clear and effective conduct of business rules and strengthen the contractual composition of structured products to give investors a better chance of recovering their investments in an event such as Lehman’s collapse.


La Experiencia Chilena Disuadiendo Ilícitos Corporativos, Diego G. Pardow Oct 2012

La Experiencia Chilena Disuadiendo Ilícitos Corporativos, Diego G. Pardow

Diego G. Pardow

This paper analyzes the investigations on potential misconducts conducted by the Chilean public enforcer (Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, “SVS”) between 1990 and 2012. The evidence reveals two groups of problems: on the one hand, the SVS has leaved a substantial region of the market unmonitored; on the other hand, the level of specific deterrence is generally low and relies greatly on indirect mechanisms of punishment. Such results suggest that future reforms should facili- tate private enforcement on both the extensive and the intensive margin. Whereas improving the performance of the SVS on the extensive margin should mitigate its monitoring …


What Should We Expect From The Dodd-Frank Bounty Program?, Diego G. Pardow Jul 2012

What Should We Expect From The Dodd-Frank Bounty Program?, Diego G. Pardow

Diego G. Pardow

Among other changes, the Dodd–Frank bounty program substantially increases the size of the rewards. The supporters argue that the program should encourage more players to step in, whereas the critics claim that it would only increase less reliable whistleblowers. This note describes the economic reasoning behind the dispute, attempting to build a reasonable expectation in light of the available empirical data. Although most of the evidence from previous bounty programs sides with the supporter’s theory, it has to be considered that the quantity and quality of whistleblower reporting are not the only relevant factors. Whistleblowers play a key role diversifying …


The Alternative Forms Of Dispute Settlement And The Essential Difference Between These And Arbitration, Michael Diathesopoulos Mar 2012

The Alternative Forms Of Dispute Settlement And The Essential Difference Between These And Arbitration, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

The paper examines the characteristics of some common alternative forms of dispute settlement and their key differences from arbitration regarding their nature and scope. Its purpose is to explore each mechanism's suitability for specific types of disputes.


Threats Escalate: Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, Lawrence J. Trautman Jan 2012

Threats Escalate: Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

In a previous publication The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, (with Kara Altenbaumer-Price) we examined: The IT Governance Institute’s Executive Summary and Framework for Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 4.1 (COBIT®); reviewed the Weill and Ross Corporate and Key Asset Governance Framework; and observed “that in a survey of audit executives and board members, 58 percent believed that their corporate employees had little to no understanding of how to assess risk.” We further described the new SEC rules on risk management; Congressional action on cyber security; legal basis for director’s duties and responsibilities relative to IT governance; …


The Uncertainty Of “True Sale” Analysis In Originator Bankruptcy, Stephen P. Hoffman Jan 2012

The Uncertainty Of “True Sale” Analysis In Originator Bankruptcy, Stephen P. Hoffman

Stephen P. Hoffman

While much of law is complex or unclear, it is unusual for a judge to comment that a legal doctrine is so unsettled that courts “could flip a coin” to decide an issue. Unfortunately for practitioners, determining what constitutes a “true sale” for bankruptcy purposes is such an issue. Add to this the recent novel and innovative processes of structured finance and asset-backed securitization, and you have the stuff of law students’—and corporate counsels’—nightmares. As a result, courts and legislatures need to provide clarity in this area so that originators can safely structure investments and transactions, not only for the …


Globalization Of Securities Enforcement: A Shift Toward Enhanced Regulatory Intensity In Brazil’S Capital Market?, Eugenio J. Cárdenas Jan 2012

Globalization Of Securities Enforcement: A Shift Toward Enhanced Regulatory Intensity In Brazil’S Capital Market?, Eugenio J. Cárdenas

Eugenio J. Cárdenas

This Paper, written for the “Globalization of the United States Litigation Model” symposium at Brooklyn Law School (October 21, 2011), inquires on whether emerging capital markets are shifting toward enhanced regulatory intensity in the enforcement of their securities laws, under the context of global legal convergence. It ventures into this puzzle of globalization, corporate law enforcement, and financial development, in light of the increasing phenomenon of regulatory convergence and international cooperation among securities regulators, in the realm of capital market surveillance and enforcement.

Focus is placed on the emerging Latin American region, namely Brazil’s securities market. The study explores Brazil’s …


The Economic Theory Of Derivative Actions, Diego G. Pardow Oct 2011

The Economic Theory Of Derivative Actions, Diego G. Pardow

Diego G. Pardow

This paper offers a model to formalize the economic theory of derivative actions developed during the last 30 years. From this perspective, the derivative action presents two interrelated problems. The first is how to solve the collective action problem that prevents that minority shareholders file a suit. The second is how to control the risk of collusive settlements between the defendant manager and the plaintiff’s attorney. This model identifies the fundamental tradeoffs that are implicit in these problems, as well as an optimum that could be used as normative benchmark. In brief, it argues that if the goal of derivative …


Ownership Unbundling In European Energy Market & Legal Problems Under Eu Law, Michael Diathesopoulos Sep 2011

Ownership Unbundling In European Energy Market & Legal Problems Under Eu Law, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

In this paper we will examine the issue of ownership unbundling and forced divestiture remedies imposed in a series of recent competition law cases of the energy market - examined in other papers - in relation to the possible existence of a series of legal obstacles. These energy market decisions belong to a group of antitrust cases in which a structural divestiture remedy has been imposed under the provisions of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. This divestiture refers to transmission networks and to generation capacity and is meant to lead to severe structural changes, which are compatible with the findings …


Recuperação De Empresas Viáveis Em Dificuldades: Prevenção E Preservação De Valor [Restructuring Distressed Viable Business Entities: Prevention And Value Preservation], Bruno Ferreira Aug 2011

Recuperação De Empresas Viáveis Em Dificuldades: Prevenção E Preservação De Valor [Restructuring Distressed Viable Business Entities: Prevention And Value Preservation], Bruno Ferreira

Bruno Ferreira

No abstract provided.