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Articles 1 - 30 of 41
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
The Sec's Spac Solution, Karen Woody, Lidia Kurganova
The Sec's Spac Solution, Karen Woody, Lidia Kurganova
Scholarly Articles
The SPAC craze has ebbed and flowed over the past few years, creating fortunes and ruining others. The SEC stepped into the mix in 2022 and proposed rules governing SPACs. The proposed rules artfully balance the interests of investor protection while retaining some of the featured characteristics of SPACs as innovative ways to take companies public. This Article details the history of SPACs, including their benefits and risks, and analyzes the SEC’s proposed rules, arguing that the SEC is well within its Congressional authority to regulate SPACs, and that the proposed rules are both well-tailored and necessary.
Temporary Securities Regulation, Anita K. Krug
Temporary Securities Regulation, Anita K. Krug
Washington and Lee Law Review
In times of crisis, including during the 2020–2021 global pandemic, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has engaged in a type of securities regulation that few scholars have acknowledged, let alone evaluated. Specifically, during recent market crises, the SEC adopted rules that are temporary, designed to help the securities markets and their participants— both public companies and public investment funds, such as mutual funds and ETFs—weather the crisis at hand but go no further. Once that goal has been accomplished, these rules usually expire, replaced by the permanent rules that they temporarily supplanted. Although the temporary-rulemaking endeavor is laudable—and …
Profiting From Our Pain: Privileged Access To Social Impact Investing, Cary Martin Shelby
Profiting From Our Pain: Privileged Access To Social Impact Investing, Cary Martin Shelby
Scholarly Articles
Social impacting investing has become the latest trend to permeate the financial markets. With massive anticipated funding gaps for sustainable development goals, and a millennial-driven thirst for doing good while doing well, this trend is likely to continue in the coming decades. This burgeoning industry is poised to experience yet an additional boost, since it provides an alternative mechanism for private actors to “profit from our pain,” particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Black Lives Matter movement.
As to be expected, the law has not sufficiently adapted to this new wave of innovation. Scholars have thus …
Real Insider Trading, Michael A. Perino
Real Insider Trading, Michael A. Perino
Washington and Lee Law Review
In popular rhetoric, insider trading cases are about leveling the playing field between elite market participants and ordinary investors. Academic critiques vary. Some depict an untethered insider trading doctrine that enforcers use to expand their power and enhance their discretion. Others see enforcers beset with agency cost problems who bring predominantly simple, easily resolved cases to create the veneer of vigorous enforcement. The debate has, to this point, been based mostly on anecdote and conjecture rather than empirical evidence. This Article addresses that gap by collecting extensive data on 465 individual defendants in civil, criminal, and administrative actions to assess …
The Independent Board As Shield, Gregory H. Shill
The Independent Board As Shield, Gregory H. Shill
Washington and Lee Law Review
The fiduciary duty of loyalty bars CEOs and other executives from managing companies for personal gain. In the modern public corporation, this restriction is reinforced by a pair of institutions: the independent board of directors and the business judgment rule. In isolation, each structure arguably promotes manager fidelity to shareholder interests—but together, they enable manager prioritization. This marks a particularly striking turn for the independent board. Its origin story and raison d’être lie in protecting shareholders from opportunism by managers, but it functions as a shield for managers instead.
Numerous defects in the design and practice of the independent board …
Adversarial Failure, Benjamin P. Edwards
Adversarial Failure, Benjamin P. Edwards
Washington and Lee Law Review
Investors, industry firms, and regulators all rely on vital public records to assess risk and evaluate securities industry personnel. Despite the information’s importance, an arbitration-facilitated expungement process now regularly deletes these public records. Often, these arbitrations recommend that public information be deleted without any true adversary ever providing any critical scrutiny to the requests. In essence, poorly informed arbitrators facilitate removing public information out of public databases. Interventions aimed at surfacing information may yield better informed decisions. Although similar problems have emerged in other contexts when adversarial systems break down, the expungement process to purge information about financial professionals provides …
Boards In Information Governance, Faith Stevelman, Sarah C. Haan
Boards In Information Governance, Faith Stevelman, Sarah C. Haan
Scholarly Articles
This Article focuses on the evolving role of boards of directors. It charts the decline of the two leading, twentieth-century conceptual frameworks shaping corporate boards’ roles: agency cost theory, which produced the limited “monitoring board,” and “separate realms” theory, which ceded board responsibility for matters other than profit maximization to government regulation. Hedge fund activism and wild stock market swings have exposed the limits of the board’s role in agency cost theory. The 2020 pandemic, economic crises, investors’ demands for socially responsible stewardship, and corporations’ own political activism have rendered separate realms thinking untenable.
Although much theorizing in corporate law …
Social Activism Through Shareholder Activism, Lisa M. Fairfax
Social Activism Through Shareholder Activism, Lisa M. Fairfax
Washington and Lee Law Review
This article is based on the author's keynote address at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.
In 1952, the SEC altered the shareholder proposal rule to exclude proposals made “primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.” The SEC did not reference civil rights activist James Peck or otherwise acknowledge that its actions were prompted by Peck’s 1951 shareholder proposal to Greyhound for desegregating seating. Instead, the SEC indicated that its change simply reflected a codification …
Chancery’S Greatest Decision: Historical Insights On Civil Rights And The Future Of Shareholder Activism, Omari Scott Simmons
Chancery’S Greatest Decision: Historical Insights On Civil Rights And The Future Of Shareholder Activism, Omari Scott Simmons
Washington and Lee Law Review
This article builds upon the author's remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.
Shareholder activism—using an equity stake in a corporation to influence management—has become a popular tool to effectuate social change in the twenty-first century. Increasingly, activists are looking beyond financial performance to demand better corporate performance in such areas as economic inequality, civil rights, human rights, discrimination, and diversity. These efforts take many forms: publicity campaigns, litigation, proxy battles, shareholder resolutions, and negotiations with corporate management. However, a consensus on …
From Public Policy To Materiality: Non-Financial Reporting, Shareholder Engagement, And Rule 14a-8’S Ordinary Business Exception, Virginia Harper Ho
From Public Policy To Materiality: Non-Financial Reporting, Shareholder Engagement, And Rule 14a-8’S Ordinary Business Exception, Virginia Harper Ho
Washington and Lee Law Review
This article builds upon the author's remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.
In 2017, shareholder proposals urging corporate boards to report on their climate-related risk made headlines when they earned majority support from investors at ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum, and PPL. The key to this historic vote was the support of Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard, which broke with management and cast their votes behind the proposals. The 2018 proxy season saw several more climate-related proposals earn majority support, and in 2018 …
How Did We Get Here? Dissecting The Hedge Fund Conundrum Through An Institutional Theory Lens, Cary Martin Shelby
How Did We Get Here? Dissecting The Hedge Fund Conundrum Through An Institutional Theory Lens, Cary Martin Shelby
Scholarly Articles
This article dissects both the origins and resulting harms of what the author terms the "hedge fund conundrum," in which institutional investors, such as pension plans and endowments, have consistently increased hedge fund allocations over the past decade despite pervasive evidence of excessive fees and subpar returns. It then utilizes an historical institutionalist lens to examine how lawmakers may have enabled a conundrum of this magnitude. By and large, this phenomenon is a symptom of regulatory loopholes that have permitted the private hedge fund market to increase in "publicness" through its expanding access and subsequent harm to retail investors. Such …
Myth Of The Attorney Whistleblower, Carliss N. Chatman
Myth Of The Attorney Whistleblower, Carliss N. Chatman
Scholarly Articles
Notwithstanding the political grandstanding and legal regimes put in place to prevent the next Enron, this article explores whether attorney whistleblower provisions provided in the Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer and in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are effective. When faced with attorney involvement in Enron, Congress passed § 307 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (Sarbanes), which required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to amend its standards governing the conduct of attorneys practicing before the SEC. In response, the SEC and the American Bar Association …
Justice Stevens And Securities Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Jason A. Cantone
Justice Stevens And Securities Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Jason A. Cantone
Scholarly Articles
In this Article, we tell the overlooked story of Justice Stevens's important role in Supreme Court securities law decisions. In Part I, where we briefly highlight Stevens's career before his 1975 appointment to the Supreme Court, we observe that we can identify no evident interest in or connection to federal securities law or the securities industry, making his contributions all the more remarkable. The only foreshadowing of his prolific opinion-writing on the subject of securities law was his voluminous writing of opinions, in general, while serving on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This commitment to authoring opinions stemmed, in …
Docket Dividends: Growth In Shareholder Litigation Leads To Refinements In Chancery Procedures, Donald F. Parsons Jr., Jason S. Tyler
Docket Dividends: Growth In Shareholder Litigation Leads To Refinements In Chancery Procedures, Donald F. Parsons Jr., Jason S. Tyler
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Contingent Capital In Executive Compensation, Wulf A. Kaal
Contingent Capital In Executive Compensation, Wulf A. Kaal
Washington and Lee Law Review
Contingent capital has great potential to improve corporate governance in Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in executive compensation. The proposal adds an important element to the literature on inside debt and the creditor-centered approach to executive compensation. Contingent convertible bonds with early triggers could be preferable to other debt instruments because, in addition to lowering income inequality and increasing sustainability, the early trigger design can improve incentives for executives …
Gender And Securities Law In The Supreme Court, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Michelle Harner, Jason A. Cantone
Gender And Securities Law In The Supreme Court, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Michelle Harner, Jason A. Cantone
Scholarly Articles
The 2010 appointment of Elena Kagan to the United States Supreme Court meant that, for the first time, three female justices would serve together on that court. Less clear is whether Justice Kagan’s gender will really matter in how she votes as a justice. This question is an especially visible aspect of a larger issue: do female judges display gendered voting patterns in the cases that come before them?
This article makes a novel contribution to the growing literature on female voting patterns. We investigated whether female justices on the United States Supreme Court voted differently than, or otherwise influenced, …
"Patient Capital": Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, Jack B. Jacobs
"Patient Capital": Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, Jack B. Jacobs
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Citizens United And Forced Speech: Why Protecting The Dissenting Shareholder Necessitates Disclosure Of Corporate Political Expenditures After Citizens United V. Fec, Sabina Bunt Thaler
Citizens United And Forced Speech: Why Protecting The Dissenting Shareholder Necessitates Disclosure Of Corporate Political Expenditures After Citizens United V. Fec, Sabina Bunt Thaler
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
No abstract provided.
Corporate Governance Reform In A Time Of Crisis, Christopher M. Bruner
Corporate Governance Reform In A Time Of Crisis, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Articles
In this article I argue that crisis-driven corporate governance reform efforts in the United States and the United Kingdom that aim to empower shareholders are misguided, and offer an explanation of why policymakers in each country have reacted to the financial crisis as they have. I first discuss the risk incentives of shareholders and managers in financial firms, and examine how excessive leverage and risk-taking in pursuit of short-term returns for shareholders led to the crisis. I then describe the far greater power and centrality that U.K. shareholders have historically possessed relative to their U.S. counterparts, and explore historical and …
Option Backdating And Its Implications, Jesse M. Fried
Option Backdating And Its Implications, Jesse M. Fried
Washington and Lee Law Review
Thousands of U.S. companies appear to have secretly backdated stock options. This Article analyzes three forms of secret option backdating: (1) the backdating of executives' option grants; (2) the backdating of nonexecutive employees' option grants; and (3) the backdating of executives' option exercises. It shows that each type of backdating less likely reflects arm's length contracting than a desire to inflate and camouflage executive pay. Secret backdating thus provides further evidence that pay arrangements have been shaped by executives' influence over their boards. The fact that so many firms continued to secretly backdate after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in blatant violation …
Comment: Corporate Governance And The "D-Word", Thomas W. Joo
Comment: Corporate Governance And The "D-Word", Thomas W. Joo
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Separation Of Ownership And Control In Modem Corporations: Shareholder Democracy Or Shareholder Republic? A Commentary On Dalia Tsuk Mitchell's Shareholders As Proxies. The Contours Of Shareholder Democracy, Lucas E. Morel
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Shareholders As Proxies: The Contours Of Shareholder Democracy, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell
Shareholders As Proxies: The Contours Of Shareholder Democracy, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Take It Slow: A Novel Concept In The Life Of Sarbanes-Oxley, D. Skylar Rosenbloom
Take It Slow: A Novel Concept In The Life Of Sarbanes-Oxley, D. Skylar Rosenbloom
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Modern Partnership Interests As Securities: The Effect Of Rupa, Rulpa, And Llp Statutes On Investment Contract Analysis, James B. Porter
Modern Partnership Interests As Securities: The Effect Of Rupa, Rulpa, And Llp Statutes On Investment Contract Analysis, James B. Porter
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Form And Substance In The Definition Of A "Security": The Case Of Limited Liability Companies, Larry E. Ribstein
Form And Substance In The Definition Of A "Security": The Case Of Limited Liability Companies, Larry E. Ribstein
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Case Beyond Time, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
The Case Beyond Time, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Scholarly Articles
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.' treats several important questions that arise in connection with hostile corporate takeovers. At the same time, it leaves three critical issues unanswered. In this article, we first briefly describe what the Time decision did, comparing Chancellor William Allen's somewhat discursive Chancery Court opinion with the more peremptory ruling of the Supreme Court. Next, we identify three unarticulated but potentially far-reaching implications of both the Supreme Court's and Chancellor Allen's reasoning that threaten to destabilize seemingly settled doctrine governing the conduct of target company management.
Iii. Corporate & Securities Law
Vii. Corporate & Securities Law
Virginia's Affiliated Transactions Article: The Death Of Two-Tiered Takeovers In Virginia?
Virginia's Affiliated Transactions Article: The Death Of Two-Tiered Takeovers In Virginia?
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.