Securities Law Commons^™

Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch

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Regulators responded to the analyst scandals of the late 1990s by imposing extensive new rules on the research industry. These rules include a requirement forcing financial firms to separate investment banking operations from research. Regulators argued, with questionable empirical support, that the reforms were necessary to eliminate analyst conflicts of interest and ensure the integrity of sell-side research.

By eliminating investment banking revenues as a source for funding research, the reforms have had substantial effects. Research coverage of small issuers has been dramatically reduced—the vast majority of small capitalization firms now have no coverage at all. The market for research …

Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, Jill E. Fisch

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No abstract provided.

Regulatory Responses To Investor Irrationality: The Case Of The Research Analyst, Jill E. Fisch

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An extensive body of behavioral economics literature suggests that investors do not behave with perfect rationality. Instead, investors are subject to a variety of biases that may cause them to react inappropriately to information. The policy challenge posed by this observation is to identify the appropriate response to investor irrationality. In particular, should regulators attempt to protect investors from bad investment decisions that may be the result of irrational behavior?

This Article considers the appropriate regulatory response to investor irrationality within the concrete context of the research analyst. Many commentators have argued that analyst conflicts of interest led to biased …

Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch

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No abstract provided.

Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard

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When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 (“PSLRA”), the Act’s “lead plaintiff” provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel’s compensation.

Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors—pension funds, mutual …

The New Federal Regulation Of Corporate Governance, Jill E. Fisch

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No abstract provided.

Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen

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Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.

This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the actors …

The Securities Analyst As Agent: Rethinking The Regulation Of Analysts, Jill E. Fisch, Hillary A. Sale

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Recent press has highlighted shocking examples of bias, self-dealing, and inaccuracy in the behavior of the securities analyst. Critics have attributed the bubble and subsequent crash in the technology sector to analyst hype and posited that undue analyst optimism contributed to scandals such as Enron. After many years of minimal regulator oversight analysts are now the subject of extensive regulatory reform proposals, including a mandate in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requiring that the Securities and Exchange Commission adopt a variety of restrictions on analyst behavior.

Despite the media attention, there have been few attempts to conceptualize carefully the analyst's …

Aggregation, Auctions, And Other Developments In The Selection Of Lead Counsel Under The Pslra, Jill E. Fisch

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No abstract provided.

From Legitimacy To Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, Jill E. Fisch

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On October 16, 1992, after a comprehensive review of its system of proxy regulation and after two separate amendment proposals that drew more than 1700 letters of comment from the public, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission" or the "SEC") voted to reform the federal proxy rules. The reforms were "intended to facilitate shareholder communications and to enhance informed proxy voting, and to reduce the cost of compliance with the proxy rules for all persons engaged in a proxy solicitation.' The SEC explained the amendments by stating that the rules were "impeding shareholder communication and participation in the corporate …

As Time Goes By: New Questions About The Statute Of Limitations For Rule 10b-5, Jill E. Fisch

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In this Article. Professor Fisch examines the history and legacy of Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberston, the controversial 1991 Supreme Court decision that established a federal statute of limitations for private causes of action brought under Rule 10b-5. In Part I Professor Fisch reviews the history of the 10b-5 statute of limitations prior to LampE Part II then analyzes both the issues resolved and questions raised by Lampf. Part III traces the congressional reaction to Lampf that culminated in the addition of section 27A to the Securities Act of 1934. In Part IV, Professor Fisch concludes by …

Start Making Sense: An Analysis And Proposal For Insider Trading Regulation, Jill E. Fisch

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No abstract provided.

Antitrust And The Market For Corporate Control, Edward B. Rock

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No abstract provided.