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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Accusers As Adjudicators In Agency Enforcement Proceedings, Andrew N. Vollmer
Accusers As Adjudicators In Agency Enforcement Proceedings, Andrew N. Vollmer
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Largely because of the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Withrow v. Larkin, the accepted view for decades has been that a federal administrative agency does not violate the Due Process Clause by combining the functions of investigating, charging, and then resolving allegations that a person violated the law. Many federal agencies have this structure, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission.
In 2016, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania, a judicial disqualification case that, without addressing administrative agencies, nonetheless raises a substantial question about one aspect of the combination of functions at agencies. …
The Two Faces Of Janus: The Jurisprudential Past And New Beginning Of Rule 10b-5, John Patrick Clayton
The Two Faces Of Janus: The Jurisprudential Past And New Beginning Of Rule 10b-5, John Patrick Clayton
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and its implementing Rule 10b-5 are the primary antifraud provisions for both private and public enforcement of the federal securities laws. Neither the statute nor the rule expressly provides for a private right of action, but federal courts have long recognized such an implied right, and the Securities and Exchange Commission has supported the implied private right of action as a “necessary supplement” to its own efforts. However, after a decade of applying an expansive interpretation to Section 10(b), in the early 1970s the U.S. Supreme Court began to narrowly interpret this implied …
Corruption And The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Of 1977, Fredric Bryan Lesser
Corruption And The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Of 1977, Fredric Bryan Lesser
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This article first discusses the business activities and competing interests which prompted congressional action. Part II analyzes the FCPA and attempts to solve the ambiguities inherent in the criminalization provisions, thereby clarifying which activities are proscribed by the FCPA and what is meant by the Act's corruption requirement. Finally, Part III examines the possibilities for multinational agreements prohibiting bribery.