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Articles 1 - 30 of 30
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Introduction To Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds And Private Equity, Economics And Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
Introduction To Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds And Private Equity, Economics And Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
All Faculty Scholarship
The increase in institutional ownership of recent decades has been accompanied by an enhanced role played by institutions in monitoring companies’ corporate governance behaviour. Activist hedge funds and private equity firms have achieved a degree of success in actively shaping the business plans of target firms. They may be characterized as pursuing a common goal – in the words used in the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, both seek ‘to increase the market value of their pooled capital through active engagement with individual public companies. This engagement may include demands for changes in management, the composition of the board, …
A Transactional Genealogy Of Scandal: From Michael Milken To Enron To Goldman Sachs, William W. Bratton, Adam J. Levitin
A Transactional Genealogy Of Scandal: From Michael Milken To Enron To Goldman Sachs, William W. Bratton, Adam J. Levitin
All Faculty Scholarship
Three scandals have reshaped business regulation over the past thirty years: the securities fraud prosecution of Michael Milken in 1988, the Enron implosion of 2001, and the Goldman Sachs “ABACUS” enforcement action of 2010. The scandals have always been seen as unrelated. This Article highlights a previously unnoticed transactional affinity tying these scandals together—a deal structure known as the synthetic collateralized debt obligation involving the use of a special purpose entity (“SPE”). The SPE is a new and widely used form of corporate alter ego designed to undertake transactions for its creator’s accounting and regulatory benefit.
The SPE remains mysterious …
The Destructive Ambiguity Of Federal Proxy Access, Jill E. Fisch
The Destructive Ambiguity Of Federal Proxy Access, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
After almost seventy years of debate, on August 25, 2010, the SEC adopted a federal proxy access rule. This Article examines the new rule and concludes that, despite the prolonged rule-making effort, the new rule is ambiguous in its application and unlikely to increase shareholder input into the composition of corporate boards. More troubling is the SEC’s ambiguous justification for its rule which is neither grounded in state law nor premised on a normative vision of the appropriate role of shareholder nominations in corporate governance. Although the federal proxy access rule drew an unprecedented number of comment letters and is …
The Political Economy Of Fraud On The Market, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
The Political Economy Of Fraud On The Market, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Insignificance Of Proxy Access, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
The Insignificance Of Proxy Access, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
The Modern Corporation and Private Property highlighted the evolving separation of ownership and control in the public corporation and the effects of that separation on the allocation of power within the corporation. This essay explores the implications of intermediation for those themes. The article observes that intermediation, by decoupling economic ownership and decision-making authority within the shareholder, creates a second layer of agency issues beyond those identified by Berle and Means. These agency issues are an important consideration in the current debate over shareholder empowerment. The article concludes by considering the hypothetical shareholder construct implicit in the Berle and Means …
The Power Of Proxy Advisors: Myth Or Reality?, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan
The Power Of Proxy Advisors: Myth Or Reality?, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan
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Recent regulatory changes increasing shareholder voting authority have focused attention on the role of proxy advisors. In particular, greater shareholder empowerment raises the question of how much proxy advisors influence voting outcomes.
This Article analyzes the significance of voting recommendations issued by four proxy advisory firms in connection with uncontested director elections. We find, consistent with press reports, that Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is the most powerful proxy advisor and that, of the others, only Glass, Lewis & Co. seems to have a meaningful impact on shareholder voting. This Article also attempts to measure the impact of voting recommendations on …
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Director Elections And The Role Of Proxy Advisors, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan
Director Elections And The Role Of Proxy Advisors, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan
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Using a dataset of proxy recommendations and voting results for uncontested director elections from 2005 and 2006 at S&P 1500 companies, we examine how advisors make their recommendations. Of the four firms we study, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Proxy Governance (PGI), Glass Lewis (GL), and Egan Jones (EJ), ISS has the largest market share and is widely regarded as the most influential. We find that the four proxy advisory firms differ substantially from each other both in their willingness to issue a withhold recommendation and in the factors that affect their recommendation. It is not clear that these differences, or …
Embattled Ceos, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Embattled Ceos, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
In this paper, we argue that chief executive officers of publicly-held corporations in the United States are losing power to their boards of directors and to their shareholders. This loss of power is recent (say, since 2000) and gradual, but nevertheless represents a significant move away from the imperial CEO who was surrounded by a hand-picked board and lethargic shareholders. After discussing the concept of power and its dimensions, we document the causes and symptoms of the decline in CEO power in several areas: share ownership composition and shareholder activism; governance rules and the board response to shareholder activism; regulatory …
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
The Hanging Chads Of Corporate Voting, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
The Hanging Chads Of Corporate Voting, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
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Never has voting been more important in corporate law. With greater activism among shareholders and the shift from plurality to majority voting for directors, the number of close votes is rising. But is the basic technology of corporate voting adequate to the task? In this Article, we first examine the incredibly complicated system of US corporate voting, a complexity that is driven by the underlying custodial ownership structure, by dispersed ownership and large trading volumes, and by the rise in short-selling and derivatives. We identify three ways in which things predictably go wrong: pathologies of complexity; pathologies of ownership; and …
Measuring Efficiency In Corporate Law: The Role Of Shareholder Primacy, Jill E. Fisch
Measuring Efficiency In Corporate Law: The Role Of Shareholder Primacy, Jill E. Fisch
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The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth. Law and economics scholars have incorporated the shareholder primacy norm into their empirical analyses of regulatory efficiency. An increasingly influential body of scholarship uses empirical methodology to evaluate legal rules that allocate power within the corporation. By embracing the shareholder primacy norm, empirical scholars offer normative assessments about regulatory choices based on the effect of legal rules on measures of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits, and Tobin’s Q.
This Article challenges the foundations of using the shareholder primacy norm to judge corporate …
Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, And The Volatile Shareholder Interest, William W. Bratton
Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, And The Volatile Shareholder Interest, William W. Bratton
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No abstract provided.
The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
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The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.
Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen
Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen
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Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.
This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the actors …
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Islands Of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, And The Self-Governing Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Islands Of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, And The Self-Governing Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Understanding Lockups: Effects In Bankruptcy And The Market For Corporate Control, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
Understanding Lockups: Effects In Bankruptcy And The Market For Corporate Control, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
All Faculty Scholarship
The article investigates the effects of lockups, devices used to compensate unsuccessful bidders. Lockups are relevant in contexts in which sales have auction-like characteristics. Bankruptcy and the market for corporate control are two such situations, since the governing legal regimes prevent sales from being swiftly consummated and require sellers to take the most favorable offer that emerges during the waiting period. Existing scholarship has considered lockups in both areas. The analysis of lockups in the market for corporate control is fairly well developed. This article shows that it is importantly incomplete because it fails both to distinguish between ex ante …
Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, Jill E. Fisch
Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Waiting For The Omelet To Set: Match-Specific Assets And Minority Oppression In The Close Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Waiting For The Omelet To Set: Match-Specific Assets And Minority Oppression In The Close Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Can Internet Offerings Bridge The Small Business Capital Barrier?, Jill E. Fisch
Can Internet Offerings Bridge The Small Business Capital Barrier?, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
Internet technology offers the potential to reduce the search and information costs associated with capital formation. Commentators have suggested that the Web will enable small business to achieve better access to the capital markets. To facilitate this access, they have suggested regulatory reforms to make internet offerings cheaper and easier. At the same time, small business offerings have been identified as among the most risky, offering a caution to those who counsel regulatory reform. This article examines the existing regulatory climate. State and federal regulators have adopted a number of recent reforms to facilitate the use of the internet and …
Dividends, Noncontractibility, And Corporate Law, William W. Bratton
Dividends, Noncontractibility, And Corporate Law, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Some Corporate And Securities Law Perspectives On Student-Athletes And The Ncaa, David A. Skeel Jr.
Some Corporate And Securities Law Perspectives On Student-Athletes And The Ncaa, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, And Corporate Self-Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Prof
Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, And Corporate Self-Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Prof
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Controlling The Dark Side Of Relational Investing, Edward B. Rock
Controlling The Dark Side Of Relational Investing, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, Jill E. Fisch
Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Markets, Courts, And The Brave New World Of Bankruptcy Theory, David A. Skeel Jr.
Markets, Courts, And The Brave New World Of Bankruptcy Theory, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Logic And (Uncertain) Significance Of Institutional Shareholder Activism, Edward B. Rock
The Logic And (Uncertain) Significance Of Institutional Shareholder Activism, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.